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This thesis emphasizes a core concept of the preemptive effect that uniform law may 
have on other domestic norms. It exemplifies the situation in which the laws and principles of 
contracts, particularly the uniform laws and principles formulated for transnational sales, can 
exclude or limit tort liability. This study does not object to the recognition of concurrency of 
claims under contract and tort law. On the contrary, it accepts that the contracting party’s right to 
both contract and tort actions is commonly recognized in many legal systems, especially the 
common law system. Tort liability could be actionable insofar as the actions or words, or even 
their omission, trigger the requirements of tort claims developed in many legal systems. 
However, when the uniform law of contracts interacts with tort laws in disputes arising from 
cross-border transactions, the rules and principles provided under the uniform law, as well as its 
purposes, justifiably give priority to such a unified law, which is considered a part of binding 
contract law. In particular, the doctrine of party autonomy legitimately and considerably 
influences the extent to which the uniform law of contracts affects or modifies liability available 
under tort law.   
Using the relationship between the CISG and US tort law, this thesis illustrates both the 
situation where uniform contract law and domestic tort law govern the matters in question 
concurrently, as well as the circumstances in which the uniform law can be said to be dominant. 
The principal goal of this thesis is to minimize undermining the CISG’s fundamental 
objectives, while reducing the risk of excessive encroachment on the domain of tort law. On one 
hand, this thesis recognizes the importance of the elements of extra-contractual obligation and 
non-contractual interests under tort law, and thus supports the right to parallel tort claims. On the 
other hand, subject to policy concerns under tort law, the CISG’s rules and principles, as well as 
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the contractual terms in a particular case, may have a preemptive force that excludes or modifies 
tortious liability under domestic tort law. In other words, there may be a situation where, because 
of the CISG’s doctrine or policy concerns, tort liability could be excluded or limited by the 
application of the CISG, even without an express CISG exclusivity provision.   
Based on doctrinal perspective and policy concerns, this study adopts the existing 
approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG in determining whether 
and to what extent the CISG has a preemptive effect on domestic tort claims, or whether there is 
a concurrence of a domestic tort claim based on domestic law and a contractual claim based on 
the CISG. The chosen approach recommends that tribunals consider the actual scope of the CISG 
and its purposes to see whether the alleged matter of the tort claim, in essence, falls under its 
scope. If it does, the CISG has a preemptive effect on the alleged matter. As compared to other 
emerging approaches to the CISG’s preemption of a tort remedy, this thesis believes that the 
chosen approach is the most appropriate and convincing solution, which requires careful 
analysis. This is because such a solution accords with both the general obligation to give effect to 
the binding uniform law for international sales, as well as the functions of national tort law in 
regulating extra-contractual conduct and compensating for the loss of extra-contractual interests, 
thereby establishing a proper division of functions between the CISG and tort law. Further, this 
thesis offers opinions on the essential aspects of this approach of acknowledging the substantive 
scope and aims of the CISG to make the renewed approach more convincing. Rules and opinions 
given by this thesis are primarily offered to assist tribunals with uniform application of the 
proposed solution when dealing with the CISG’s preemption and concurrency issues. That is, the 
principle of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope and the policy of attaining its aims are 
the primary notions underlying the preemptive effect of the CISG on tort remedy. From the 
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doctrinal perspective of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope, its preemption issue is 
essentially the problem of the scope of its application, which could be dealt with through the use 
of the mechanisms provided by the CISG. To this effect, it is recommended that tribunals adhere 
to a dynamic method of interpreting the CISG’s provisions, as well as take sales contracts into 
consideration when finding the scope of the CISG’s application to a situation that fully overlaps 
with tort law. Considering the CISG’s goals and adhering to its substantive scope, this thesis 
suggests that the alleged tort claim should be subsumed under the CISG when a fully 
overlapping situation is established in a particular case. Accordingly, the party to a contract 
dispute is barred from relying on tort remedy. Further, in solving the issue of the CISG’s 
preemption of tort remedy, it is important to note that domestic laws play a secondary role, either 
as part of the forum law on characterization or as part of the applicable tort law. In other words, 
the rules on doctrinal characterization and the domestic rules and principles on the right to 
concurrent claims do not have a considerable influence on determining how the CISG interacts 
with tort law.   
Additionally, whenever it appears that the application of the CISG does not preclude the 
alleged tort claim, this thesis suggests modifying the ancillary rules that govern parallel tort 
claims to adhere with the CISG’s protective regulations. Such a modification is suggested as a 
policy concern to prevent circumvention of the CISG’s goals or purposes. Therefore, the 
modification is limited to occasions when concurrent tort claims are closely connected to the 
claim under the CISG. Importantly, such equitable adjustments to tort law may be prohibited, 
depending on the existence of a more highly valued policy underlying tort law, or the recognition 
of tort law’s mandatory character under the relevant tort law system.   
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All in all, although there have been attempts by some jurists and judicial bodies to 
suggest various approaches to solving the problem of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims, this 
study performs in-depth analysis and provides critiques of those existing solutions. This thesis 
also put forth a renewed approach, which facilitates international trade, preserves international 
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Contract and tort are core areas of a general law of obligations, or the essential branches 
of substantive private law which have been developed and applied to disputes in both civil and 
common law systems. Contract law and tort law typically focus on different kinds of 
relationships. The law of contract principally plays a role in facilitating and enforcing contractual 
relationships based on bargained-for exchanges, and in providing remedies to a non-breaching 
party who is in privity of contract. In contrast, tort law primarily regulates wrongful conduct by 
persons generally, and allocates responsibilities and losses in society on a large scale. Since 
tortious liability is imposed by law, rather than by the parties’ consent, it aims to compensate the 
injured person for losses arising from tortious conduct regardless of whether the injured person 
has a contractual relationship with a tortfeasor or not. This explains why some legal treatises 
treat these two subjects distinctly and deal with them separately. Likewise, in an actual dispute, it 
is typical for a plaintiff to assert claims and seek remedies under either a legal theory of contract 
or a theory of tort, but not both. Nevertheless, the existence of a contractual relationship does not 
preclude the application of tort law, and tort law is not restricted to only non-contractual 
relationships. It is legitimate for tort laws to carry out their functions in granting civil protections 
to either consumers1 or businesspersons as parties to a contract, unless the laws governing the 
contract expressly prohibit tortious liabilities. Thus, legal issues arising from a single factual 
situation may involve both private law regimes. The interaction between these two areas gives 
rise to the problem of concurrent liability in contract and tort. In cases presenting such an issue, 
 
1 This thesis does not place the primary focus on particular tort rules, which protect consumers who have 
relatively weaker bargaining power because consumer sales are excluded from the CISG’s substantive 




the division of functions between contract law and tort law is required for parties to ascertain 
their respective rights. This thesis aims to examine the legal issues that arise when both 
contractual and tort claims are asserted simultaneously, leading to an interaction between 
contract law and tort law. Mainly, the focus of this thesis will be on the preemption/concurrency 
issue arising from a situation in which the uniform international contract law and domestic tort 
law are involved, and the two interact with each other in a cross-border transaction, namely 
transnational sales. 
Practically, the legal norms of contract and tort get involved in certain ways, in both 
domestic and international settings. In a domestic setting, some difficulties arise in determining 
the exact nature of a wrongful act, and together with implications of the recognition of a parallel 
tort remedy, these have given rise to complicated legal issues on concurrency. This is why a 
diversity of academic and judicial perspectives dealing with concurrent liabilities has emerged 
within the domestic system. 
When the question of concurrent remedies comes up in a purely domestic contract, the 
question and its respective consequences are dealt with within the particular national system, in 
accordance with its own balance of rules and doctrines on contractual and tortious matters. It is 
not surprising that the approaches to the clarification of the hierarchy or concurrency of claims 
brought in contract and tort are thus primarily based upon the laws stemming from the limited 
borders of a single legal system. Accordingly, the question of whether the parties may be able to 
assert those claims concurrently makes it less difficult to navigate such a situation, which is 
relatively harmless to the interests protected by both laws, which are at the same level under the 
system in question. 
 
 3 
In disputes arising from cross-border contracts, the issue of concurrent claims remains 
prevalent in many kinds of transactions, including transnational sales, contracts of carriage, 
construction contracts, contracts for service, and employment contracts. The issue of concurrent 
claims arising from those cross-border transactions is more complicated than those originating 
from a purely domestic contract. It is because tribunals encounter the conflict-of-law problem in 
locating applicable domestic laws, including (1) laws governing the contractual relationship; (2) 
laws governing tort remedies; and (3) laws governing the issue of concurrent claims. Further, 
when an issue of the right to concurrent claims comes up in particular types of transnational 
contracts such as a sale of goods or a contract of carriage, international law is involved. The 
situation becomes even more complicated then, and could result in unwarranted outcomes. This 
is because the tribunals have already struggled with the transcendence of international uniform 
rules and diversity of applicable domestic tort laws, and subsequently must deal with two 
competing norms that have been independently developed, each with its own distinct objectives. 
When a unified international law on contract is involved in regulating a particular kind of 
contractual relationship, tribunals are bound to apply the uniform rules on remedies for a breach 
of contract, rather than relying on different contract laws. Giving the party free choice of 
concurrent claims may be problematic when tort law has the potential to provide the party with a 
tort remedy that undermines implementation of the unified law. One way to preserve the goal of 
uniformity is to recognize the preemptive power of uniform law by denying or limiting the 
contracting party’s right to rely on tort remedies available under domestic laws. However, an 
overly preemptive reading of the uniform law inevitably places a risk of an unwarranted 
intrusion upon the right to the protections under tort law. 
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Specifically looking at the uniform law for international sales, most countries in the 
trading world ratified, and have been bound by, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (CISG). This creates a high degree of possibility for the CISG to 
govern transnational sales between parties who have their places of business in the different 
Contracting States to the CISG. In practice, a tension between the CISG and domestic tort law is 
frequently raised and disputed among parties to international sales. Such a problem of the right to 
concurrent tort claims available under domestic laws is commonly raised in certain types of sales 
of goods, including: 
(1) A sale of goods to be designed and manufactured by the seller; (2) a contract for 
manufacturing and distributing products; (3) a contract for the sale of goods to be produced 
under the desired model and specifications; (4) a contract where the seller agrees to supply labor 
or other services, such as installing and repairing goods; (5) a contract where the seller agrees to 
furnish goods and operate instructions; (6) a contract in which the seller is asked to arrange for 
carriage of the goods; (7) a contract in which the buyer purchases the goods to resale to his 
customers; and (8) a contract for the sale of goods to be used in the buyer’s business. 
It is agreed that the CISG primarily governs rights and obligations arising from 
contractual relationships between the parties. However, there are still controversies over how the 
CISG and domestic tort laws should interact, particularly when a party needs to rely on tort laws 
for the recovery of damages to properties or economic losses. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to address and clarify the research question of whether, and to 
what extent, the CISG preempts alleged tort claims under domestic laws that would otherwise 
apply to the claims. Answering this question is important for three particular reasons. First, 
regarding the issue of concurrent claims arising from different kinds of cross-border transactions 
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aforementioned, the issue of the CISG’s preemption/concurrency of tort claims continues to 
appear frequently. Secondly, it speaks to the more general question of how and when 
international laws preempt national laws, providing tribunals with an example of that dynamic. 
Thirdly, given that the CISG’s provisions are unclear regarding its preemptive force, it is 
necessary to investigate and provide rational justification for the proposed approach dealing with 
such preemption issues. 
In addressing this research question, the thesis draws and recognizes an important 
distinction between the virtue of the function served by tort law and the merit of the CISG’s 
purposes. On the one hand, the proposed approach to this question must reflect on the vital 
functions of tort remedies, and ensure that a non-breaching party is provided with protections 
that such a party would otherwise have under tort laws against the breaching party’s tortious 
behavior. That is, the CISG would not be applied in a way whereby it severely deprives 
contracting parties of protections that the uniform sale law does not provide. On the other hand, 
it is essential to effectuate the CISG’s purposes of creating uniformity and providing fair and 
balanced protections. That is, a concurrent tort claim should be allowed to the extent that it does 
not undermine the CISG’s fundamental regulatory rules and doctrines. In this regard, the 
approach put forth by this thesis will primarily make an appropriate division of functions 
between the governing law of CISG and the applicable law of tort, creating a balance of the 
competing values. 
In terms of the research methodology, this study adopts a documentary qualitative 
analysis. The study exhaustively investigates the entire system of the CISG, along with its 
methods of interpretation. All relevant documents, including scholarly writings and judicial 
decisions on the interpretation and application of the CISG, mainly when it interacts with the law 
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of torts, are the main focus of the analysis. As for judicial decisions, although this thesis mostly 
focuses on US court decisions, foreign court decisions are also taken into consideration, such as 
those of Canada, Australia, Germany, and Israel. Correspondingly, the US law of torts is 
thoroughly explored and then exemplified as a norm with which the CISG competes. US law and 
jurisdictions are the key focus of the study because this thesis intends to analyze US tort law as 
an illustration to shed light on the justified approach put forth by this study. US tort law serves as 
an example because it consists of several causes of action, resulting in a more holistic analysis. 
Those various tort claims are optimally sufficient for this thesis to examine the context within 
which the variety of tort laws interact with the CISG and analyze the essential aspects of such 
interplay. Importantly, there exist the actual disputes in which a contracting party alleged 
multiple such causes of action alongside contractual claims under the CISG. Another reason is 
that the CISG is likely to govern most international sales relationships involving US business 
parties and their trading partners, who have been engaged in business with NAFTA members.2 
Thus, it is likely that US tribunals have dealt with this common issue of how the CISG interacts 
with the US law of torts. In this event, it is the hope that this research will contribute 
significantly in terms of the proposed approach to the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort 
claims available under US laws. Finally, when the question of the Treaty’s preemption is asked, 
the US principle of federalism, i.e. federal preemption of state law,3 is of considerable interest 
for this thesis. As we realized, the general rule is that “courts must be reluctant in finding federal 
 
2 James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of International Sales, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 273, 314 (1999).  
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the Convention, as a treaty made under the authority of the United 
States, is the “supreme law” of the United States and would prevail over conflicting laws of any state); 
see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 301, 308 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) 
(emphasizing that a treaty as the law of the United States has a preemptive effect on State and local law, 
and the United States’ courts are bound to give effect to such a self-executing international convention). 
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preemption of a subject ‘traditionally governed by state law.’”4 The plain text of federal law 
reflecting a clear and manifest Congress’s preemptive intent is the best evidence to support such 
federal preemption.5 Despite the principle of the federal preemption, tribunals must take 
precautions to ensure that the Treaty does not overly preempt state law beyond Congress’s intent. 
Otherwise, it is possible that such an expansion of the Treaty’s preemptive power might 
unreasonably infringe upon the legislative power reserved to the states in promulgating tort rules 
in order to regulate unlawful conduct and protect injured parties’ interests. 
In light of the requirement for caution in finding federal preemption, the analysis is 
primarily based on a presumption against the CISG’s preemptive effect on matters traditionally 
governed by domestic tort laws. This thesis asserts that the CISG exclusively governs and settles 
the alleged matter of tort in the case at bar only when the fully overlapping situation is 
established. Stated another way, an injured party is permitted to bring any putative tort causes of 
action alongside contractual claims, as long as the tort claim is distinct, or related but separate 
from contractual claims under the CISG. It is then proved in the following chapters that the 
Contracting States’ preemptive intent is presented in case of a fully overlapping situation, where 
the CISG’s rules and principles justify its preemption. In addition, this thesis provides further 
arguments for the CISG’s preemptive force from doctrinal and policy perspectives. Mainly, this 
method of the grounded theory is employed to appraise existing approaches, and to then develop 
theoretical points of view, rules, and opinions, through the lens of the existing approaches 
dealing with the problem of the CISG’s preemption. 
 
4 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 673 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
5 Id. at 673–74. 
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This thesis is divided into six chapters, namely the introduction, four chapters, and a 
conclusion. The specific details of Chapter One to Chapter Four are as follows: 
Chapter One aims to ensure that readers recognize the extent to which domestic tort laws 
are involved in disputes arising from international sales. The chapter begins by making known 
that a party typically brings claims for breach of contract and tortious action against a breaching 
party to attain benefits from generous ancillary rules in tort regarding the prerequisites for, or 
restrictions on, remedies. Subsequently, it thoroughly investigates several tortious actions that 
possibly emanate from the sales contract and are mostly available under the US law of torts. In 
doing so, Chapter One mainly points out the elements of such putative tort causes of action, 
together with the circumstances that make those claims, generally, independent from contractual 
claims under the CISG. Correspondingly, it reflects the necessary functions of tort remedies in 
either regulating unlawful conduct and thus imposing an extra-contractual duty, or protecting a 
non-contractual interest. Additionally, the Chapter presents actual cases under the CISG, where 
an injured party brings, in one suit, both a contractual claim under the CISG and a tort claim 
against the breaching party, as per usual when commencing a lawsuit in a domestic dispute. It is 
then necessary for this thesis to propose and discuss in detail the justified approach to the 
concerns, posed by such close involvement of domestic tort laws, to the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrency. 
Therefore, to answer the main research question, Chapter Two aims to primarily 
determine what the CISG suggests regarding the preemption/concurrency issue. It presents the 
CISG’s essential features, which are connected to, and somewhat guide, the arguments 
concerning the interaction of the CISG and tort laws. 
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Chapter Three examines and discusses existing academic and judicial approaches to this 
question of interaction between the CISG and tort law. As we will see, the CISG’s preemption 
issue deriving from international sales is of considerable interest to many scholars. The issue has 
been discussed among scholars since it became effective6 and binding on the Contracting States. 
Until recently, there have been arguable perspectives on the CISG’s preemption of tort claims. 
This chapter further criticizes those academic and judicial solutions so as to appraise whether 
each of them is theoretically and practically justified, and appropriate for addressing the CISG’s 
preemption of tort remedy. 
Chapter Four seeks to achieve the goals of creating an appropriate division of functions 
between the CISG and tort law, and of establishing legitimate justifications for applying both 
norms to the disputes without fear of the two severely encroaching upon each other. Chapter 
Four proposes developing the compromise approach, which acknowledges the substantive scope 
and aims of the CISG. Further, this Chapter offers opinions on the essential aspects under the 
adopted approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG to make the 
proposed approach more convincing. Rules and opinions given by this thesis are primarily 
offered to assist tribunals with uniform application of the proposed solution when dealing with 
the CISG’s preemption and concurrency issues. This chapter thus performs an analysis and sets 
forth opinions on several aspects including (1) the use of mechanisms existing in the CISG to 
solve the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims; (2) the indication of an inconsistency 
between competing norms; (3) the criteria for considering the establishment of fully overlapping 
situations; (4) the secondary roles of domestic rules and approaches in disputes concerning the 
 
6 The Convention came into force on January 1, 1988. See United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, Texts and Status: International Sale of Goods (CISG) and Related Transactions (Aug. 2, 
2020, 9:25 PM), https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg.   
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CISG’s preemption of tort claims; (5) the legal effect of exculpatory clauses on tort claims; and 
(6) the policy of modifying the ancillary tort rules when a concurrent tort claim is permitted. 
Lastly, this chapter discusses the legal consequences which arise when solving the issue of the 
CISG’s preemption of tort claims raised in a hypothetical case by applying the proposed 




I. THE INVOLVEMENT OF DOMESTIC TORT LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL SALES TRANSACTIONS 
The availability of potential claims, in more than one branch within an international sales 
contract, gives rise to the issue of interaction between the governing laws of the CISG and tort. 
In the majority of such cases, the CISG and the law of torts interact when Article 74 permits the 
contracting party to seek foreseeable consequential damages to other property or economic 
losses, and when tort laws simultaneously confer such a right to the same categories of damages. 
This interplay may lead to the CISG’s preemptive power over tort remedies, or result in a 
concurrence of both contractual and tort claims. Before beginning the exhaustive investigation of 
how the CISG itself, or the scholarly discussions and judicial practices, handle the problem of 
the CISG’s preemption of tort laws, it is essential to explain to what extent domestic tort laws get 
involved in the international sales contract. This chapter discusses the reasons why commercial 
parties to transnational sales prefer to lodge a tort remedy as an alternative, or as an additional 
action, to a contractual claim under the CISG. This chapter then identifies the availability of 
putative claims possibly alleged by the parties under US tort law. After that, it provides 
illustrations of the fact that the party practically proceeds with tort claims arising from, or 
relating to, international trade. Finally, the chapter introduces certain CISG’s regulations and 
protections that commonly interact with an alleged tort claim in practice. Such an explanation 
allows readers to comprehend examples of situations where some rules, especially those 
formulated by the CISG, overlap and compete with the alleged tortious actions. Then, it poses 




A. The Perception of Advantages in a Variety of Aspects Given by the Ancillary Rules in 
Tort 
In disputes at both national and international levels, one contracting party who suffered 
from the other’s breaching conduct is inclined to resort to remedies under tort laws, despite 
retaining the right to compensation under contract law. This is because the aggrieved party 
perceives certain advantages in terms of the compensation granted by tort rules. 
In disputes governed by domestic laws, the reasons for resorting to a remedy under tort 
law along with the remedy under contract law or sale law, are that a contractual claim and a tort 
claim, as a protective device, have considerably different requirements for or restrictions on 
seeking recovery for damages, and they vary in the scope of remedies recoverable.7 Undeniably, 
each legal regime has its own specificities to be considered and applied to the disputed matter. 
However, when the issue of concurrent claims is presented, there are some common areas of the 
ancillary rules which motivate a party to prefer asserting a tort remedy alongside a contractual 
claim. For instance, limitation periods may differ, such that a plaintiff may be barred from 
bringing a claim based on a breach of contract by shorter limitation periods. In contrast, it may 
be possible to rely on a remedy based on tort law, since it sets forth a more extended limitation 
period. Alternatively, an action in a contract may be time-barred because of an earlier start date 
of the limitation period, adopting the occurrence rule.8 Likewise, notification requirements may 
 
7 It should be noted that the issue of a concurrent claim between contract and tort under domestic laws of 
a single system might not be primarily significant in a country whose ancillary rules in contract and tort 
are identical. For example, Korean law regarding the scope of damages is identically applied to a breach 
of contract claim and to a tort action. Accordingly, the injured party might believe that it does not make a 
considerable difference to the benefits gained in terms of the scope of recoverable damages between 
asserting a claim based on contract and resorting to tort remedy. See Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471, 
Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act. No. 14965, Oct. 31, 2017, arts. 393, 763 (S. Kor.). 
8 The statute of limitations frequently states that the start date of the limitation period begins to run when 
the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues. Common law courts develop three different rules, which are the 
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differ as well, since a strict rule of the contract is the notification requirement. For instance, a 
buyer may be barred from asserting a contractual claim for defective goods by domestic sales 
law, such as UCC Article 2, § 607, if he fails to notify a seller of the breach, whereas there is no 
such prerequisite requirement for seeking damages under tort law. And, importantly, there may 
be differences in the extent of rights to the types of damages recoverable. First, as it appears in 
certain legal systems, the right to pure economic loss is generally allowed only in a typical 
breach of contract, while damages for pain and suffering are usually recoverable in tort. It is thus 
said that, from the viewpoint of a contracting party, he will get a greater benefit from tort law, 
which also permits a concurrent tort remedy for economic loss. Secondly, punitive damages are 
generally available by tort law to punish the defendant who acts with malice, but this is not 
typically granted by contract law. Lastly, contract rules regarding the remoteness of damage, 
which grant damages which would have been within the contemplation of the parties, are more 
restricted than those under tort law, which may allow damages insomuch as such damage was 
reasonably foreseeable. Another implication of the exclusion of liability is also taken into 
consideration, since an exculpatory clause is basically permitted and generally valid for 
excluding or limiting contractual liability, while tortious liability cannot be exempted or limited 
so easily. It is thus unsurprising when parties choose to rely on tort remedy, considering that 
there is a possibility of gaining better advantages from tort law, than what parties are given under 
contract law or sale law. In sum, there are a variety of aspects in which domestic contract law 
may be less favorable to plaintiffs, as compared to domestic tort law. 
 
occurrence rule, the damage rule, and the discovery rule, in order to determine what point accrual begins 
at. The courts generally adopt the occurrence rule, which considers the occurrence of the legal violation, 
or the appearance of a breach of contract, to be the date of the commencement for a breach of contract 
action. However, courts also recognized the damage rule, which starts the limitation period for a tort 
claim when the damage occurs. See CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 370, 375–76 (1991). 
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Similarly, there are reasons that contract rules supplied by the CISG may be less 
favorable to plaintiffs than domestic tort law. For example, when the breaching conduct that 
invokes a claim for delivery of non-conforming goods under the CISG simultaneously 
constitutes a breach of tortious duty under domestic law, the buyer is more than willing to 
commence a tort action alongside the CISG claim, because of the advantageous rules in tort. 
Some preferred advantages are that, first, unlike the notification required by Article 39 of the 
CISG, domestic tort law generally grants damages irrespective of whether the buyer gives the 
seller an adequate notice of non-conformity. Secondly, parties may limit or even exclude their 
contractual liability by means of exercising party autonomy under Article 6 of the CISG, but 
such an exculpatory clause is not commonly agreed to beforehand with respect to tortious 
liability, or it is rarely found effective when exempting a party from liability for damage suffered 
from fraud, gross negligence, or reckless conduct. As for the favored rule of the remoteness of 
damage, Article 74 of the CISG limits the extent of recoverable damages to those which are in 
the parties’ contemplation at the time of concluding the contract, whereas national tort law grants 
damages that are reasonably foreseen. Another aspect of the CISG, regarding the exemption of 
liability by law, may be considered as being more detrimental to the contracting party when 
asserting the CISG claim rather than resorting to tort remedy. In explaining, the CISG expressly 
exempts parties from liability or limits liability either because of impediments to performance 
(Article 79), fault attributable to the injured party (Article 80), or the buyer’s awareness of lack 
of conformity at the conclusion of the contract (Article 35(3)). However, these kinds of 
exemptions/limitations of liability are not exactly seen under tort laws of all countries. With a 
few exceptions, there are similar rules adopted by the common law system, particularly the US, 
namely a rule of contributory negligence, as well as a principle of assumption of risk. Such tort 
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rules somewhat provide a higher degree of adverse effects to the injured party, provided that the 
defendant bears the burden of proof of such defenses. That said, the action in tort will preferably 
be brought against a breaching party in the event that the non-breaching party has an interest in 
resorting to domestic laws, especially the separate ancillary rules that govern tort claims and thus 
provide more advantages in compensation as compared to contractual remedies under the 
Convention.9 This is why it is of both theoretical and practical importance to have a justified 
solution to the difficult problem of whether a party can resort to all the protective devices subject 
to the CISG and national law, especially when both norms state different requirements that are in 
conflict with each other. 
B. Tortious Actions Relevant to Contracts for Sales: The Availability of Claims 
This part of the chapter generates the focal discussion on the availability of claims, to 
explain the extent to which tort laws are involved in, and possibly interact with, the CISG’s rules 
governing the relationship between parties to international sales. 
As we will see, the US law of torts provides for a variety of tortious actions relevant to 
sales contracts in order to regulate improper behaviors and protect non-contractual interests. 
Thus, contracting parties have various claims in tort, which they resort to as alternative claims, or 
in addition to an assertion of a contractual claim, under contract law. At the same time, in 
discussing each claim, the following sections will present whether circumstances exist under 
which US tort law denies protecting the interests sought by a contracting party, or whether those 
laws refuse to regulate the behaviors against which the party brings a claim. 
 
9 Markus Müller-Chen, Part III Sale of Goods Chapter II Obligations of the Seller Section III Remedies 
for Breach of Contract by the Seller Article 45, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 720, 732 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016) (ebook). 
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The discussion on the availability of tort claims mainly demonstrates the elements 
required for each claim to be actionable. More importantly, the analysis emphasizes the elements 
that reflect the purpose of imposing extra-contractual duties or protecting non-contractual 
interests. Further, this thesis supposes that the existence of those extra-contractual elements 
arguably considers the putative tort claims as distinct claims, or related but separate claims, 
available under US tort law. Inasmuch as each tort claim is distinct, or related but separate from 
a claim in contract, the contracting party should be permitted to seek recourse in tort remedies, as 
they see appropriate for seeking the protection of rights. 
1. Product Liability 
 Tort theory on product liability recognizes the economic loss doctrine, which originally 
developed in the US legal system. Under the economic loss doctrine, where the commercial 
enterprise sustains only pure economic losses, including losses to the product itself,10 it cannot 
maintain a tort claim for either negligence or strict liability.11 It follows that in a product liability 
case, tort recovery for damages to other property separate from harm a product causes to itself, 
and loss of customers, sales, and profits sustained as a result of breaching conduct is not barred 
by the economic loss doctrine.12 
It is said that damages to other property, in the same position as personal injury, are 
considered non-contractual interests and are particularly protected under tort law on product 
liability. Such a position is supported by the policy underlying product liability actions, which 
 
10 Rem Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 386 Pa. Super. 401, 404 (1989).   
11 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539, 541 (3d Cir. 1997). 
12 Id. at 541–43. 
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protect the public from unsafe products that go beyond the protection provided by contract law.13 
This thesis thus takes the view that the interest of safety in life, limb, and other property 
protected by product liability law, against a dangerous manner in manufacturing, designing, or 
supplying the products, is generally independent and separate from the interest and duty under 
the sale contract. 
As we can see, product liability is developed based on the dominant public policy of a 
desire to protect the interest outside of the product itself, such as when a product malfunctions or 
is defective.14 Insofar as the trader incurs economic losses, the policy concerned is not 
involved.15 Considering such a major approach,16 this thesis holds that the actual question of the 
CISG’s preemption regarding product liability claim creates difficulty, especially when the 
defective product causes damage to other property. This is because Article 35 could be applied to 
impose a contractual duty to deliver a safe product in terms of the manufacturing, design, or 
supply process. When parties foresee, or ought to have foreseen, the possibility of suffering a 
loss to other property at the time of contract, Article 35 may be interpreted in a way so as to 
warrant property interest resulting from such a breach of a contractual duty. 
 
13 Rem Coal Co., 386 Pa. Super. at 404. 
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
15 Rem Coal Co., 386 Pa. Super. at 404, 408–09 (holding that an action in tort is not an appropriate 
mechanism for giving a recovery for economic losses); see E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 
476 U.S. 858 (1986); Marrone v. Greer & Polman Const., Inc., 405 N.J. Super. 288 (App. Div. 2009). 
16 The decision of Marrone, 405 N.J. Super. 288 overruled a court decision in Santor v. A & M 
Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965), which permitted the plaintiff to redress its economic loss 
under tort rule on strict liability and placed on the manufacturer all risks associated with defective 
products launched into the market. The decisions of Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d 
Cir. 1987) and KING v. HILTON-DAVIS, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988) overruled another inconsistent 
view in Pa. Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981), which held that 
the permissibility of recovery for economic loss based on a strict liability claim in tort depends on the 




 In terms of improper conduct to be regulated, when US courts initially imposed such a 
strict liability for manufacturing defects on the sellers, the courts relied on the concept of 
warranty, which also holds sellers liable for non-conforming goods without fault.17 According to 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. §§ 1-2, commercial sellers or distributors are 
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by their defective products.18 Notably, 
the liability for manufacturing defects is imposed without fault on the sellers or distributors for 
harm caused.19 In contrast, design defects, as well as defects based on inadequate instructions or 
warnings, are predicated on a theory of negligence, thus requiring proof of the reasonableness 
standard.20 Moreover, the design defects and defects based on inadequate instructions or 
warnings can also be established by identifying a government-imposed standard and showing 
that violations of such statutory and regulatory norms exist.21 
2. Promissory Estoppel 
The traditional type of promissory estoppel invoked under the theory of detrimental 
reliance, as a substitute for consideration asking for contract damages, was rooted in the common 
law action of assumpsit.22 Although this type of promissory estoppel historically evolved and 
was viewed as a substitute for consideration, it later became recognized in the context of 
 
17 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
18 See id. §§ 1–2. As for product liability rules applicable to a special product or product markets, the 
Restatement provides separate rules in §§ 5–8. See id. §§ 5–8. 
19 See id. § 2(a). 
20 See id. § 2(b)–(c). 
21 Apart from the standards required for design or warning under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. 
Liab. § 2, an identification of a government-imposed standard is recognized as an alternative method of 
establishing defects. See id. § 4.   
22 See Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., 29 F.3d 821, 824–25 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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commercial disputes, and then formed a completely independent theory of recovery under which 
it is necessary to avoid injustice.23 Consequently, it is, as a public policy matter, highly possible 
for this independent theory to impose pre-contractual liability on a promisor for promises made 
during business negotiations as a tort like-claim,24 in order to prevent injustice or unfair 
advantages taken by the promisor.25 Furthermore, imposing pre-contractual liability based on this 
independent theory of promissory estoppel is effectively justified as the legal means of 
controlling opportunistic behavior.26 In order to ensure justice and avoid severe intervention with 
the parties’ freedom to negotiate, the court renders an award granting damages incurred, instead 
of specifically enforcing the promisor’s promise.27 
It is commonly claimed that promissory estoppel under detrimental reliance has the same 
purposes as the tort of misrepresentation when deterring conduct that misled others to their 
detriment and compensating innocent parties who are misled.28 As far as parties’ reliance without 
a bargain is concerned, there exists a prevailing presumption that the CISG’s explicit rule does 
not contemplate this kind of reliance protection that is, under the viewpoint of this thesis, 
considered as the reliance upon an extra-contractual promise.29 
 
23 See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 
798 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Mass. 2011). 
24 Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary 
Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1254 (1996). 
25 Dixon, 798 F. Supp. 2d at 343–46. 
26 Id. at 346. 
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see Clifford R. Gray, Inc. v. 
LeChase Constr. Servs., LLC, 857 N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Div. 2008); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 15 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2020). 
28 Katz, supra note 24, at 1254. 
29 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3847, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 
2003) (affirming that there are distinct types of promissory estoppel and recognizing a separate claim for 
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   Therefore, this section will mainly demonstrate the elements of promissory estoppel as 
adopted in the context of transnational sales.30 A claim for promissory estoppel under Illinois law 
requires four main elements to be actionable. That is to say, a plaintiff is required to “allege: (1) 
an unambiguous promise; (2) reasonable and justifiable reliance by the party to whom the 
promise was made; (3) the reliance was expected and foreseeable by the promisor; and (4) the 
promisee relied upon the promise to her detriment.”31 
There is great emphasis placed on the existence of an unambiguous promise, which is the 
main element of improper conduct regulated by the theory of promissory estoppel. Under the US 
theory of promissory estoppel, a mere representation of fact is not generally treated as a promise 
of future action, on which promissory estoppel is typically based.32 An act of promise that is 
typically alleged for stating a promissory estoppel claim must indicate one’s declaration where 
one commits himself to do or to refrain from engaging in something specific.33 It is possible, 
though scarce, that the representations regarding existing conditions constitute a promise, such 
that representation could be seen as a promise to pay for the consequences of a breach of that 
warranty, which is then the basis for a promissory estoppel claim.34 However, the promissory 
estoppel claim alleging breach of promise or warranty in such limited circumstance is still barred 
by, among other things, the critical reason that the alleged promise emerged out of an express 
 
promissory estoppel, which asks the court to create a new right in the interest of justice where there would 
be none otherwise). 
30 Please see the elements of a claim as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
31 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 679–80 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also Geneva 
Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
32 Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 680.  
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 680–81; see also All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 868–69 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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contract governing the relationship between the parties.35 As a consequence, the alleged promise 
is not recognized as independent tortious conduct. In other words, the defendant’s 
representations regarding the properties and performance of goods would constitute a promise 
for the purpose of the plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim only if the contract did not exist 
between the parties, and the alleged breach of such a promise or warranty did not emerge from 
the contractual relationship between them.36  
Let us turn to consider tort claims for promissory fraud under the Restatement of Torts. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 15 (2020) recognizes promissory fraud 
claims as a type of fraudulent misrepresentation if the intention to perform a promise does not 
exist at the time the statement is made. This claim requires an allegation that the promisor did not 
intend to carry out the promise at the time he fraudulently made such a misstatement of intent. 
This thesis argues that this specific element arguably makes the promissory fraud claim 
independent from the contractual claim given by the CISG because it aims to protect the 
promisee’s right in placing value on the promisor’s intention to perform and to control dishonest 
conduct.37 Hence, it is significant for the plaintiff to make an allegation with particular facts, 
showing that the defendant did not intend to keep a promise at the time it was made. 
3. Misrepresentation 
 Tort claims for misrepresentation are closely connected with the duty to deliver 
conforming goods under a contract for sale. Most misstatements of facts are potentially related to 
 
35 All-Tech Telecom, Inc., 174 F.3d at 869. 
36 In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, the plaintiff, Caterpillar, could not allege a contractual breach 
of promise/warranty claim because of the vertical privity rule. See Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 
680–81.  
37 See discussion infra Section I.B.3.3.  
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the purchased goods in some respects, namely the nature and quality of the goods, the suitability 
for use or the functions of products for a particular purpose, the durability of products, the 
intended design of products, or the feasibility of repair. Such statements could be made either 
during the negotiation period or after the contract has concluded. Usually, when incorrect 
statements made during negotiation were formed as part of contractual terms, it would be 
claimed that liability for those misrepresentations is a matter governed solely by the CISG.38 
Also, such a view holds the other way around, in that if incorrect statements are not incorporated 
into the contract, a claim for loss deriving from such misstatements lies outside the scope of the 
Convention because the wrongful conduct occurred during negotiations.39 The latter opinion is 
more compelling insofar as the elements of misrepresentations proved under tort laws do not 
overlap with the matters regulated or protected under the CISG’s supplementary rules. In sum, if 
it appears that tort laws on misrepresentation impose non-contractual duties or protect extra-
contractual interests independent from the duties regulated or the interests protected by the CISG 
or the contract, a claim for misrepresentation is outside the realm of the Convention. 
Some legal systems, in particular US common law, have generally recognized tort claims 
for misrepresentation. This section investigates US common law claims for innocent 
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation for which the 
contracting party typically asks, alongside claims of breach of express or implied warranty 
available under the international sales contract. 
 
38 Hans Stoll, Part III Sale of Goods Chapter V Provisions Common to the Obligations of the Seller and 
of the Buyer Section II Damages Article 74, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 552, 557 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Geoffrey Thomas trans., 2d 
ed. 1998).  
39 Id. at 557–58. 
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 3.1 Innocent Misrepresentation 
Under US law, commercial product sellers are subject to tortious liability for innocent 
misrepresentation, although the seller does not make a misrepresentation through fraud or 
negligence. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B subjects the business entity to liability for 
physical harm to a consumer of the chattel when he “by advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes 
to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel 
sold by him.”40 To ascertain that a seller could be liable for an innocent misrepresentation made 
to an individual, and not to the public at large, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 9 
(1998) additionally insists that a commercial seller could be liable for an innocent 
misrepresentation of material fact concerning the product.41 
 As for the claim of pure economic loss, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552C (1977) 
reaffirms that an individual who engages in a sale transaction is liable for the innocent 
misrepresentation of a material fact he makes to another in a sale contract.42 Under this rule, a 
claim for pecuniary loss is available without regard to the requirement that the sale transaction is 
ultimately rescinded by the plaintiff or by the court. 
 3.2 Negligent Misrepresentation 
Most cases have long followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 (1965), holding 
commercial product sellers liable for negligent misrepresentation. Section 311 imposes a duty of 
reasonable care upon the seller, in ascertaining the accuracy of the information or in the manner 
in which the information is communicated. By giving false information that constitutes a breach 
 
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
42 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
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of such a duty of care, the seller is liable for physical harm caused by action taken by the other 
party in his reasonable reliance upon such information. Further, given an explicit rule under the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 9 (1998), there is no doubt that commercial product 
sellers can be held liable for harm to persons or property resulting from their negligent 
misrepresentation of material facts concerning the goods sold.43 Inasmuch as the seller’s liability 
for harm to property is recognized under the theory of negligent misrepresentation, it raises the 
question of how this tort rule and the CISG’s rule on breach of express warranty or implied 
warranty interact, especially when the allegation of false statements concerns the quality of the 
product sold. 
Additionally, a seller, who in the course of business negligently supplies misinformation 
concerning goods sold to the purchaser, is liable for pecuniary loss caused to the purchaser who 
relied upon the misinformation and thus purchased goods from the seller. Such liability for 
pecuniary loss requires proving a breach of the standard of care in obtaining or communicating 
information for the guidance of the other party in his business transactions as stated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).44 Such a duty of care is limitedly imposed upon the 
seller, who intended to supply the information for a particular purpose whereby he was 
manifestly aware of the buyer’s intention to utilize such information for his benefit or guidance 
in the sale transaction, as well as the buyer’s pecuniary loss incurred in the sale transaction in 
 
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).  
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. 
Seney, 292 Md. 328 (1982); MM Glob. Servs. v. Dow Chem. Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 689 (D. Conn. 2003); 
Colo. Visionary Acad. v. Medtronic, Inc., 397 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 2005); Level 3 Communs., LLC v. 
Liebert Corp., 535 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2008); BHC Dev., L.C. v. Bally Gaming, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 
1276 (D. Kan. 2013) (imposing the tortious duty of care in communicating inaccurate information upon a 
party that expects to conclude a commercial contract with another). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2020). 
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which that information is expected to influence.45 Regarding the measure of damages for 
negligent misrepresentation, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552B (1977) enumerates the 
recoverable pecuniary loss to the recipient of negligent misrepresentation of which such 
misrepresentation is a legal cause.   
It should be emphasized here that while some US courts mostly adopted the rule under 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977) and held sellers liable for negligent 
misrepresentations which induce buyers to enter into sale contracts with them, the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm (2020) provides rules, which preclude the tort claim in 
such circumstances.46 Although the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm 
recognizes a negligent misrepresentation claim for economic loss in certain circumstances, 
Section 5(5) expressly states that the Restatement “does not recognize liability for negligent 
misrepresentations made in the course of negotiating or performing a contract between the 
parties.”47 That is, the Restatement Third of Torts has a preference of restricting the seller’s 
negligent misrepresentations to the realm of the law of contract and restitution. 
As we can see, tort rules on negligent misrepresentation liability for the physical harms 
aforementioned aim to regulate the seller’s negligent conduct, either in ascertaining the accuracy 
of the information, or in the manner in which the information concerning the goods is 
communicated. Also, tort rules on negligent misrepresentation liability for pure economic loss 
aim to control the seller’s negligent conduct in obtaining or communicating the information for 
 
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2) cmts. i, j (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2020); see id. § 
5 reporter’s note. 




the guidance of the buyer in the sale transaction. Given that Article 35 subjects the seller to strict 
liability for non-conformity even in the absence of fraud or negligence, there is no doubt that, as 
a fortiori, the seller is also subject to such contractual liability for his fraudulent or negligent 
conduct in providing material facts concerning the goods sold. Tribunals are then possibly asked 
to consider whether subjecting the seller to such contractual liability is sufficient to regulate the 
seller’s negligent conduct, which threatens certain risks or harms to the buyer. Alternatively, the 
question is raised as to whether it is persuasive to imply that insofar as Article 35 is applicable, 
there is no need for resorting to any other rules that specifically intend to regulate negligent 
conduct. In answering, this thesis presumes that the concept of strict liability underlying Article 
35 is not seen as the exclusive mechanism in allocating risks to both parties, when those risks are 
caused by the seller’s negligent conduct, which is a matter generally regulated by tort law. An 
exception would be made if the contract agreed otherwise to that effect. 
 3.3 Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
 There is little doubt that the person who intentionally makes a misstatement is liable to a 
defrauded person for physical harm resulting from what he did in reliance upon the truth of such 
representation. The first restated provision is the rule of liability for a fraudulent 
misrepresentation that involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another. The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 310 (1965) subjects the maker of false representation to tortious 
liability, since he intended to induce the action of another person, knowing that such action 
involves a resulting unreasonable risk to the other.48 Notably, such liability under Section 310 is 
based upon unreasonable risks of physical harm, which get involved in the intended 
 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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misrepresentations rather than being based on the fact that the misrepresentations are intended to 
mislead.49 Thus, this liability is enforced in an ordinary negligence action.50 The defendant is 
held liable when the representation made by the defendant is one of fact, opinion, or law, 
provided that the defrauded party reasonably relies on it.51 It is submitted that tort rules on 
fraudulent misrepresentation for physical harm are mostly applicable to a situation where the 
misrepresentation made concerns the physical condition of a thing, including a chattel, and such 
misstatement induces the other party to believe that the thing is safe to the other or his property.52 
Apart from Section 310, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 557A (1977) is another important 
provision covering the case of physical harm to a defrauded party or other property in justifiable 
reliance on fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. Under Section 557A, a defrauded 
party is permitted to maintain a tort action of deceit against the person who fraudulently makes a 
misrepresentation or fails to disclose a fact that he is bound to disclose.53 Moreover, the injured 
party is also allowed to base his claim on liability for fraudulent misrepresentation when he 
suffered economic loss that resulted from the physical harm.54 Similarly, the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 9 (1998) expressly recognizes the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation for 
harm to persons or property, including economic loss caused by those physical harms against a 
seller who engages in selling products, and then makes a fraudulent misstatement of material fact 
 
49 Id. § 310 cmt. a. 
50 Id. § 557A cmt. a.  
51 Id. § 310 cmt. b.  
52 Id.  




concerning the product sold.55 Further, there exist other restated rules of Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (1977) dealing with liability for pecuniary loss resulting from fraudulent 
misrepresentation.56 The general rule stating the right to maintaining an action of deceit is stated 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977). Under Section 525, the seller is subject to 
tortious liability to the buyer in deceit for pure economic loss caused to him if the seller 
fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention, or law for the purpose of 
inducing the buyer to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, and it is proved that the 
buyer’s reliance is justified.57 As we can see, this rule regulates the defendant’s conduct that is 
called “scienter.”58 Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) also provides other rules 
dealing with the fraudulent character of a misrepresentation.59 In practice, a plaintiff is able to 
plead actions in both deceit and negligent misrepresentation in one declaration, and then relies on 
the same set of facts, attempting to satisfy the different burdens of proof under both claims.60 
 
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 9, 21 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–551 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM §§ 9–14 (AM. LAW INST. 2020) (stating similar rules 
regarding liability for the tort of deceit, which recognizes a party’s claim seeking compensation for 
economic loss based on fraud).  
57 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 2020). 
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2020). 
59 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 526–530 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also id. §§ 531–536 
(dealing with the requirement of intent to influence conduct—that is, the requirement that the 
representation is purposely made to induce the conduct in the type of transaction intended, or a 
transaction where a party has reason to expect influencing conduct); id. §§ 537–545 (dealing with the 
matter of whether the plaintiff’s reliance is justified); id. § 549 (providing the measure of damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation). 
60 Martens Chevrolet, Inc. v. Seney, 292 Md. 328, 337 (1982). 
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As long as the sale contract is principally concerned, there have been disputes applying 
common law rule on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim that is typically brought alongside a 
breach of warranty claim. The buyer commonly brings a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, 
together with the contractual claim, no matter which law between the CISG or domestic sale law 
governs the alleged breach of warranty claim.61 Taking New Jersey tort law as an example, the 
court held that a fraud claim requires proof of the elements as follows: “(1) made a material 
misrepresentation of present or past fact, (2) with knowledge of its falsity and (3) with the 
intention that the other party rely thereon, (4) resulting in reasonable reliance by that party to its 
detriment.”62 Breach of the duty to disclose can serve as an element for false representation in 
the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation, as is adopted by the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Missouri. Such a duty to disclose arises when there exists “a relation of trust and 
confidence between the parties or where one party has superior knowledge or information not 
within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party.”63 The party is in breach, amounting to an 
 
61 Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. 10-05321, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36695, at *35–36 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2012) (“In connection with the sale of the Poli 2, the First 
Amended Complaint alleges that PoliElettronica and its agents Colex and Waden misrepresented to 
Schiffer that the Poli 2 was a professional grade machine that was a smaller and cheaper version of the 
Poli 1. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62-63, 87-88. During the repair period, PoliElettronica allegedly 
misrepresented through Colex, Waden, and Poli-Pro USA that the Poli 2 could be repaired when 
PoliElettronica knew that repair was impossible due to serious design flaws. Id. ¶¶ 64, 89-90.”). 
62 Id. at 37–38. 
63 Semi-Materials Co., Ltd. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc, No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 1790, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011) (citing Reeves v. Keesler, 921 S.W.2d 16, 21 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996) and the court also found “there to be substantial evidence raising genuine issues of material 
fact, including, but not limited to, whether, at the time the parties entered into the contracts at issue, 
MEMC, its agents, and/or employees 1) made false representation(s) to Semi-Materials regarding 
MEMC’s intent to deliver all of the products as contracted for in the high/low agreements; 2) failed to 
disclose MEMC’s intention or understanding that MEMC could unilaterally cancel said contracts without 
notice; and 3) knew, at that time, that such representation(s) were false or were ignorant of their truth”). 
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act of fraud, when the party is in silence or fails to disclose a material fact despite having such a 
duty to disclose. 
Additionally, the pleading must meet the requirement of particularity under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 9(b).64 Even if the court demonstrated that the particularity rule is aimed at notification of the 
defendant’s precise misconduct against which it is asserted,65 this thesis suggests that the specific 
allegations as to fraudulent conduct could make the fraud claim arise independently from breach 
of contract claim. In other words, one might be inclined to reckon that the requirement of 
particularity makes the fraudulent misrepresentation claim arise independently out of the 
contractual claim, i.e. the breach of warranty claim, irrespective of whether the sales contract is 
governed by the CISG or not. Given that the seller is strictly liable for breach of warranty under 
the CISG, the particularity requiring statements that constitute fraud justifies tort law to serve its 
function to regulate fraudulent conduct. For example, a buyer alleges a particular false 
misrepresentation communicated by a seller in marketing materials, or during the repair period in 
attempting to mollify and defraud the buyer that goods could be repaired, despite knowing this is 
impossible because of a severe defect in design flaws. The strict pleading of particularity 
presents that tort law on fraud provides an essential safeguard against a contractual action being 
recast as a fraud claim. This is especially so when the plaintiff tends to allege that the defendant 
made a fraudulent misrepresentation in performing his duty under the contract. With the 
 
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s 
mind may be alleged generally.”); see also Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 36695, at *38; CIMC Vehicles Grp. Co. v. Direct Trailer, LP, No. H-10-709, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 129931, at *50–53 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2012); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft 
mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149, at *44 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013) (“This requires 
the plaintiff to allege ‘the date, time and place of the alleged fraud or otherwise inject precision or some 
measure of substantiation into a fraud allegation.’”).  
65 Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36695, at *38. 
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requirement of particularity, for a party to recover on the fraud claim, he is not required to prove 
damages that are separate from losses suffered from a breach of contract where there is a 
contractual relationship between the parties.66 
In sum, as far as misstatements of facts are related to subject matters67 protected by the 
CISG, the defendant may contend that the alleged claim of misrepresentation is subsumed and 
thus trumped by the CISG altogether. Apart from interpreting the CISG’s rules, this thesis 
submits that tribunals must consider the extent of the contractual duty agreed to under the 
binding sale contract to determine whether the uniform law regime expressly or impliedly 
imposes on the party a contractual duty not to behave below the standard of care or not to act in a 
dishonest manner. Otherwise, considering the rules, as explained in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, this 
thesis presumes that a plaintiff, who proves that the misrepresentation causing harm was made 
negligently or fraudulently, should have a remedy under tort law that typically aims to regulate 
such probable wrongful conduct. 
4. Negligence  
As we will see, in some circumstances, tort law imposes a duty of care upon those who 
have a relationship in the course of business. On the contrary, the CISG does not provide an 
express rule generally imposing a duty to adopt the standard of due care in performing 
contractual obligations under the contract or the CISG. Thus, one might support the concurrent 
application of tort law to deter one party from injuring the other party’s life, limb, property, or 
economic interest by the former’s negligent conduct. Another view, however, might state that 
 
66 Semi-Materials Co., Ltd., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1790, at *7.  
67 Those said subject matters are certain features of sold goods, or the trustworthiness of the capability to 
perform the contract, or the party’s creditworthiness. 
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liability without fault under the CISG encompasses the faulty conduct of negligence that is 
merely a state of mind, and it is closely related to obligations under the CISG. Also, the CISG 
provides more advantageous rules, which do not require any proof of fault. The latter view thus 
opines that the CISG’s rules on remedies exclusively govern the alleged matter of a negligent 
breach of warranty or a claim for negligently performing a contractual duty. 
In terms of the recognition of claim in negligence, a separate claim in negligence, seeking 
recovery for pure economic loss incurred from defective goods, is limitedly recognized in the 
case where the contracting parties are in the same bargaining positions to allocate their risks.68 
Moreover, it was claimed that the economic loss doctrine has originally come into play in a 
 
68 Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660 (N.J. 1985) (holding that the commercial 
buyer should be restricted to assert contract claims under the Uniform Commercial Code. Thus, the 
negligence and strict liability cause of action were not allowed when seeking damages for economic loss 
incurred from receiving goods that are not as warranted. Importantly, when making its decision, the court 
considered the policies underlying both sale law and tort law, and then reasoned that a comprehensive 
statutory scheme of the UCC, which satisfies the requirements of the world of commerce, should not be 
obviated by tort doctrine for either strict liability or negligence, which primarily intends to protect 
personal injuries and society’s interest in freedom from harm); see also City of Lennox v. Mitek Indus., 
519 N.W.2d 330 (S.D. 1994) (extending the application of economic loss doctrine to a case where a 
defective component damages the product into which such a component was incorporated. In other words, 
the court found that damages to the product as a whole are considered as economic losses, which fall 
under the category of consequential losses, and are not losses to other property. Thus, the injured party 
was barred from recovering such damages under tort theory); McDowell v. Atco Rubber Prods., 221 
A.D.2d 876 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (insisting that the traditional tort claim in negligence must be 
dismissed where the purchaser seeks pure economic loss and not personal injury or property damage); 
Rotorex Co., Inc. v. Kingsbury Corp., 42 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md. 1999) (providing the primary reason 
based on the ground that the sophisticated parties, after lengthy negotiations, already allocated their risks 
and limited their remedies through the commercial contract’s detailed provisions); Trinity Indus. v. 
McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (limiting the alleged negligent breach of 
warranty of sale of goods to contract theory, rather than a tort one); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 
P.3d 1 (Utah 2003) (denying a claim for negligence in the mismeasurement of BTU adjustments, 
reasoning that the source of tortious duties, which were breached, are identical to the duties prescribed in 
the contract. This is because the purchaser voluntarily assumed the alleged special contractual duties 
under the Wyoming contract in dispute. This reasoning is also supported by the fact that the alleged 
mismeasurement is based on the same conduct that is asserted in the contract claim, constituting 
overlapping duties in this case); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 3 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2020) (precluding tort liability for economic loss caused by negligence in performing a 
contract between parties). 
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product liability case where a buyer sustains economic loss due to defective goods.69 Thus, it is 
not surprising that US courts are inclined to apply economic loss doctrine, and deny imposing 
upon the seller a separate tortious duty of care in manufacturing or supplying goods when the 
buyer did not incur any personal injury or damage to property other than the goods themselves. 
Despite the recognition of economic loss doctrine, one dominant US court, in limited 
circumstances, appears to impose the duty of care and then hold the manufacturer liable for an 
employee’s breach of due care in the active work of repairing. In Sain v. ARA Mfg. Co., the 
defendant’s negligent conduct in repairing the air conditioner installed in the vehicle purchased 
sounds in the tort of negligence.70 The court in Sain recognizes an action in negligence, although 
the conduct caused a fire and extensive damage only to the vehicle sold.71 In Sain, the court 
found that the alleged negligent conduct was not predicated on breach of warranty.72 Instead, the 
court reasoned that the warranty was introduced to prove that the manufacturer had a contractual 
obligation to repair the air conditioner.73 Also, the buyer in Sain sued the manufacturer for harm 
to the goods caused by the negligent conduct in repairing the goods, rather than bringing suit 
against the seller/manufacturer for defective goods. The decision in Sain thus illustrates the 
possibility of imposing upon the seller, who entered into, e.g., a contract for the sale of 
 
69 Ham v. Swift Transp. Co., 694 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922–23 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (noting that the economic 
loss doctrine originally lies in product liability cases. The court also reasoned that the UCC gives a 
complete set of rights and remedies to the commercial parties to sales contracts, so that there is no need to 
provide tort remedies to the party who sustains an economic loss). Cf. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. 
Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 2004) (holding that the economic loss doctrine does not extensively apply to 
a contract for services, which is outside the product liability context). 
70 Sain v. ARA Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 502. 
73 Id.  
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machinery with the agreement to install the machinery and put them into operation, a duty of 
care in active performance of installing machinery and putting it into operation.74 Nevertheless, 
the buyer’s interest will be protected against such negligent conduct insofar as the buyer alleges 
negligent conduct in installing the goods, rather than alleging claims against the seller for loss 
suffered from defective goods. From the viewpoint of this thesis, the economic loss doctrine is 
likely not applied to deny the imposition of a duty of care upon the party to the sale contract in 
two ways. First, an action in negligence is possibly permitted when a party sustains damage to 
personal injury and to property other than the goods sold. Apparently, under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, the suppliers75 and manufacturers76 are more likely to be subjected to liability 
in negligence when a breach of a duty of care causes an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the 
other contracting party using the chattels supplied or produced. Second, in the case of economic 
loss, a separate duty of care is recognized when the plaintiff alleges negligent conduct that 
involves the active performance of additional duties77 agreed upon by the contracting parties, 
rather than alleging a negligent breach of warranty of the sale of goods (emphasis added).  
 
74 Cf. Trinity Indus. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159, 172–74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (denying a 
tort claim of a negligent breach of warranty of sale. However, the court further distinguished the case at 
bar from a situation in other cases where an active negligent performance was alleged against the 
defendant). 
75 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388–390 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating rules applicable to all 
suppliers); see id. §§ 399–402 (stating special rules applicable to sellers of chattels manufactured by third 
persons).  
76 Id. §§ 394–398 (stating special rules applicable to manufacturers of chattels). 
77 For example, the seller can agree to perform the services of packaging, containing, and shipping the 
sold goods for the buyer. The seller may also assume duties to perform the inspection, installation, 
integration, and commissioning of the goods. Those engagements require an exercise of care, skill, and 
knowledge. Cf. N. Am. Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 764 (1997) (deciding the dispute 
arising from contracts for the performance of services, and held that such a contract gives rise to a duty of 
care, which requires the party to render such services in a competent and reasonable manner).  
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    In sum, when negligent conduct is alleged in performing the obligation under a sale 
contract, it is important for tribunals to primarily consider whether the applicable tort law 
imposes a separate duty of care on the party whose behavior may fall below such a standard 
established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm. If the 
answer is affirmative, tribunals must then consider whether the CISG also provides solutions that 
are adequately equivalent to the regulations or protections provided by tort law on negligence. 
When similar solutions are not given within the realm of the CISG, domestic tort law is 
justifiably applied to provide the injured party with the right to tort remedy on grounds of 
negligence.   
5. Tortious Interference with Contract or Business Relations 
 There exists one dominant US decision holding that the economic value received from a 
promisee’s contract and prospective business relations is independent of the interests conferred 
by the contractual relationship with a promisor.78 This court decision reflects the need for the law 
of tort in protecting such economic interests, provided that the independent unlawful conduct is 
presented with all the elements of claims required by US tort law.   
5.1 Intentional Interference with Contract or Business Relations 
 In recognizing a claim for intentional interference with prospective business, tort law 
acknowledges that a person’s property interest, in engaging in prospective business relationships, 
 
78 Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5276, at *63–64, 
*68 (June 27, 2007) (finding the alleged wrongful breach of contract as a part of a comprehensive plan 
designed to disrupt the plaintiff’s prospective economic relationship with the customer); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (stating rules on the right to recover 
compensatory damages, including pecuniary loss and emotional distress, or actual harm to reputation 
when the actor is held liable to another for tortious interference). 
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is entitled to protection from unjustified interfering by another.79 Similarly, the contractual 
relation receives a sacrosanct value, and the inviolability of the contractual right takes 
precedence over the tortfeasor’s rights to trade competition and prospective advantages.80 
Therefore, the tort of interference with an existing contract, a fortiori, protects the contracting 
parties’ interests in benefits gained from a contract with a third person.  
In establishing a claim for intentional interference with either the existing contract or 
prospective contractual relationship, US tort law requires prima facie proof of the main elements. 
On the one hand, one must prove the defendant’s intent to interfere with contract or business 
relations; otherwise, the plaintiff is unable to be protected, even though an improper interference 
is presumably presented.81 Another US court decision also confirmed that an intentional breach 
of one party’s direct contract may also constitute tortious interference with a third party’s 
contract if done purposely with the effect of impairing the third party’s ability to perform, or if it 
prevents the third party from performing its contract with another.82 On the other hand, one’s 
purposeful intent to harm another person’s business relationship is not solely sufficient to 
constitute a claim for intentional interference. Accordingly, tort law requires proof of facts 
indicating that the defendant’s conduct of interference is accomplished through improper 
 
79 Belden Corp. v. Internorth, Inc., 90 Ill. App. 3d 547, 551–52 (1980); Miller v. Lockport Realty Grp., 
Inc., 377 Ill. App. 3d 369, 373–74 (2007). 
80 Belden Corp., 90 Ill. App. 3d at 551–52; Miller, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 373–74. 
81 Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1024–25 (D. Minn. 
2010) (finding that the seller/manufacturer did not deliver damaged goods to the buyer/distributor. 
Importantly, the court reasoned that no evidence shows that the seller/manufacturer sought to procure the 
buyer/distributor’s breach of existing or prospective contractual relations with the third person). 
82 Am. Nat’l Petroleum Co. v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 798 S.W.2d 274, 278–79 (Tex. 1990) 
(finding that the defendant knew its actions were a breach of its contracts with the plaintiff and would 
cause the third parties, the operators, to breach their balancing agreements with the plaintiff. Also, the 
evidence suggested that the defendant purposefully engaged in that unprivileged course of action). 
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means.83 In other words, tort law aims to impose upon the individual a general duty to not use 
improper means in his intent to interfere with the business affairs of another and to protect the 
adverse party’s property interest from being impaired by the defendant’s act with the intent of 
procuring a breach of the plaintiff’s business relations.84 For an actor to be held liable for such 
intentional interference, US tort law not only requires proving an intentional and improper act in 
interfering, but also requires proof of other elements as restated in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 766, 766A and 766B (1979).85   
This section emphasizes the elements of intentional and improper interference because 
this thesis believes that through the lens of the CISG’s rules on non-conformity or other rules, 
such an element is viewed as unlawful behavior that is different from a breach of contractual 
 
83 Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB-08-65, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
82217, at *26–28 (D. Md. July 27, 2011); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979) (stating the factors on which the court may rely in determining whether interference is 
improper). 
84 Among other elements, while a claim for intentional interference with prospective business requires 
proof of the defendant’s purposeful interference, which prevents the plaintiff’s legitimate business 
expectancy, a claim for intentional interference with an already existing business relationship requires 
proof of the defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the contract between the 
plaintiff and another. See Glob. Material Techs., Inc. v. Dazheng Metal Fibre Co., No. 12-cv-01851, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36519, at *18–19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014). Cf. Dig. & Analog Design Corp. v. N. 
Supply Co., 540 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Ohio 1989) (ruling that the adverse party is limited to a contractual 
claim, and thus cannot seek recovery for loss based on the tort of business interference when the alleged 
interference with a business resulted as a mere consequence of such breach of contract. Also, the court 
found no evidence in the case at bar indicating a defendant’s motive to interfere with the injured party’s 
business relations, and thus denied the recovery in tort). 
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766–766B (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see Belden Corp., 90 Ill. 
App. 3d at 551–52; ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 665 (E.D. Pa. 
2003); Glob. Material Techs., Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36519, at *18–19; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM §§ 17–18 (AM. LAW INST. 2020) (using a different 
framework to define tortious interference with contract or economic expectation for clarity and 
predictability purposes. That is, Sections 17 and 18 restate the elements of each type of liability, which 
are narrower and more specific. However, this Restatement does not intend to make substantial changes 




duties, primarily a breach of the duty to deliver conforming goods.86 Importantly, it seems that 
when the means of interference are, in nature, found tortious, such as in cases of fraud or 
fraudulent misrepresentation, such conduct is improper87 and thus more likely separate from a 
breach of contractual obligation under the CISG. Accordingly, the injured party needs separate 
protection under tort law in case of such an event. Notably, the breaching party likely points out 
that the CISG preempts a claim for intentional interference when alleged improper means are 
used through a contractual relationship,88 or the international contract expressly prohibits any use 
of improper means to interfere with a business relationship.   
 
86 It is more likely that a claim for intentional interference with another’s own contract under § 766A, or a 
claim for interference with prospective contractual relation under § 766B(b) normally creates a situation 
where the defendant’s conduct simultaneously constitutes both a breach of contract with the plaintiff, and 
a breach of the duty to not interfere with the plaintiff’s contract or prospective business relations with a 
third person. This is because when the defendant is in breach of a direct contract with the plaintiff, such a 
breach tends to impair the plaintiff’s ability to perform his binding duty under the contract with the third 
person, or the breach prevents the plaintiff from acquiring or continuing prospective relations. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766A, 766B(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
87 See id. § 767 cmt. c (noting that among other factors, the nature of the actor’s conduct enumerated in 
section 767(a) is the main factor in determining whether interference is improper); see also Gruppo 
Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82217, at *26–27 (ruling that “to recover for tortious 
interference with business relationships, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was 
independently wrongful or unlawful.” Also, the court insisted that “Maryland courts have defined 
independent ‘improper means’ to include ‘violence or intimidation, defamation, injurious falsehood or 
other fraud, violation of the criminal law, and the institution or threat of groundless civil suits or criminal 
prosecutions in bad faith’”). Cf. K & K Mgmt., Inc. v. Lee, 557 A.2d 965, 979–80 (Md. 1989) (finding 
that the means employed were not sufficiently improper because they were neither illegal nor tortious). 
88 Cf. Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 618 (1993) (affirming the dismissal of 
intentional tort of interference. Also, the court reasoned that if the contracting party is allowed to plead 
the elements of the tort of interference with prospective business relations by way of a conclusory 
allegation, which merely claims that the defendant maliciously intended to destroy the injured party’s 
business, this tort claim would be routinely pleaded in the case of breach of contract). Cf. Arntz 
Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 4th 464, 478–79 (1996) (ruling that the 
contracting party’s unjustified breach of contract by failure or refusal to perform his contract cannot be 
transmuted into tort of interference by alleging that the wrongful breach detrimentally interfered with the 
promisee’s business relations). Cf. JRS Prods., Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th 
168, 182–83 (2004) (providing reasoning that the existence of wrongful termination of a contract is 
insufficient to establish independent interference with the plaintiff’s interest). 
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5.2 Negligent Interference with Contract or Business Relations 
As stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C (1979), there has been no general 
recognition of a liability for negligent interference with a contract or with prospective business 
relations.89 Nevertheless, the court in Orthotec v. Eurosurgical90 applied California tort law and 
held the defendant liable for negligent interference with a prospective economic advantage.    
6. Conversion  
Regarding conversion, the general rules on the elements of a claim are restated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965). As is related to the sale contract, US court 
decisions also articulate existing common law rules on the tort of conversion, deciding the issue 
of whether conversion is available alongside claims in a contract for sale.   
 Given that both the seller and the buyer have an ancillary duty to preserve goods under 
Article 8591 and Article 86,92 respectively, the CISG seemingly imposes on the parties the 
responsibility similar to that imposed on the bailee by the bailment contract.93 Accordingly, 
when it appears that the seller or the buyer breaches his duty of preservation of the goods, the 
 
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
90 This thesis observes that the element of the duty not to commit independent unlawful conduct is 
essentially similar to the main element required by a claim for intentional interference with contract or 
prospective business. See Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 5276, at *58–65 (June 27, 2007).  
91 Under Article 85, when the buyer delays taking of the delivery, the seller who is in possession of the 
goods, or in the position to control the disposition of the goods, must adopt reasonable steps to preserve 
the goods. The seller also has a similar duty when the buyer fails to pay the price at the due date 
scheduled concurrently with the delivery of the goods. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods art. 85, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CISG].  
92 Article 86(1) imposes a duty to preserve the goods that the buyer intends to reject. Such an obligation 
requires taking steps that are reasonable in the circumstances to preserve the goods. See id. art. 86(1). 
93 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORT 118 (2d ed. 2016); see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 237 cmts. e, f, g (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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other party may bring tort of conversion against the breaching party, alleging that he converted 
the goods by non-return or otherwise, and thus recover damages or the goods themselves. 
Subject to the right to deposit goods to a warehouse and to sell them,94 US tort law is likely to 
protect the parties’ possession or ownership and to regulate one’s intentional conduct that 
seriously interferes with another’s rights. In Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. Gentec Enters,95 the 
terms of the contract required the seller (plaintiff) to hold the molds used to create the products 
sold, until the buyer (defendant) requested their delivery. The seller’s refusal to relinquish 
possession of the molds when the buyer requested the delivery was seen as an adequate 
allegation of the elements of conversion under California law.96 The elements of conversion are 
(1) injured person’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of conversion; 
(2) tortfeasor’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of the property; and (3) damages.97 
Based on the same elements required to allege conversion,98 another decision ruled that under 
Pennsylvania law, the right to payment under a contractual agreement does not suffice to create a 
property interest for purposes of a conversion claim.99 In terms of recoverable damage, the 
 
94 See CISG, supra note 91, arts. 87–88. 
95 Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. Gentec Enters., No. CV 13-08799-RGK-SSx, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
199891 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014). 
96 Id. at *6–7. 
97 Id. 
98 It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107149, at *61 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013). 
99 Id. at *62; see also NovaCare, Inc. v. S. Health Mgmt., CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-5903, 1998 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12326, at *6–13 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 1998) (noting that money could be the subject matter of 
conversion, provided it belongs to the plaintiff before it is converted. The court then denied the claim for 
the tort of conversion when enforceable agreements adequately protect the plaintiff’s rights to payments 
due); Duane Morris, L.L.P. v. Todi, 2002 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 57, 2002 WL 31053839, at *12–13 




injured party can recover for monetary damages, including the market value of the goods at the 
time and place of conversion, damages for loss of use, and other consequential damages.100 
Significantly, punitive damages are allowed in a conversion action.   
In this regard, one might argue that a claim in conversion is separate from a contractual 
claim under the CISG. This is because conversion requires the intentional act of deprivation, 
committed by exercising substantial control over an injured party’s possession of the goods in 
different ways, including dispossession, destruction, acquiring possession or ownership, or 
refusal to surrender goods.101 This thesis agrees that when the intentional act of conversion is 
proved, the injured party should be simultaneously protected by tort law against conduct 
amounting to conversion. Importantly, the injured party must show a degree of departure from 
both the contractual duties and rights provided by the CISG or contractual terms, if any.   
7. Tort Remedy for Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
A claim for tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is typically 
brought alongside a cause of action for breach of contract. Under the relationship in an insurance 
contract, US law justifies a bad faith claim against the insurer, and it treats such an action as a 
separate claim for breach of duty of good faith implicitly established by a particular contractual 
relationship under the contract of insurance.102 As a consequence, violation of a duty to act in 
good faith sounds in tort, notwithstanding the fact that the same bad faith conduct may also 
 
100 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 93, at 125–26. 
101 Id. at 107; see JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING 
TORTS 21 (4th ed. 2010); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 223 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
102 Bullet Trucking, Inc. v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 84 Ohio App. 3d 327, 332–34 (1992). Notably, the tort 
remedy for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing occasionally expands to the 
relation under employment contracts. See Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 174–79 (1980); 
Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453 (1980). 
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constitute a breach of contract.103 The required element of bad faith is met when the breaching 
party’s action or inaction showing his wrongful intent or his conduct for a dishonest purpose is 
proven.104   
A cause of action for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is rarely recognized in business litigations outside the cases of insurance contracts, unless 
there exists a special relationship between the business entities with similar characteristics to 
those found in insurance contracts.105 It is more important to observe that there are hardly cases 
where US tort law imposes a separate and distinct duty of good faith and fair dealing upon 
parties to the sale contract. The reason is that there appears to be a general duty of good faith and 
fair dealing imposed under both the UCC106 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,107 which 
could be applied to the relationship under a sales contract.108 With limited recognition of the tort 
 
103 Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 63 Ohio St. 3d 690, 694–95 (1992); see Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 
Cal. 3d 566, 573–75 (1973). 
104 Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Ohio St. 3d at 698–99. 
105 See Seaman’s Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768–69 (1984) 
(characterizing special features of the relationship between the insurer and insured by taking into account 
the elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility). The special relationship can be 
found upon the indicia of unequal bargaining, as is stated in Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 
222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1398–1400 (1990). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979) (stating that one is liable to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the 
fiduciary relation). However, it should be noted that later, a decision of Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher 
Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 679–80 (Cal. 1995) overruled the court’s decision in Seaman’s Direct Buying 
Serv., Inc., 36 Cal. 3d at 768–69, which allowed tort recovery for bad faith denial of liability under a 
noninsurance contract. Cf. Thompson v. Asimos, 6 Cal. App. 5th 970, 984–85 (2016) (affirming the trial 
court’s holding that non-contract relief based on the theory of breach of the covenant of fair dealing claim 
duplicates the breach of contract theory, and thus fails for lack of any showing of a special relationship).  
106 U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
107 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
108 It is also submitted that those factors constituting special relationships do not arise in commercial 
contracts, particularly a sales contract between merchants where parties possess presumably equal 
bargaining power. See Matthew J. Barrett, “Contort”: Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good 
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remedy for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a noninsurance 
contract, particularly in the contract for sales, US tort law is likely to not give parties to 
international sales contract the right to the same cause of action either.109    
C. Illustrative Cases Where the Party Proceeds with a Claim in Tort alongside a 
Contractual Claim under the CISG 
This part exemplifies the real problems underlying the issue of the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrency of tort claims. The court decisions referred to in this part illustrate that, 
in practice, it is common for contracting parties to assert tortious actions, as explained in Part B, 
alongside a contractual claim, under the CISG.  
In theory, most scholars generally take national tort law on product liability as the typical 
situation where tort law coexists and competes with the Convention.110 However, in practice, a 
product liability claim is mostly alleged alongside a warranty claim, available under domestic 
sale law.111 In court decisions under the CISG, as far as it is published and accessible, a situation 
where the party alleges both a contractual claim and product liability claim has not yet arisen.   
 
Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts—Its Existence and Desirability, 60 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 523–25 (1985). 
109 See Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd. v. Gentec Enters., Inc., No. CV 13-08799-RGK-SSx, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 199889, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2014) (insisting that California law does not recognize a 
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim when a special relationship 
with fiduciary characteristics does not exist between parties. Further, the court stated that the language of 
good faith in Article 7(1) indicates that the CISG intends for an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to exist in contracts, which fall under the sphere of its application); see also RENÉ FRANZ 
HENSCHEL, CONFORMITY OF GOODS IN INTERNATIONAL SALES 40–41 (2005); AYSE NIHAN KARADAYI 
YALIM, INTERPRETATION AND GAP FILLING IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 113–21 
(2019) (suggesting that the observance of good faith referred to in Article 7(1) could be applied to 
consider the relationship between the parties, as long as it reflects the general principles on which it is 
based). 
110 See discussion infra Part III.B.  




Seeing this in practice, the party to international sales governed by domestic law has 
brought a claim for a breach of contract, along with some claims in tort, e.g., claim for fraudulent 
misrepresentation,112 and a claim for tortious interference.113 Similarly, there are several cases in 
which the contracting party asserted a contractual claim and other tort claims, namely promissory 
estoppel, misrepresentation, negligence, tortious interference, conversion, and tort remedy for 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing simultaneously in the context of the 
transnational sales governed by the CISG. In a range of claims asserted in different cases, some 
courts were confronted with the CISG’s preemption issues, which were contended by the party 
against whom the alleged tort claims were brought.114 On the other hand, other courts determined 
such preemption/concurrency issues relevant to the CISG without a request from either party.115 
 
112 See Ho Myung Moolsan Co. v. Manitou Mineral Water, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127869, at *45 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2010) (“Plaintiff’s original complaint contained a claim for fraud in the inducement of 
the contract based on defendant’s representations, made before the contract was executed, ‘that 
[defendant] [was] fully capable of providing as much water as plaintiff[] required for sale and distribution 
anywhere including the United States and Korea.’”).  
113 See Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5276 (June 27, 
2007); Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB-08-65, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 82217 (D. Md. July 27, 2011). 
114 See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Caterpillar, 
Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing 
Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76748 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 
2006); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC, No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21121 
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008); Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd., 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 199889; U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v. Pack Line Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
115 See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
22, 2006); Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, No. 10-80851-CV, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft 
mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013); Weihai Textile Grp. 
Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014); 
Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 4358 (PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
71289 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014); Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. Gentec Enters., No. CV 13-08799-RGK-
SSx, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199891 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014). 
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First, it is worth taking up the phenomena in which a range of tortious actions mentioned earlier 
are practically asserted alongside contractual claims under the CISG. 
 As for promissory estoppel, three particular cases are worth highlighting. In Geneva 
Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,116 the plaintiffs alleged claims against defendants based 
on breach of contract, in that they failed to supply clathrate in response to a specific purchase 
order. One of the plaintiffs, Invamed, asserted promissory estoppel along with the contractual 
claim. The issue of the CISG’s preemption of promissory estoppel was principally discussed and 
determined as a matter of first impression.117 Subsequently, other court decisions118 cited and 
referred to the analysis and holding of Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. as the relevant authority 
when dealing with the CISG’s preemption of promissory estoppel. In the first case of 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, it is shown that the immediate buyer and the downstream 
purchaser alleged breach of express and implied warranties, as well as failure to deliver 
conforming goods in violation of the CISG, along with promissory estoppel.119 In the second 
case, Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd. v. Gentec Enters., Inc., the manufacturer/seller brought 
claims for breach of contract under the CISG alongside promissory estoppel, alleging that the 
defendant refused to pay for the ordered products in violation of the agreement.120 
 
116 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 280. 
117 Id. at 285–87. 
118 Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 659; Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
199889. 
119 Caterpillar, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d at 663. 
120 Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. ltd., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199889, at *9–11 (following the authority of 
Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. in holding that the CISG does not preempt state promissory estoppel claims. 




Let us examine the CISG cases where the parties brought claims for misrepresentations. 
On the one hand, most cases show that the buyer typically brought claims for negligent 
misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement along with a contractual claim under the CISG.121 As 
can be seen, the alleged misstatements communicated by the seller in each case are most likely 
related to the seller’s duty to deliver goods as promised or as required by the CISG. Taking the 
allegation of TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH case as an example, TVT asserted 
both the contract claims under Articles 35 and 36 of the CISG, and a fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim. The allegation states, “Schubert represented that it had the expertise and 
experience to design, build, and service a reliable Biobox system, knowing that such 
representations were false, to induce TVT to enter into the February 1995 Quotation 
Contract.”122 The court in TeeVee Toons, Inc. was then faced with the issue of whether the fraud 
claim was duplicative of the contract claim. Similarly, in another case, Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. 
Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, the plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim under the 
CISG and a fraudulent inducement claim, alleging non-delivery of goods purchased and a false 
 
121 In Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., as for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant, ACIC/Brantford, failed to disclose the fact regarding the defendant’s intent and ability to 
supply the plaintiff with clathrate for a commercial launch. See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 
2d at 281, 287; see also TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2006); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-
CV-00702, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76748, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2006); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. 
Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GMBH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25201, at *31–32 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (“As evidence of misrepresentation, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s statement 
from the May 22, 2003 proposal that ‘[t]he machines just got out on the market and those are a very good 
deal. The owner is selling them because of bankrubsy [sic]. Therefore we should act fast on this.’”); Sky 
Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC, No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21121 (E.D. Ky. 
Mar. 18, 2008); Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, No. 10-80851-CV, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011); Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods 
LLC, No. 13 CV 4358 (PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014). 
122 TeeVee Toons, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *49.  
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statement as to the possibility of shipment of goods presented by the defendants.123 This court 
principally decided the merits of the case regarding the plaintiff’s right to recovery for loss in 
expectancy, consequential damages, and punitive damages as a result of the fraudulent 
inducement claim against the defendants.124 On the other hand, other examples, such as It’s 
Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH and Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. 
Level 8 Apparel, LLC,125 manifest in that the seller who bargained for a payment also proceeded 
with a breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims regarding the intention to pay 
the contract price against the buyer.  
 Let us turn to discuss negligence cases arising from international trade.126 Electrocraft 
Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd. is one significant illustration where the plaintiff alleged 
liability for negligent conduct in manufacturing and furnishing allegedly defective refrigerator 
motors, alongside claims for breach of express/implied warranty.127 The defendant moved to 
dismiss this action in tort, contending that the CISG preempts and subsumes the negligence/strict 
 
123 Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723, at *3 (stating that the 
trial court “finds that Gutierrez represented that Southeast Ranch had actually shipped 200,000 tons of 
agricultural products in the past and that it currently had double compressed hay available for shipment”).  
124 Id. at *6–8. 
125 See It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107149, at *1, *40 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013); Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, 
LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014). 
126 See Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120183 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 281, 287. The 
plaintiff in Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp alleged a claim in negligence in a separate count of its complaint, 
alleging that the defendant, ACIC/Brantford, was unable to supply the plaintiff, Invamed, with clathrate 
for a commercial launch. See also Israel 17 March 2009 Supreme Court (Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael 
Mendelson Ltd) (Aug. 7, 2020, 1:04 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html. Please note 
that the Israeli court’s decision is another significant example of the cases where the plaintiff brought both 
a claim for non-conformity and tort claim based on negligence against the seller (manufacturer) for 
negligent manufacturing of goods sold. 
127 Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183, at *18 n.4. 
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liability claim.128 Another example where the buyer asserted a negligence claim against the seller 
can be seen in TeeVee Toons, Inc.. The complaint stated,   
“Schubert had a duty to exercise the reasonable care and prudence that is 
customary in the high-speed packaging industry” in “its efforts to design, develop, 
manufacture, install, service, and repair the Biobox production system,” and that 
Schubert “failed to live up to its duty of reasonable care” such that TVT suffered 
“monetary damages” (including the “loss of funds” paid for the Schubert System 
itself and spent on maintenance to support use of the Schubert System and use of 
the Cinram facility and lost profits).129  
 
Given such allegations, the court then applied New York law to the negligence claim, so 
as to decide the actionability of the alleged claim.   
 Regarding claims for tortious interference, the party usually filed either a claim for 
intentional interference or a claim for negligent interference with prospective economic 
advantage. Evidently, when the buyer discovered that the seller delivered defective goods130 or 
that the goods did not conform to the agreed terms regarding the specifications,131 the buyer 
usually brought claims for tortious interference with business expectancy in connection with 
defective goods or non-conforming goods against the seller. Taking Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. 
Seneca Hardwoods LLC case as an example, the buyer asserted a tort claim based on negligent 
interference with prospective economic advantage, claiming that by delivering wooden planks 
that did not conform to the agreed terms regarding the specifications, the seller negligently 
interfered with the buyer’s prospective economic advantage.132 Additionally, another setting 
 
128 Id. at *4. 
129 TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *55 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
22, 2006). 
130 Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183, at *1. 
131 Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 4358 (PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. 




shows that the buyer asserted a claim for tortious interference relating to a breach of duty other 
than that imposed with regard to the products purchased.133 In Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. 
Gentec Enters., the buyer filed a counterclaim based on a claim of intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage, and a claim for negligent interference with prospective 
economic relations against the seller’s refusal to deliver the molds, tooling, and dies (“the 
molds”) that the seller used to create the products purchased.134 
 Taking the illustrative case of conversion, It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim 
Hotelgesellschaft mbH shows that the plaintiff-seller proceeded with a claim for conversion 
along with a breach of contract claim against the defendant-buyer and its employee, alleging that 
the buyer’s employee withheld payment from the plaintiff.135 Instead, the buyer in Shagrow filed 
a counterclaim based on conversion against the seller’s act of refusal to relinquish possession of 
“the molds” used to create the products sold when the buyer requested delivery.136   
The last common instance of a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is also worth mentioning. While one court considered the issue of the CISG’s preemption 
of such a claim sua sponte, the party in another court moved for a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state causes of action because the CISG preempts state law claims. Taking Weihai Textile Grp. 
Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC as an example in the former, the defendants brought 
counterclaims against the plaintiff, alleging a breach of contract and breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing for the plaintiff’s continued possession of defendants’ materials, and other 
 
133 Shagrow Telecom Tech Co. v. Gentec Enters., No. CV 13-08799-RGK-SSx, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
199891 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014).  
134 Id. at *1–3.   
135 It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107149, at *61 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013). 
136 Shagrow Telecom Tech Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199891, at *2, *6–7. 
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state law claims as well.137 In deciding the parties’ claims other than the contractual claim under 
the CISG, this court ruled that “[w]here the parties’ claims are duplicative or preempted by the 
CISG, the Court will dismiss them sua sponte.”138 As it was held, the counterclaim for an 
implied covenant was dismissed based on the ground that it is duplicative of the claim for breach 
of contract under the CISG because its allegation rested on the same underlying facts and 
conducts.139 Considering U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v. Pack Line Corp. as an example in the latter, 
the plaintiff, in this case, asserted a breach of the implied covenant of good faith, along with 
causes of action for breach of contract and other claims for breach of warranties against one of 
the defendants.140 Instead, the defendant contended that the CISG preempts state law claims.141 
Referring to Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co., this court held that the plaintiff’s claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith is duplicative of the claim for breach of contract 
due to the allegations being based on the same underlying facts.142 
All in all, what is of interest for this thesis is to discuss a range of court decisions above, 
whereby US tribunals encountered the real issues of the CISG’s preemption/concurrency of tort 
remedy regardless of a prior motion from either party, or which party brings such a tort claim. 
Thus, the following chapters will further analyze and understand the approaches which 
 
137 Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *12 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014). 
138 Id. at *40. 
139 Id. at *42–46. Although this court cited domestic case law rules as its authority when dismissing the 
duplicative claim of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, it also took into account the 
CISG’s scope. That is, the court still considered whether the alleged tortious conduct is the same as the 
breaching conduct alleged in the statement of the breach of contract claim under the CISG. 
140 U.S. Nonwovens Corp. v. Pack Line Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868, 870 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 872. 
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judiciaries would adopt in solving such issues at bar. Also, it aims to assess whether the 
approaches adopted are justifiably appropriate to deal with the tension between the CISG and tort 
law. 
D. The CISG’s Contractual Claims Commonly Interact with a Range of Tort Claims: 
Scope of Regulations and Protections   
It is necessary here to introduce a claim for non-conformity under Articles 35 and 36, 
which intend to protect the seller from excessive liability and thus provide for a balance of the 
parties’ interests in the goods purchased.143 This is because a claim for non-conformity under 
Articles 35 and 36 is typically brought together with other tort claims, as illustrated in Part C 
when the buyer suffers losses from defective goods. Thus, it is exclusively of practical 
importance to investigate the CISG’s rules on non-conformity to determine whether the alleged 
tortious actions and a claim for breach of warranty under the CISG possibly overlap each other. 
Likewise, the contracting party commonly asserts promissory estoppel, along with a claim for 
breach of contract under the CISG. Typically, the defendant attacks the promissory estoppel 
claim on the ground that the CISG preempts such a claim. Also, tribunals are inevitably required 
to consider the protection granted by Article 16(2)(b) to determine whether the alleged 
promissory estoppel claim falls within the CISG’s scope and is thus preempted. Article 16(2)(b) 
is of primary relevance when considering the interplay between the CISG and tort law. Thus, it is 
worth investigating the extent to which this provision provides for the protection of the offeree’s 
reliance on the offer received, which might overlap with tort law on promissory estoppel.    
 
143 Müller-Chen, supra note 9, at 732.  
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1. Claim for the Delivery of Non-conforming Goods 
Articles 35 and 36 are the pivotal provisions to be considered, to define the scope of 
regulations and protections when a claim for delivery of non-conforming goods is brought 
against a seller. While Article 35 is of importance for establishing the seller’s obligations with 
respect to the conformity of the goods, it is under Article 36 that the seller is held liable for lack 
of conformity of the goods existing at the time the risk passes to the buyer.144 This means that the 
CISG intends to regulate the duty to deliver conforming goods, and holds the seller liable for loss 
suffered from breach of such duty only at the time when the risk passes to the buyer.145   
The assessment of the non-conformity of goods under Article 35(1) encompasses 
variations in quantity, quality, and description, as required by the contract, as well as variances in 
a container for, or packaging of, the goods required by contract. As such, it could be said that the 
respective terms agreed to under the contract must be considered146 and interpreted to indicate 
the contractual duties and the respective interests to be protected under the contract and the CISG 
regarding this kind of express warranty claim.147   
 
144 Larry A. DiMatteo, Lucien Dhooge, Stephanie Greene, Virginia Maurer & Marisa Pagnattaro, The 
Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 391 (2004). 
145 (emphasis added). See also BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador (PetroEcuador), 
332 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that conformity standards should be tested prior to the passing 
of risk to the buyer).  
146 See Ajax Tool Works v. Can-Eng Mfg., No. 01 C 5938, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1306, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 29, 2003) (referring to Article 6 of the CISG and stating that the agreed terms are not completely 
superseded by provisions under the CISG). 
147 See id.; U.S. Nonwovens Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d 868. 
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Apart from the requirements, as described by the contract, conformity standards would be 
required by the default rules under Article 35(2), as an implied warranty148 or the parties’ 
presumed intentions.149 The first implied standard of Article 35(2)(a) requires the seller to deliver 
goods that are fit for all purposes150 for which goods of such description are ordinarily used. As 
regards another implied warranty, Article 35(2)(b) imposes the duty to furnish the goods to be fit 
for a particular purpose. The particular purpose under Article 35(2)(b) includes a special 
condition of merchantability, or of being capable of resale, which is principally determined by 
compliance under the public law of the seller’s country. It is also submitted that the seller may be 
obliged to supply goods that conform to those standards under the regulations of the buyer’s 
country or as per the laws enforced at the sub-purchaser’s country, when the goods are delivered 
directly to a sub-purchaser in a third country. The imposition of such a duty depends upon the 
seller’s knowledge of those particular requirements.151 If the special requirements under the 
 
148 See U.S. Nonwovens Corp., 4 N.Y.S.3d at 872 (stating that Article 35 of the CISG could be read to 
suggest claims for breach of implied warranties of fitness and merchantability); DiMatteo, Dhooge, 
Greene, Maurer & Pagnattaro, supra note 144, at 390. 
149 HENSCHEL, supra note 109, at 199, 219. 
150 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980 1, 32 (1980), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-ocred-e.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
151 There is an opinion that it is sufficient to assume the seller’s duty to comply with public law in this 
case if the seller has reason to know the purpose for which the goods would be used, or should have 
known about the regulations at issue. See Ingeborg Schwenzer, Part III Sale of Goods Chapter II 
Obligations of the Seller Section II Conformity of the Goods and Third-Party Claims Article 35, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 9, 
at 591, 605–07; see also CISG-AC Opinion No. 19, Standards and Conformity of the Goods under Article 
35 CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Djakhongir Saidov, King’s College London, United Kingdom. Adopted 
by the CISG Advisory Council following its 25th meeting, in Aalborg Denmark, on 25 November 2018, 
https://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_19d.pdf (last visited Aug. 
7, 2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 19]; Med. Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico 
Scientifica, S.R.L., CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-0380 SECTION “K”(1), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380, at 
*5–7 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999) (holding in affirming an arbitral award, which held that under the 
exceptions recognized by the foreign court decision, a seller was obligated to supply goods that conform 
to public laws and regulations enforced at the buyer’s place of business, when the seller knew or should 
have known about the regulations concerned). Cf. Peter Schlechtriem, Compliance with Local Law, 
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relevant country’s public law were applied to impose a duty on the seller, in either case, this duty 
would become a contractual duty under the CISG. Accordingly, the duty to comply with public 
law is likely identical to the duty imposed by the tort law of the country that is the buyer’s place 
of business, or the law of a third country, which is the place of delivery.152 Besides, the seller is 
deemed to warrant that the goods possess the qualities which he has presented to the buyer as a 
sample or model according to Article 35(2)(c).153 Lastly, the seller implicitly warrants that the 
goods are “contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no such 
manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.”154   
That being said, Article 35 imposes duties on the seller with respect to the contractual 
performance in delivering conforming goods in terms of their types, quantity, quality, and 
packaging. Thus, if any tortious duty, as recognized, involves those aspects of the contractual 
 
Seller’s Obligations and Liability: Annotation to German Supreme Court Decision of 2 March 2005 [VIII 
ZR 67/04], in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(CISG) 2005-2006 197, 201–02 (Pace Int’l Law Review ed., 2007) (noting that Article 35(2)(b) also gives 
protection to the seller by stating that the seller could not be reasonably expected to know all public law 
regulations or other local restrictions of merchantability in some circumstances). Cf. Austria 13 April 
2000 Supreme Court (Machines case) (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:19 PM), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000413a3.html (stating that the special requirements, which apply in the 
buyer’s country, could only be applied to impose upon the seller a duty to comply with such standards “if 
they also apply in the seller’s country, if they are agreed on, or if they are submitted to the seller at the 
time of the formation of the contract, according to Art 35(2)(b) CISG”). 
152 We can see an example of the US law of torts, which makes the commercial product sellers and 
distributors strictly liable when the designs or inadequate instructions or warnings violate, or do not 
comply with, any applicable governmental safety standard. This is because such noncompliance renders 
the product defective, whereas complying with such safety rules can reduce the risk that causes the 
plaintiff’s harm. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. §§ 1, 2, 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1998); 
see also, e.g., Australia 17 January 2003 Supreme Court of Western Australia (Ginza Pte Ltd v. Vista 
Corporation Pty Ltd), paras. 204–06 (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:30 PM), 
https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030117a2.html (finding that the applicable tort law imposes on the 
Singaporean seller a duty of care in furnishing the Australian buyer with goods manufactured, in 
compliance with the requirements of the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA)). 
153 See Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027–29 (2d Cir. 1995). 
154 CISG, supra note 91, art. 35(2)(d). 
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performance, it could be the case whereby the seller’s same conduct in failing to comply with the 
standards of conformity under Article 35 inevitably invokes elements of tortious action, thus 
resulting in the involvement of tort law. It is then necessary to discuss whether tort law still 
serves its function in regulating tortious conduct and giving the buyer a right to tort remedy in a 
situation where the CISG also regulates such a tortious obligation. Thus, the following chapters 
will discuss and analyze relevant rules and doctrines in order to answer this question.  
2. The Protection of the Offeree’s Reliance on the Offer Received under Article 
16(2)(b)  
Article 16(2)(b) states that an offer could not be revoked “if it was reasonable for the 
offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the 
offer.”155 According to Article 16(2)(b), the CISG protects the offeree’s justified reliance on a 
received offer, provided that the offeree also acted in reliance. It is submitted that Article 
16(2)(b) is not restricted only to cases where the offeree’s reliance is detrimental, whereby he 
suffers any provable damage because of the revocation.156 Another comparable view holds that 
Article 16(2)(b) is similar to the doctrine of promissory estoppel under US law,157 even though 
promissory estoppel has stricter requirements than those outlined under Article 16(2)(b).158 
 
155 Id. art. 16(2)(b). 
156 Ulrich G. Schroeter, Part II Formation of the Contract Article 16, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 9, at 318, 325.   
157 Donald J. Smythe, The Road to Nowhere: Caterpillar v. Usinor and CISG Claims by Downstream 
Buyers Against Remote Sellers, 2 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 123, 150 (2011); see Henry Mather, 
Firm Offers under the UCC and the CISG, 105 DICK. L. REV. 31, 48 (2000). 




Further, it is predicted that tribunals will more likely interpret and apply Article 16(2)(b) in the 
same way as US courts have used the common law for promissory estoppel.159   
One significant protection of reliance on an offer is that the revocation made is 
ineffective.160 Consequently, the offer can be accepted and the sales contract concludes when the 
acceptance becomes effective, creating rights and obligations under the contract and the 
Convention. In this event, when the offeror fails to perform his duty as promised, the failure to 
fulfill his obligation constitutes a breach of contract.161 Accordingly, the offeree has the right to 
remedies for breach of contract under the CISG. Thus, it is submitted that as long as the offeror 
has not acted fraudulently, claims for damages under domestic law on promissory estoppel must 
be excluded, because the offeree can treat the revocation as a refusal to perform his obligations 
under the contract governed by the CISG.162   
 However, one may argue that the only remedy explicitly stated in Part II of the CISG–
that is to hold the offer open so the offeree can conclude a contract– is insufficient when it is 
economically impractical for the offeree to accept and thereby complete the contract.163 In this 
setting, given the fact that the offeree had reasonably relied on the offer and acted to his 
 
159 Id.  
160 FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: CONVENTION ON THE 
LIMITATION PERIOD IN THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: COMMENTARY 89 (1992). 
161 See generally Shahdeen Malik, Offer: Revocable or Irrevocable. Will Art. 16 of the Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale Ensure Uniformity?, 25 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 26, 26–49 (1985) 
(Reproduced by Pace Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Commercial Law with permission from Indian J. Int’l L.) 
(discussing the nullity of the purported revocation of an irrevocable offer and gives an opinion that the 
offeree may ignore such revocation and seek damages under a contractual claim).  
162 Schroeter, supra note 156, at 326–27. 
163 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION 167 (3d ed. 1999) (Reproduced by Pace Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Commercial Law with 
permission of the publisher, Kluwer Law International). 
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detriment, recourse to promissory estoppel under domestic tort law is necessary and 
simultaneously permitted. Otherwise, tribunals are invited to develop general principles under 
the Convention regarding a remedy for damages suffered from the offeror’s wrongful revocation 
through the method of gap-filling under Article 7(2).164   
Apart from the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel, the European doctrine of 
culpa in contrahendo, recognized under the civil law system, is seen as a corollary of the 
irrevocable offer doctrine.165 The problem of the CISG’s scope, in relation to pre-contractual 
liability based on the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, thus resembles the main problem asked 
regarding the Convention’s scope of promissory estoppel. Since this concept of pre-contractual 
liability could not be developed and adopted as the uniform rules under the CISG, Peter 
Schlechtriem and John O. Honnold thus concede that the quest of pre-contractual liability for 
breaking off negotiations is a matter outside the CISG’s boundaries.166 Nevertheless, Michael 
Joachim Bonell argues that, given that the concept of pre-contractual liability may, in essence, 
encompass different situations, a distinction should be drawn between such cases, in order to 
determine the extent to which they probably fall under the Convention’s scope.167   
 
164 Id. at 168. 
165 See Shelley v. Trafalgar House Pub., 977 F. Supp. 95, 97–98 (D.P.R. 1997). 
166 See Harry M. Flechtner, Transcript of a Workshop on the Sales Convention: Leading CISG Scholars 
Discuss Contract Formation, Validity, Excuse for Hardship, Avoidance, Nachfrist, Contract 
Interpretation, Parol Evidence, Analogical Application, and Much More, 18 J.L. & COM. 191, 223, 230 
(1999) (transcribing John O. Honnold’s statement, which is that “I am right with you in thinking that you 
cannot get culpa in contrahendo out of the Convention, even though—as you may know—I’m very 
strong for developing the principles of the Convention”). 
167 Michael Joachim Bonell, Formation of Contracts and Precontractual Liability under the Vienna 
Convention on International Sale of Goods, in FORMATION OF CONTRACTS AND PRECONTRACTUAL 
LIABILITY 157, 167, 171 (1990); see Marco Torsello, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 630, 637–39, 646 (Larry A. 
DiMatteo ed., 2014). 
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 Based on Bonell’s idea of distinguishing the different situations of pre-contractual 
liability, it is persuasive to consider promissory estoppel under American law as a kind of extra-
contractual liability, when it has been developed to protect contracting parties from damages 
incurred at a stage prior to concluding the contract. Accordingly, that matter falls outside the 
realm of the CISG, provided that the contract is not concluded due to improper conduct of the 
offeror during negotiation or because, in the view of the offeree, it would be uneconomic to 
accept the offer and continue the preparatory work in reliance on such offer, predicting the 
offeror’s breach.168 However, this thesis raises a critical point, which is that it would impair the 
uniform application of Article 16, along with Article 74, if the offeree were allowed to ignore the 
protection under Article 16 and then rely on the domestic claim of promissory estoppel to 
recover specifically expectation interests, which would reach the same outcome as under the 
protection provided by the Convention (emphasis added). If, in contrast, the offeree claimed that 
promissory estoppel made the offeror bound by his unilateral promise, and then, upon the 
effective acceptance, based his right as agreed to under the contract, the alleged promissory 
estoppel matter would entirely overlap with Article 16 and other relevant provisions on remedies 
for breach of the sale contract, and thus fall under the CISG’s scope. In such an event, it is 
necessary to discuss further the extent of the degree of the preemptive force the CISG may have 
over a tort claim in the case where both norms entirely overlap each other.  
 
168 See generally Malik, supra note 161, at 26–49. But see Schroeter, supra note 156, at 326 (submitting, 
to the contrary, that the offeree cannot treat the revocation as it is effective and choose to resort to the 
right to damages under domestic law). 
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E. Preliminary Conclusion  
In practice, there exist several cases in which an injured party brought tort actions 
alongside a breach of contract claim under the CISG. Each contracting party proceeded with the 
tortious actions in hope that, for legitimate reasons, the right to a concurrent tort claim is 
recognized by the applicable law of tort, and that the party would gain benefits from the 
incidental rules of the law of torts.   
On one hand, US tort laws recognize a variety of claims for breach of tortious duties. The 
existence of the extra-contractual duty or interest under the law of torts is intended to support 
domestic tort laws to serve their particular functions alongside the CISG. On the other hand, 
some alleged claims in tort, such as those based on product liability and negligence for pure 
economic loss, or a tortious breach of duty of good faith, are not available under US tort law. 
Notably, US tort laws on the availability of claims in tort might not be similar to the laws of 
other countries. Given that the applicable tort law of a foreign country presumably recognizes the 
alleged tortious actions, tribunals inevitably encounter the involvement of tort laws, and thus 
need to deal with the CISG’s preemption of those tort claims when resolving disputes arising 
from international sales. Therefore, the following chapters will further discuss the CISG’s 
features and its interpretive dimension, as well as analyze scholars’ viewpoints and judicial 








II. THE FEATURES OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND ITS PREEMPTIVE FORCE ON TORT CLAIMS 
It is generally accepted that regard must be had for a uniform law for international sales 
when tribunals are confronted with any controversial questions posed due to the involvement of 
this Convention. Likewise, to answer the question of whether, and to what extent, the CISG 
preempts the alleged tort claims, as specifically stressed by this thesis, the primary need is 
therefore the exploration of the CISG itself. Before exploring the diverse scholarly and practical 
legal opinions, it is essential to first investigate whether, and to what extent, the CISG and its 
historical legislation suggest regarding the scope of the CISG and its preemption of tort remedy. 
This chapter discusses the history of the CISG’s rules, the CISG’s text, its purposes and 
functions, the CISG’s approach to remedies, and its approach to party autonomy. Subsequently, 
these explorations will navigate and justify the academic and juridical arguments concerning the 
interaction between the CISG and tort laws.     
A. The CISG’s Historical Evolution and Its Preemptive Power 
This part presents the CISG’s historical evolution, so as to investigate what the history of 
the uniform law for international sales suggests about the CISG’s preemption of tort claims. 
The Draft of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods – the CISG draft – was reviewed and considered by sixty-two countries at the 
diplomatic conference in Vienna in 1980.169 Before the preparation of the CISG draft, its two 
predecessors, namely a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS),170 and a 
 
169 E. Allan Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History and Scope, 18 INT’L L. 17, 17 (1984). 
170 ULIS came into force on August 18, 1972, without being ratified by the United States. See Muna 
Ndulo, The Vienna Sales Convention 1980 and the Hague Uniform Laws on International Sale of Goods 
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Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF),171 had 
laid the foundation for the uniform laws governing the international sales of goods. The CISG 
draft was established from work on a revision and a modification of the ULIS, which only has a 
few Contracting States, most of which are from Western Europe.172 The work on harmonization 
and unification of uniform rules for international sales was carried on by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), established by the United Nations 
General Assembly.173 The UNCITRAL appointed a Working Group of fourteen Member States 
to study the ULIS and consider what changes should be made to this Convention.174 The 
modifications to the ULIS were expected to make the uniform sale laws more acceptable to 
various countries with their variety of legal, social, and economic systems.175 In this regard, the 
text of the CISG draft was finally formulated by adopting, rewriting, modifying, and deleting 
some provisions of ULIS.176 It is worth noting that throughout the process of improving the text 
of the CISG, the revised CISG draft, together with the commentary, was sent to the governments 
 
1964: A Comparative Analysis, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 2 (1989); see also Farnsworth, id. at 17 (stating 
that a final text of the ULIS did not justify United States’ ratification). 
171 The United States did not ratify the ULF which came into force on August 23, 1972. See Ndulo, supra 
note 170, at 2–3. 
172 Kazuaki Sono, The Vienna Sales Convention: History and Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 1, 2 (Petar Sarcevic & Paul Volken eds., 1986) (Reproduced by Pace 
Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Commercial Law with permission of Oceana Publications). 
173 Farnsworth, supra note 169, at 18; John Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223, 225 (1979). 
174 Honnold, supra note 173, at 225–26. 
175 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 4; see also Farnsworth, supra note 169, at 18; Ndulo, supra note 170, at 3. 
176 Henry Landau, Background to U.S. Participation in United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, 18 INT’L L. 29, 30 (1984). 
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of various nations and interested international organizations so as to gather their comments and 
proposals.177   
In revising relevant provisions regarding the preemptive effect of the uniform sale law, 
three relevant proposals were worthy of being considered. The discussions and decisions of these 
proposals are the main focus of this thesis and are presented as follows. 
Firstly, the Working Group considered the proposal to delete Articles 34178 and 53179 of 
the ULIS.180 The Working Group’s main discussions were primarily focused on deleting Article 
34. In the third session, the Working Group considered the ULIS draftsmen’s intention in 
enacting Article 34. It was noted that the drafters intended “to protect the uniformity of the rules 
of Article 33 regarding conformity of the goods by preventing recourse to other remedies 
available under some national rules, like a plea of nullity, based on mistake as to the quality of 
goods.”181 The Working Group feared that the retention of Article 34 might go considerably far 
beyond what the draftsmen intended. It was further argued that the text of Article 34 could 
“possibly be interpreted to preclude not only remedies under the national law but those remedies 
 
177 Sono, supra note 172, at 5. 
178 Article 34 of the ULIS states that “In the cases to which Article 33 relates, the rights conferred on the 
buyer by the present Law exclude all other remedies based on lack of conformity of the goods.” See 
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July, 1964 (1964), 
https://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1964ulis/convention-international-sale-goods1964.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
179 Article 53 of the ULIS states that “The rights conferred on the buyer by Article 52 exclude all other 
remedies based on the fact that the seller has failed to perform his obligation to transfer the property in the 
goods or that the goods are subject to a right or claim of a third person.” See id. 
180 JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES: 
THE STUDIES, DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 97, 103–04, 151 (1989). 
181 Id. at 104.  
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that the parties might have agreed upon in the contract.”182 Although there were proposals to 
modify the text of Article 34 to prevent ambiguous interpretation, the proposals were not 
accepted.183 Finally, the Working Group concluded that “[A]rticle 34 should be deleted 
altogether for lack of appropriate language that would clearly reflect the intention of the 
draftsmen of this article.”184 It was also noted that the requirement for resolving the tension 
between the rules of Article 33 and national laws, which were referred to as the intention of the 
draftsmen of the ULIS, would arise only in exceptional cases.185 However, the Working Group 
clearly reported, and submitted in its fourth session, that the decision to remove Article 34 does 
not indicate disagreement with the objective of protecting “the uniformity of the Law by 
prohibiting recourse to other remedies provided under some national rules that would be 
different than those established by the present Law for failure to perform the contract of sale.”186 
It was also stated in the report that varying national rules on the matters covered by the 
provisions of the Uniform Law are displaced by virtue of “the general obligation to give effect to 
the Uniform Law.”187 It was suggested that “this obligation has been reinforced by the Working 
Group’s revision of [A]rticle 17,188 which specially directs attention to the international character 
of the law and the need to promote uniformity in its interpretation and application.”189 From the 
 
182 Id. at 104, 121. 
183 Id. at 104. 
184 Id. at 104, 121. 
185 Id. at 104. 
186 Id. at 121.  
187 Id.   
188 The text of the Uniform Law’s revised Article 17 states, “[In interpreting and applying the provisions 
of this law, regard shall be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity [in its 
interpretation and application].].” Id. at 109. 
189 Id. at 121.  
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viewpoint of the Working Group, it is impractical to specifically insert a statement reiterating 
that inconsistent national laws are replaced in connection with each of the rules of the Uniform 
Law.190 
This thesis argues that there are two primary reasons for not including any exclusivity 
provision similar to the text of Article 34 of the ULIS when revising the previous uniform sale 
laws. On the one hand, the Working Group needed to prevent the exclusion of remedies which 
the parties might have otherwise agreed to in their contract. On the other hand, the Working 
Group decided to leave open the problem of the interaction between the Convention and 
inconsistent domestic laws, instead giving the tribunals some guidelines under the text of the 
revised Article 17 of the Uniform Law,191 when they are to be faced with the issue of the right to 
remedies apart from those provided by the Uniform Law. Accordingly, it is impossible to infer 
from the deletion of Article 34 of the ULIS that the drafters intended to give the parties 
unrestricted recourse to domestic remedies under tort laws. Nor is it clear that the drafters 
supported a recourse to remedies under the Convention as mutually exclusive, so long as the 
drafters were more willing to honor party autonomy in its decision when deleting Article 34. 
Subsequently, the Working Group, at its fourth session, decided to delete Article 53 as per the 
suggestion given in the Secretary-General’s report, based on the ground that Article 53 paralleled 
with Article 34, which the Working Group had decided to delete.192 Consequently, at 
UNCITRAL’s tenth session, the Committee decided not to retain a proposed exclusivity clause, 
which stated that “the Convention limit the rights of the buyer to those conferred on him by the 
 
190 Id.  
191 This text was ultimately modified and adopted as the text of Article 7(1) of the CISG. 
192 HONNOLD, supra note 180, at 151.  
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Convention so that, except in cases of fraud,193 remedies based upon national law are 
excluded.”194 Similar to the reasoning provided by the Working Group, it was explained that 
such a proposal would add a risk of interpretation, in the way that it prevents the buyer from 
relying upon remedies agreed in the contract.195 Furthermore, it was also pointed out that it may 
be inadvisable to protect a seller who delivers defective products, thereby causing damage by 
precluding a buyer from asserting claims in tort.196 
Secondly, the Working Group decided to delete Article 89197 of the ULIS, which 
expressly grants the determination of damages, in case of fraud, to the domestic rules applicable 
to contracts of sales not governed by the ULIS. Comments provided by governments and 
international organizations claimed that the reasons underlying this decision seemed to be, 
among other things, a need for uniformity.198 In its disagreement with the deletion of Article 89 
of the ULIS, Norway suggested the Committee take into consideration that “the convention does 
not govern and cannot unify the effect of fraud regarded as a tort independent of contract, in 
 
193 Norway submitted its comment that “any remedy under national law based on tortious fraud shall be 
available to the buyer,” although it was believed that the exclusivity provision is important to preclude the 
buyer from resorting to “remedies under national law which are not considered as remedies for breach of 
contract, for instance remedies relating to error, mistake, misrepresentation or the like.” See Comments by 
Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/125 and A/CN.9/125/Add.1 to 3 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 8 U.N. Comm’n 
on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. 109, 122, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.    
194 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Tenth 
Session, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/32/17 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 8 U.N. 
Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. 11, 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.    
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 Article 89 of the ULIS states, “In case of fraud, damages shall be determined by the rules applicable in 
respect of contracts of sale not governed by the present Law.” See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law 
on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July, 1964, supra note 178. 
198 Comments by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods, supra note 193, at 125.  
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particular where the fraud is committed before or during the conclusion of the contract.”199 
Norway thus proposed that this decision to delete Article 89 of the ULIS be revised, and that the 
draft Convention should also regulate whether, and to what extent, fraudulent conduct in 
performing a contract affects recoverable damages.200 However, at UNCITRAL’s tenth session, 
although the Committee was asked to reconsider deleting Article 89 of ULIS, the proposal did 
not attract sufficient support to be discussed any further.201 Rather, it is assumed that the 
proposal regarding uniform rules on damages in fraud cases was not accepted. This is primarily 
because it appears that no provision of the CISG regulates the effect of fraud in the performance 
of the contract on damages that could be recovered. 
Thirdly, the Diplomatic Conference by the First Committee considered a joint proposal202 
at its third meeting, to exclude claims for death and personal injury from the Convention’s 
coverage. While discussing a joint proposal, some delegates further called for a modification of 
the proposal, so as to exclude damage to other properties.203 Otherwise, it was suggested that the 
 
199 Id.  
200 U.N. Secretary-General, Analysis of Comments by Governments and International Organizations on 
the Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods as Adopted by the Working Group on the 
International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/126 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 8 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade L. Y.B. 142, 162, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.    
201 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Tenth 
Session, supra note 194, at 61.    
202 See United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 
11 April, 1980, supra note 150, at 72–73, 85, 245–46 (indicating that “Article 4. [Substantive coverage of 
Convention] Finland, France and the United States propose new provisions which would exclude from the 
coverage of the Convention claims for damages due to personal injury. France would also exclude claims 
due to death. Finland would also exclude liability of the seller for damage caused by the goods sold to 
other goods, unless the goods sold were used in the production of the damaged goods.” Ultimately, all 
three proposals were consolidated as a joint proposal of Finland, France, the United States of America, 
adding a new Article 4 bis to read as follows: “This Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller 
for death or injury caused by the goods to any person”). 
203 Id. at 245. 
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joint proposal should not be interpreted a contrario in relation to material damage. It was also 
proposed that product liability claim for damages to property should be considered as tort claims 
falling outside the scope of the CISG.204 However, France’s delegation reasoned that their joint 
amendment is based on the belief that damages to property were included in economic loss, and 
excluding these kinds of damages would contradict other provisions of the Uniform Law, 
especially those that cover the conformity of goods.205 Because a joint proposal received greater 
support from other delegates, the First Committee ultimately denied the proposal of excluding 
claims, for loss to other goods caused by the goods sold, from the CISG’s scope 206 and 
forwarded the joint proposal to a Drafting Committee.207 Considering the drafting history of 
Article 5, it is unlikely that the drafters intended to exclude all claims for product liability and 
reserve the issues of product liability to domestic law (emphasis added). Additionally, it would 
go against the drafters’ intention if it were believed that the exclusion of liability for death and 
personal injury could be analogized to liability for damages to property. 
In conclusion, there were efforts to synthesize and harmonize the legal concepts and rules 
of sales contract in both common and civil law systems.208 After various attempts to modify and 
revise previous uniform sale laws, as well as analyze and improve the text of the revised draft in 
accordance with the comments and proposals given by governments and international 
 
204 Id.  
205 Id. at 246. 
206 See Warren Khoo, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions Chapter I Sphere of 
Application Article 5: Product Liability, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 
1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 49, 50 (C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell et al. eds., 1987). 
207 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 246. 
208 Landau, supra note 176, at 33. 
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organizations, the drafting committees finalized the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention. The 
Draft Convention was considered and approved at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, 
comprised of the Representatives from sixty-two Member States.209 According to Article 99(1), 
the Convention entered into force on January 1, 1988. It has eighteen signatories, including the 
United States of America.210 Currently, the Convention has been ratified, accepted, approved, or 
acceded by ninety-three States.211 The CISG is voluntarily adopted, which means that contracting 
parties can opt out of it and are not legally bound.212 The option to withdraw is important 
because the CISG mainly applies to the international sale of goods213 that may concurrently be 
subject to other domestic laws, bringing about a tension between the Convention and domestic 
law. Considering historical accounts through the drafting process is thus extremely important in 
providing guidelines to deal with the issue of the interaction between both legal bodies. As 
investigated, it seems that the historical perspective is likely to support the prevention of conflict 
between the CISG and tort law in some circumstances, i.e., in case of liability for death and 
personal injury. Also, the drafters aimed for matters falling under the scope of the Uniform Law 
to be subject to the same balanced rules of the Convention. Nevertheless, the drafting committees 
 
209 See United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 
11 April, 1980, supra note 150, at 176. 
210 https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=X-10&chapter=10&lang=en 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
211 https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg/status (last visited Aug. 7, 
2020). 
212 CISG, supra note 91, art. 6; see also Delchi Carrier Spa v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Thyssenkrupp 
Metallurgical Prods. GmbH v. Energy Coal, S.p.A., No. 653938/14, Slip Op. 31922(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 14, 2015) (recognizing parties’ right to opt out of the CISG).  
213 The application of the CISG depends on its sphere of application, including the internationality 
requirement (Article 1), the substantive requirement (Article 2 and Article 3) and the scope of application 




did not explicitly suggest that the CISG be applied as an exclusive instrument and thus 
completely prevent the party from relying on any domestic tort remedy. The reason may be that 
the drafters, other governments, and interested international organizations seem to accept that the 
CISG’s rules could not possibly be established to extensively govern all matters that can arise 
relating to international sale contracts, such as fraud cases. Regardless, the drafter insisted that 
both, the international character of the Convention and the need to promote uniformity in its 
application, be prioritized. At this point, it should also be said that the historical development of 
the CISG, however, does not definitively point in any clear direction in terms of its preemption 
of tort remedies.   
B. The Text of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power 
Dealing with the question of the CISG’s preemptive effect begs the question of whether 
the text of the CISG tells us something about the interaction between the CISG and other 
domestic laws. In comparison with either the predecessor of the uniform law for international 
sales214 or other uniform laws for international carriage,215 no provision of the CISG expressly 
 
214 See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July, 1964, 
supra note 178. 
215 Article 24 of Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 
signed in Warsaw on 12 October 1929 (Warsaw Convention) states that,  
1. In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however 
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this 
Convention. 
2. In the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph 
also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are the persons who have the 
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.  
See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Warsaw, 
12 Oct., 1929 (1929), http://library.arcticportal.org/1588/1/Warsaw1929.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
Article 29 of Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, open for 
Signature in Montreal on 28 May 1999 (Montreal Convention 1999) states that,  
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provides for the preemptive power of the CISG and directs application of the CISG in a way that 
excludes all other remedies available under domestic law. Likewise, no express rule of the CISG 
provides for concurrent tort action based on the condition that it can only be brought subject to 
the CISG’s rules and principles. It is, however, assumed that the omission of provisions 
indicating the exclusivity of the CISG does not necessarily translate to the notion that parties can 
resort to domestic remedies without any restrictions.216 Possible restrictions on the right to 
domestic remedies arguably depend upon whether the matters in question fall under the CISG’s 
sphere of application.   
The CISG itself limits its sphere of application to cross-border transactions,217 particular 
types of contracts,218 and a set of questions within its scope.219 Hence, the CISG, in essence, has 
not decisively displaced domestic contract laws or other areas of laws that govern the matters 
outside its sphere of application. It is also clearly stated that the CISG does not displace rules of 
contract law governing matters that the CISG excludes from its scope.220 
 
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, 
however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, 
can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in 
this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who have the 
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, 
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable. 
See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, Montreal, 28 May, 
1999 (1999), https://www.iata.org/contentassets/fb1137ff561a4819a2d38f3db7308758/mc99-full-text.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
216 Schwenzer, supra note 151, at 617. 
217 CISG, supra note 91, art. 1. 
218 Id. arts. 2–3. 
219 Id. arts. 4–5. 
220 Id. art. 4; see also Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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The tribunals are, however, challenged by more complicated situations when the CISG’s 
sphere of application overlaps with the domain of domestic laws. As for the CISG’s preemption 
of contract law, it is agreed that the CISG entirely replaces domestic contract laws,221 and that it 
exclusively governs disputes that fall under the CISG’s coverage regarding the international sale 
of covered goods. This is because the CISG was intentionally established as a uniform law 
governing the contractual relationship between the parties. However, it is possibly controversial 
to reach a similar assumption in terms of such a replacement when it comes to the concurring tort 
laws, for which the drafters of the CISG intentionally did not substitute this uniform law.   
Given that the CISG does not explicitly state its interaction with domestic tort laws, it is 
necessary to investigate the provisions regarding its sphere of application, especially those 
expressly limiting its scope of application. An understanding of the substantive scope of 
application is required because, a fortiori, the matters of tort remedies that are outside the 
potential scope of the CISG should generally be permitted. That is to say, if it were proved that 
the issues of tort remedies fall under the limited scope of the CISG, it would likely be accepted 
that tort remedies are suppressed in order to sustain uniformity. After recognizing the CISG’s 
provisions concerning its scope, the tribunals would be able to further determine in what way, 
and to what extent, the CISG interacts with domestic tort laws governing the relevant matters.   
 
221 Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging, Inc., No. 10-05321, 2012 U.S. Dist. 




1. The CISG’s Text regarding the Limited Types of the Contract Falling under Its 
Substantive Sphere and Its Preemptive Power 
The CISG’s substantive sphere of application is limited to a contract for the sale of 
goods, notwithstanding the civil or commercial character of the parties or of the contract itself.222 
In addition, Article 3 of the CISG provides that some other types of contracts could be 
considered a sale contract and thus fall under the CISG’s sphere of application. According to 
Article 3(1), contracts for the supply of goods to be manufactured or produced can be governed 
by the CISG, unless it appears that the party who orders or purchases the goods to be 
manufactured or produced undertakes the duty to supply a substantial part of the materials 
necessary for the manufacturing or production. In Article 3(2), the CISG itself excludes those 
contracts that impose a duty on the seller to supply labor or other services, alongside the 
obligation to furnish the goods insomuch as the supply of labor or other services occupies a 
preponderant part of the seller’s obligations. In other words, if the preponderance of the seller’s 
obligations does not consist of the supply of labor or other services, such a contract will be 
subject to the CISG. Thus, the contractual liability arising from international sales contracts 
could involve a breach of the duties in manufacturing goods, in supplying labor, or in 
undertaking the services that the seller agreed to under these particular types of contracts. 
Consequently, it is often argued that negligent conduct in the performance of these obligations is 
essentially a breach of a contractual duty, so the CISG, rather than domestic tort law, governs the 
right to a remedy for losses incurred from this breach.   
 
222 CISG, supra note 91, art. 1(3). 
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Furthermore, Article 2(a) excludes from its substantive sphere the sale that is termed a 
consumer contract, which includes the sale of goods bought for personal, family, or household 
use.223 Nevertheless, the CISG still governs consumer contracts if the seller does not know, nor 
ought to have known, the intention with which the goods were bought, i.e. for personal, family, 
or household use, prior to or at the conclusion of the contract. The reason underlying this 
exclusion of consumer contracts is because many legal systems intend to govern consumer 
transactions under laws and regulations designed to specifically protect consumers.224 Also, 
based on the idea that the consumers are in a weak negotiating position when faced by 
professional sellers, the drafters did not wish for the CISG to override the imperative rules of 
national systems aiming to implement public policy and providing for special protection.225 This 
thesis proposes that there are two potential viewpoints concerning the preemption problem, 
which can be inferred from Article 2(a). One perspective is that, as long as both parties are 
businesspersons who engage in arms-length commercial bargaining through contract negotiation, 
the drafters were not afraid of the CISG’s overriding power over tort remedies. Also, the drafters 
preferred applying the CISG irrespective of the fact that the relationship between merchants also 
falls under the protections provided by domestic laws. In other words, as far as the matter was 
between international corporations and falls within the CISG’s scope, the drafters did not want it 
to be governed by contradictory domestic laws. Evidently, the same is true in a case where the 
seller does not know, nor ought to have known, about personal, family, or household use. 
 
223 Article 2(a) excludes consumer sales based on the characteristics and purposes of transactions, no 
matter what rules on consumer contracts are applied. See id. art. 2(a). 
224 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Tenth 
Session, supra note 194, at 27.    
225 HONNOLD, supra note 180, at 49–50.  
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Accordingly, parties’ contemplation of the characteristics of international commercial trade is 
seemingly one supportive justification for giving the CISG preemptive force in its application to 
matters falling under its scope. The second perspective is that the uniform law should not be 
applied in a way so as to replace tort laws, if those rules are especially established to protect 
extra-contractual interests, have a mandatory character, or embrace public policies, which aim to 
provide for special protection. 
2. The CISG’s Text regarding the Scope of Application and Its Preemptive Power 
 The standardization of a specific area of law inevitably causes the problem of 
delimitation between the uniform law and national law. The CISG attempts to solve this issue by 
defining its scope in both a positive and negative manner. From what has been said thus far, it is 
possible to give the CISG a preemptive effect when the matters in question fall within the 
CISG’s scope. Admittedly, it is even more critical to preliminarily consider the language of the 
Convention itself so as to uncover the extent of the CISG’s scope.   
2.1 The Provision Expressly Says That Specific Types of Questions Fall within the 
Scope of the CISG 
 Article 4 is the most important provision in regards to the matters falling under the 
Convention’s scope. The literal wording of Article 4 seems to exclusively draw a clear line 
between matters within the CISG’s scope, and matters left to domestic law. One scholar 
nevertheless opines that it is not so simple to answer what rights and obligations arise out of a 
contract for the sale of goods, when considering matters under the CISG’s scope.226 Accordingly, 
 
226 Warren Khoo, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions Chapter I Sphere of Application 
Article 4: Questions to be Covered by Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES 
LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, supra note 206, at 44, 46. 
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this scholarly opinion further suggests that the best approach is to give the CISG the widest 
possible scope of application, so long as the application is consistent with the CISG’s aim as a 
global uniform rule governing the relationship between parties to transnational sales.227 This 
suggestion of granting a wide scope to the CISG, and extending its scope to cover matters of tort 
remedy, may be unpersuasive so long as no provision sufficiently indicates how the CISG’s rules 
include the alleged matters of tort remedies. Moreover, one may argue that granting this wide 
scope is not recommended as the proper way to sustain uniformity, insofar as the parties can 
exercise the freedom to opt out of the Convention or to deviate from its rules. Nevertheless, a 
restrictive consideration and a narrow interpretation of the text of Article 4, irrespective of 
whether other provisions stipulate otherwise, are inadvisable. If the tribunals strictly adhered to 
the literal wording of the first sentence of Article 4, the alleged tort claims would almost always 
be considered as matters outside the CISG’s scope. Accordingly, a party who is detrimentally 
influenced by the more restrictive uniform rules of the CISG is inclined to resort to those tort 
remedies to avoid the uniform rules. Thus, this thesis takes the view that the language of the first 
sentence of Article 4 is insufficient to assess the CISG’s scope of application. In this regard, the 
extent to which the CISG concurs with, or preempts, the alleged tort claims does not depend 
solely on the text of the first sentence of Article 4. Article 4, in essence, says that any disputed 
matters concerning contractual relationships are to be governed by the CISG. From the viewpoint 
of this thesis, Article 4 correspondingly conveys that in considering the scope of the CISG, 
regard must be had to a range of rights and obligations to which the parties agree, and indicates 
that the agreed terms are integral parts of the CISG. It is thus extremely necessary to consider 
Article 4 in connection with other relevant provisions of both the CISG and the contract 
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providing for rights, obligations, and remedies among the parties, in order to infer the substantive 
scope of the CISG.   
2.2 The Provisions Expressly Say That Specified Matters Are outside the Scope of 
the CISG 
Some matters are explicitly excluded from the ambit of the CISG by virtue of the second 
sentence of Article 4. The words “in particular” as used in the text of Article 4 indicate that the 
matter of validity and the issue of property in goods sold, set out in subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
respectively, are not the only matters which fall outside the scope of the Convention. Also, it is 
specifically stressed by Article 5 that a seller’s liability for death or personal injury caused by 
goods is to be addressed under applicable domestic law. In this regard, this thesis takes the view 
that apart from the matters listed in Articles 4 and 5, there are other legal issues that could 
possibly be considered as matters outside the CISG. It does not matter whether or not those 
matters are explicitly specified. For instance, a tort claim for damages to property could be 
exclusively governed by rules of applicable domestic law if it were concerned with the interests 
and obligations of the parties, which are separate from rights and obligations arising from a 
contract of sale, or those which come out of the substantive contents of the CISG’s rules.  
(1) Article 4(a): The Validity of the Contract or of Any of Its Provisions or of Any 
Usage 
As Article 4(a) expressly states, the CISG is not concerned with the validity of the 
agreement, the contractual provisions, or of any usage, unless otherwise expressed in the 
Convention. One scholar suggests that the validity-exclusion leaves the issues of “error, mistake, 
fraud, duress, unconscionability, and illegality to be determined solely by the application of 
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municipal law.”228 Another reliable view, however, suggests that substance determines whether 
the issue falls within the Convention or is instead excluded by Article 4(a).229 According to this 
view, the label or characterization of validity issues, specified by different domestic laws, is 
irrelevant.230 Besides, an exception of Article 4 stating, “except as otherwise expressly provided 
in this Convention” arguably supports the requirement to consider the substance of the issue. To 
exemplify, domestic contract laws of some States characterize the requirement of a written form 
of contract as a validity problem. As we can see, the substance of such a rule entirely overlaps 
with the substantive contents of Article 11, which explicitly provide otherwise.231 The defense of 
failure to conclude a contract in writing is thus solely governed by Article 11, though the CISG 
does not expressly state that Article 11 will replace domestic laws on validity requirements as to 
form. Thus, the scholarly view aforementioned is likely to support the idea of considering the 
substance of issue deduced from the exception of Article 4 in determining the question of 
whether the competing tort laws are displaced or affected by the Convention.   
As far as the validity issue is concerned, the validity of contractual clauses is significant 
and thus worth considering. The agreed terms regarding rights and obligations that differ from 
the CISG provisions may, for example, result in unfairness and tension between the parties’ 
 
228 Kevin Bell, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 237, 252 (1996). 
229 HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 67–68, 263. 
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231 Article 11 states that “A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing 
and is not subject to any other requirement as to form.” CISG, supra note 91, art. 11. 
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rights and duties.232 Therefore, such terms will be controlled by domestic law insofar as the 
validity of contractual clauses is called into question under Article 4(a).233 According to Article 
4(a), the validity of an exculpatory clause excluding or limiting the parties’ contractual liability 
is to be determined by applicable domestic law. It follows that the exculpatory clause would be 
found enforceable under applicable domestic law, and the breaching party is thus released from 
contractual liability under the CISG. Nevertheless, no provision of the CISG explicitly suggests 
whether concurring tort liability is terminated or limited when preventing an outcome that is 
inconsistent with the result of the contractual claim, which respects the party autonomy in 
excluding or limiting the contractual liability. 
(2) Article 5: The Liability of the Seller for Death or Personal Injury Caused by the 
Goods  
Article 5 of the CISG expressly excludes from its scope the liability of the seller for death 
or personal injury caused to any person by the goods. This provision therefore prevents the 
overlap between the CISG and certain types of tort remedies available under domestic law. On 
one hand, the reasons for excluding liability for death and personal injury recognize the rapid 
development of national laws concerning product liability, and perceive an immediate 
requirement for specific international solutions to deal with such claims on product liability.234 
On the other hand, the wording of Article 5 was adopted to avoid conflict between the CISG’s 
rules and domestic rules concerning product liability, especially since some are not based on 
 
232 Rolf Herber, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions Chapter I Sphere of Application 
Introduction to Articles 1–6, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 38, at 13, 57.  
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234 Bell, supra note 228, at 254.  
 
 79 
tort.235 However, the final text of Article 5 reads that the Convention excludes liability for death 
and personal injury from the CISG’s scope, irrespective of whether the issue in question is 
actually governed by product liability rules or not,236 provided that the goods cause such 
losses.237 It is also noted that the drafters considered the policy to not permit the seller’s liability 
for extra-contractual interests, i.e. death and personal interest, be subjected to and limited by 
regulatory requirements, such as the requirement of notice imposed by the CISG.238 Regarding 
the scope of Article 5 itself, it is assumed that a similar approach is adopted in cases where the 
breaching conduct causes personal injuries in other ways, such as breaching a contractual duty to 
advise the buyer on the operation of a machine sold to him.239 There are also two opposing views 
over another disagreement regarding the scope of Article 5. The majority holds that recourse 
action over personal injury,240 brought by the buyer against the seller, is also excluded from the 
scope of the Convention.241 Contrarily, the opposing view argues that a claim for recourse would 
not explicitly be sought in certain categories of losses specified in Article 5, unless the buyer 
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Property Damage Caused by Goods and Services under the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor Hiroo Sono, 
School of Law, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. Adopted by the CISG Advisory Council following 
its 17th meeting, in Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, on 20 January 2013 r. 2.1 cmt. D, 
http://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_12.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 
2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 12]. 
239 Stoll, supra note 38, at 557.  
240 This view holds that a recourse action is excluded by virtue of Article 5, even if the buyer asks for his 
economic loss deriving from his responsibility imposed by the relationship with a third person who got 
injured.   
241 Khoo, supra note 206, at 49; Herber, supra note 232, at 50; ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 160, 
at 46; HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 71–72. 
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suffered from death or personal injury. Adhering to the majority’s opinion will undermine the 
importance of the “liability of the seller for death or personal injury” and place too much 
emphasis on the words “any person.”242 Also, any recourse action is taken to recover economic 
loss, which consists of the sum paid by the buyer/re-seller to compensate his customers or 
employees; this could be understood as a consequential loss covered by Article 74.243 Thus, this 
recourse action is exclusively governed by the CISG, thereby precluding any claim based on the 
applicable domestic law, whether this recourse claim is characterized as a contractual one or 
not.244 This view also reasons that the policy in question is not undermined when the recourse 
claim falls under the CISG’s scope, since the buyer has already compensated for the third 
person’s injury. As we can see, the way in which Article 5 is construed defines the scope of 
application of the CISG regarding recourse action, and such a construction influences the CISG’s 
preemption of other domestic claims, particularly recourse claims based on tort law. From the 
perspective of this thesis, it would be unfair that, on one hand, the buyer’s right to a recourse 
action is restricted under the CISG’s rules and principles such as the notice requirement, and on 
the other hand, the buyer’s liability for personal injury or death to the third party is subject to 
domestic law, which is most likely to protect the injured individual. In addition, the legal 
consequences should not vary between the case in which the third party, relying on domestic 
law, asks for damages directly against the seller, and the case in which buyers have paid for the 
same losses, and then filed recourse action against the seller. Moreover, the manufacturer or 
 
242 JAMES J. FAWCETT, JONATHAN M. HARRIS & MICHAEL BRIDGE, INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS IN 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ¶ 16.80, at 951–52 (2005).  
243 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.3 cmt. 2.3.2; see also FAWCETT, HARRIS & BRIDGE, id. 
¶¶ 16.79–.80, at 951–52; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 97.   
244 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.3.   
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seller could not ascertain his liability if the reseller or the buyer was allowed to alternatively 
bring a recourse action under both the CISG and domestic law, despite the fact that the third 
person is only able to rely on domestic law.     
From what we have considered regarding the history and plain text of Article 5, it is quite 
clear that the CISG leaves a gap for this thesis to consider further and attempt to find an answer. 
Such an inquiry focuses on whether, and to what extent, the CISG’s rules overlap and thus 
preempt product liability law, which otherwise governs buyers’ claim for damages to property.  
C. The Objectives and Functions of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power 
 In discussing the plain meaning of the CISG’s text regarding its sphere of application, the 
inclination is to suggest that the party’s right to competing domestic remedies should be 
precluded or restricted insofar as such matters fall under the substantive scope of the Convention. 
Nevertheless, in granting the CISG such preemptive power over other domestic laws, which are 
inconsistent with the CISG’s rules and principles, one might ask how important this power is. It 
is also important to question what the objectives and functions of the CISG are. The last question 
to consider is why these objectives and functions are maintained by treating the CISG as the sole 
doctrine governing international sales. This part of the thesis aims to present the purposes and 
functions of the CISG, and then suggests that the CISG’s objectives and functions should be 
considered in two respects. On the one hand, its objectives and functions primarily justify the 
requirement to grant a preemptive force to the CISG in governing matters that arise from or 
relate to international sales contracts. On the other hand, its purpose somewhat supports the 
possibility of applying other domestic laws to such matters. 
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1. The Objectives of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power 
Firstly, the CISG aims to overcome the crucial shortcomings of ambiguity and the harsh, 
far-reaching effects of two antecedents, namely the ULIS and the ULF. Studies of the ULIS and 
the ULF conducted by the Working Group raised concerns of ambiguity and error that 
presumably result from the abstract and complex concepts of the two Hague Conventions.245 For 
the sake of simplicity, practicality, and clarity, the drafters thus avoided the use of any legal 
shorthand expressions, rather providing clear definitions for terms used.246 Moreover, the drafters 
tried not to employ complicated legal theories, in attempts to provide concrete legal concepts, 
rather than abstract rules.247 As a result, the CISG’s rules do not cover all possible situations. 
Some matters relating to a contractual relationship may fall outside the CISG’s ambit, and those 
that are left are governed by domestic laws. Thus, one might argue that in order to apply the 
CISG so as to completely exclude the right to domestic tort remedies will contradict the aim of 
limiting its scope to the specific matters that directly invoke the concrete rules of the CISG. 
Likewise, a complete exclusion of tort remedies will contradict the CISG’s aim of leaving other 
matters to protections provided by domestic laws. 
In terms of adopting the rules of private international law, the CISG was intended to 
eliminate the concept of completely eliminating the rules of private international law, which 
appeared in the ULIS.248 As we can see in Article 7(2), the CISG expressly recognizes the 
 
245 See Sono, supra note 172, at 3.   
246 See id. at 7. 
247 See id.  
248 Article 2 of the ULIS states, “1. Rules of private international law shall be excluded for the purposes of 
the application of the present Law, subject to any provision to the contrary in the said Law.” Article 17 of 
the ULIS states, “Questions concerning matters governed by the present Law which are not expressly 
settled therein shall be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the present Law is 
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possibility of applying the rules of private international law, and thus relieves the authority of the 
ULIS on national laws, which could have been identified by private international law. In other 
words, the CISG does not entirely exclude the rules of private international law, though it seeks 
to promote uniformity in its application.   
By attempting to remedy these shortcomings, the CISG’s drafters took a different 
position than the draftsmen of the ULIS did, regarding the intersection between the Uniform Law 
and other domestic laws. According to the perception of the drafters of the CISG, it is possible 
for tribunals to concurrently apply both the CISG and other domestic laws. In particular, it is 
possible to simultaneously apply the CISG and tort laws mainly regulating wrongful conduct that 
arises independently from the contractual relationship, or that primarily protect extra-contractual 
interests. However, this thesis will argue that the CISG’s novel approach to recognizing the rules 
of private international law does not always encourage the tribunals to apply domestic laws 
without caution. Such a precaution requires having regard for the CISG’s international character, 
the uniformity in its application, and the hierarchy of rules indicated in Article 7(2). In particular, 
the tribunals must give priority to the CISG’s explicit rules and general principles when being 
faced with the interaction between the CISG and domestic laws, so long as the matters fall under 
the CISG’s scope. Adhering to applicable law by virtue of private international law as a last 
resort, it could be said that such domestic law, applying to the matters in question, would 
function as a subsidiary to the CISG. 
 
based.” See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July, 
1964, supra note 178. 
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Another primary objective of the CISG is to promote international trade with its balanced 
rules that are established based on equality and mutual benefit.249 The CISG’s intent was to 
implement a single set of clear, articulated, and universally applicable rules to remove 
unnecessary obstacles to the free flow of trade.250 Applying these well-balanced rules to decide 
on the rights, obligations, and remedies of both sellers and buyers will help to remove legal 
barriers, contributing to the development of international trade. In advocating this dominant 
purpose, tribunals must stick to the international character not only in their interpretation of 
individual provisions, but also in developing general principles when dealing with disputes.251 In 
other words, the CISG still discourages tribunals from referencing domestic legal concepts while 
interpreting the CISG.252 Thus, when resolving the CISG’s preemption, this idea of disfavoring 
domestic legal concepts should be taken into account. Additionally, one might think it would be 
justified to grant the CISG’s rules and principles the preemptive force, if the predominance has 
led to encouraging the application of well-balanced rules to international sales. Stated clearly, 
throughout all the stages of drafting the CISG’s rules, there were many attempts to strike a 
balance between the respective rights and duties of the seller and buyer, and ensuring the CISG’s 
rules were acceptable for the requirements of international trade. The drafting committees were 
highly concerned about establishing a fair balance between the conflicting interests of both 
parties, and did not wish to unduly favor either the seller or the buyer. Thus, the argument for 
 
249 CISG, supra note 91, pmbl. See generally Rolf Herber, Preamble, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN 
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 38, at 9, 9–11. 
250 See Sono, supra note 172, at 13.  
251 See Herber, supra note 249, at 10–11. 
252 See Sono, supra note 172, at 7–8. 
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precluding concurrent tort claims in such fully overlapping situations, is that favoring the non-
breaching party to exercise concurrent rights under tort law might disturb this fair balance. 
It also appears that the goal of uniformity was referred to in practice. US courts decided 
that the issue of whether a certain action under domestic law is preempted by federal law is one 
resolved by looking at congressional intent.253 The US court also uses this analysis for the 
question of preemption by a treaty.254 The court then focused on the intent that is recognized in 
the introductory text or the Preamble, of the Contracting States, particularly the United States,255 
together with the President’s Letter of Transmittal of the CISG256 to the Senate and the Secretary 
of State’s Letter of Submittal of the CISG257 to the President. The US court concluded that this 
expressly-stated goal indicates the intent of the Contracting States to allow the CISG to preempt 
state causes of action.258 It was further emphasized that the availability of independent, domestic 
contract law causes of action would disrupt the goals of uniformity and certainty embraced by 
the CISG.259 It should be noted here that this court considered the issue of preemption by the 
CISG to determine its federal jurisdiction over the case.260 The court’s analysis primarily focused 
 
253 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987). 
254 Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Geneva Pharm. Tech. 
Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
255 CISG, supra note 91, pmbl.  
256 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 
ADOPTED BY A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE OF SIXTY-TWO STATES ON APRIL 11, 1980, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at (III) (1983) (letter of transmittal from President Ronald Reagan). 
257 Id. at VI–VII (letter of submittal from Sect. of State George P. Shultz). 
258 Asante Techs., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51; Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 285.  
259 Asante Techs., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51. 
260 The defendant particularly asserted that the CISG governs the plaintiff’s contractual claims for breach 
of contract and breach of express warranty, and that “the preemptive force of the CISG converts the state 
breach of contract claim into a federal claim.” Id. at 1144, 1147, 1150.  
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on the preemptive effect of the CISG on state contract claims,261 rather than preemption of the 
alleged tort claim. Subsequently, the court decided that the plaintiff’s assumption that “the CISG 
leaves open the possibility of other, concurrent causes of action”262 is unpersuasive. Based on all 
the reasons above, the court finally concluded that “the pleaded state law claims are 
preempted”263 insofar as those state law causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG.264 In 
Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., another US court submitted that the court’s 
decision in Asante Techs., regarding the preemptive effect of the CISG, was limited to only the 
issue of the CISG’s preemption over domestic contract law claims.265 However, the plaintiff in 
Asante Techs. brought claims sounding in both tort and contract.266 Therefore, the practical 
implementation of sustaining uniformity to decide the issue of the CISG’s preemption over tort 
remedy remains doubtful and arguable today. 
2. The Functions of the CISG and Its Preemptive Power 
Turning now to the CISG’s main functions, this Convention was formulated to serve as a 
set of unified rules for the international sale of goods, particularly when the parties’ places of 
business are in different Contracting States.267 In this regard, the CISG was intended to replace 
several domestic laws, in particular those of sales, governing the relationship established by the 
 
261 Most cases and academic writing regarding the CISG’s preemption cited by this court mainly involve 
state contract claims brought by the plaintiff.  
262 Asante Techs., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
263 Id.  
264 Id. 
265 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 286. 
266 Id.  
267 According to Article 1(1)(a), the CISG applies to contracts for the sale of goods as long as the parties 
have their places of business in different Contracting States. CISG, supra note 91, art. 1(1)(a). 
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contract of sale. Predominantly considering domestic laws of sales in the United States as an 
example, the CISG would replace Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which dealt with 
the international sales of goods (hereinafter UCC Article 2).268 UCC Article 2 applies to purely 
domestic transactions or international sale transactions which do not meet the requirement of 
internationality under Article 1 of the CISG. The CISG thus claims the status of lex specialis, 
thus being considered as an independent body of international contract law, governing specific 
subject matters, and is separate from state law governing contracts, as well as UCC Article 2. 
Moreover, when the CISG is considered the federal law applicable to the contract in question, it 
substitutes for a general state contract law.269 Notably, the same status and relationship explained 
above are, of course, true for the relationship between the CISG and either contract laws or sales 
laws of other Contracting States. To this effect, the CISG takes the place of national contract or 
sales laws, as the applicable law for international sales. These uniform international rules will, 
therefore, generally govern and play a significant role in controlling the contractual relationship 
between the parties to the international sale of goods, especially when parties do not anticipate 
and agree to solve the disputed issue.270 Likewise, once the dispute arises, as in the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrence of tort remedies, one might suggest that tribunals should first consider 
the CISG’s scope, and apply the CISG’s rules and principles found within the Convention. Also, 
 
268 HENRY GABRIEL, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC) 4 (1994); see 
also Isaak I. Dore, Choice of Law under the International Sales Convention: A U.S. Perspective, 77 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 521, 525 (1983). 
269 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (recognizing that the Convention, as a treaty made under the authority of the 
United States, is the “supreme law” of the United States and would prevail over conflicting laws of any 
state). 
270 THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, 
ADOPTED BY A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE OF SIXTY-TWO STATES ON APRIL 11, 1980, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at (III) (1983) (letter of transmittal from President Ronald Reagan). 
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relying on domestic legal concepts of the right to concurrent claims originating from the 
interaction between general contract law and tort law seems to be ill-advised and unconvincing 
in solving the CISG’s preemption and concurrence of tort remedies.  
D. The Approach of the CISG to Remedies and Its Preemptive Power 
Proponents of the CISG claim that the uniform law provides well-balanced rules and 
approaches to remedies based on equality and mutual benefit. Accordingly, the remedial system 
established by the CISG should be exclusively applied to any breach of contractual duty, even 
though such a breach constitutes tort liability. At this point, it is significant to explore the rights 
and remedies provided under the CISG, and consider what the provisions of remedies suggest 
about the CISG’s preemption of tort law.  
To begin with, in a case in which the seller is in breach of his obligations under the 
contract or the CISG, the buyer can resort to four main kinds of remedies based on the concept of 
full compensation. Those kinds of remedies include specific performance, avoidance, damages, 
and reduction in price. Let us then consider Article 45, which provides the buyer with both the 
right to other remedies, as well as the right to claim additional damages. As we can see, this 
article indicates a single consolidated set of remedial provisions for any breach of contract by the 
seller. It thus brings together the seller’s obligations in one place with a single set of remedies.271 
Consequently, it is clear for the merchants to ascertain what they are required to do in case of a 
breach. This consolidation of remedies is one of the CISG’s improvements, in comparison with 
the ULIS, which regulated the remedies for a non-breaching party in connection with every 
 
271 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 37. This advantage was raised in the commentary on Article 41 of the 
Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat.  
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particular obligation and its respective breach.272 The drafters seemingly intended to give the 
buyer a single set of remedies, no matter what obligation was to be breached by the seller. 
Nonetheless, many articles referred in Article 45 have their roles in setting forth either the 
substantive conditions under which that right to remedies may be exercised, or the rules for the 
calculation for the amount of damage. Similarly, Article 61 grants to the seller both rights to 
other remedies, and to the recoverable damages for breach of contract by the buyer. Since the 
buyer has only two principal obligations, i.e. to pay the price and to take delivery of the goods, 
the seller’s right to remedies is not as prominent as the buyer’s. Clearly stated, the seller has the 
right to ask for specific performance (Article 62-63), to declare the contract avoided (Article 64), 
and to recover damages (Article 74-77). However, he does not have the right to reduce the price 
of the goods. Further, Article 45(2) and Article 61(2) explicitly say that the parties’ right to claim 
damages is not impaired by exercising the right to other remedies. 
Some remedies under the CISG are granted upon the essential element of contractual 
violation, which is defined as a fundamental breach of contract.273 Under the CISG, when the 
seller committed the fundamental breach of contract, the buyer could ask for substitute goods 
under Article 46(2), or declare the contract avoided under Article 49(1)(a). The same is true for 
the buyer’s breach of his duties to pay the price and to take delivery of the goods. Under Article 
64(1)(a) of the CISG, the seller could declare the contract avoided if the buyer failed to perform 
his obligations, and such a violation amounts to a fundamental breach of contract as defined. 
 
272 Peter Schlechtriem, From the Hague to Vienna – Progress in Unification of the Law of International 
Sales Contracts?, in THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 125, 
129 (Norbert Horn & Clive M. Schmitthoff eds., 1982). 
273 Ndulo, supra note 170, at 15. 
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As to the right to avoidance aforementioned, it is important to point out that the concept 
of an automatic or ipso facto avoidance in certain circumstances appeared in the ULIS, but was 
denied by the drafters when they enacted the provisions regarding the remedial systems under the 
CISG.274 Under this Convention, the contract would not have been avoided unless the non-
breaching party had made the declaration of avoidance pursuant to the conditions specified in 
Article 49 or Article 64. As we can see, the requirement of declaration of avoidance is aimed at 
ensuring that the contract is still enforced, and the contractual relationship is still subject to the 
Convention’s remedial rules in the case of a breach. After a fundamental breach of contract 
occurs, so long as the parties do not exercise the right to declare the contract avoided, the parties’ 
intent to keep their contractual relationship should be respected. The view in support of 
exclusively applying the unique remedial systems provided by the CISG seems to be consistent 
with the parties’ intention, and is thus highly convincing. Further, it is significant to point out 
that even in a case where a valid declaration of avoidance terminates the contract, Article 81(1) 
of the Convention still protects the injured party by allowing for the right to damages due under 
the CISG. Thus, although the parties would be released from any contractual obligation when 
one party declared the contract avoided, this relief is still subject to any damages which may be 
due.275 In other words, the avoidance of the contract does not terminate the party’s obligation to 
pay any damages caused by the failure to perform the contractual obligations. Likewise, as is 
expressly stated in Article 81(1), it is clear that the avoidance does not impact any provision for 
the settlement of disputes, or “any other provision of the contract governing the rights and 
 
274 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 41. 
275 This outcome of avoidance is as same as a result provided under Article 78(1) of the ULIS. See 




obligations of the parties, consequent upon the avoidance of the contract”276 (emphasis added).  
Therefore, it should be noted that the avoidance of the contract would not eliminate contract 
clauses relating to the settlement of disputes, such as provisions for arbitration, and clauses 
governing the right to damages, such as exculpatory clauses or liquidated damages clauses. If the 
CISG did not specifically indicate the effects of avoidance, all rights and obligations arising from 
the existence of the contract might be eliminated under some legal systems’ rule of contract 
avoidance. Consequently, the party might have no claim for damages for breach of contract. If 
this were the case, it would be necessary for tort law to play its role in filling the gap left by the 
CISG. When the CISG, in fact, expressly recognizes a claim for damages due, and enforces 
contractual terms governing the rights and obligations of the parties, contingent upon the 
avoidance of the contract, one might think that these results replace the role of tort remedy. It 
then comes as no surprise that proponents of the CISG will argue that it is unnecessary to give 
the injured party any tort law protections that are otherwise invoked by the same breaching 
conduct.    
It should also be noted that any proof of fault, lack of good faith, or any breach of an 
express promise is not required to seek damages.277 On the one hand, this means that the 
objective failure to fulfill the seller’s obligations is the only condition for a buyer to exercise the 
right to damages resulting from the seller’s breach of duty. On the other hand, it can be inferred 
that whenever the buyer fails to objectively fulfill his obligation, the seller can exercise his right 
to damages, irrespective of any consideration of whether the buyer is in breach by his fault or 
because of a lack of good faith. Since the claim for damages under the CISG does not require 
 
276 CISG, supra note 91, art. 81(1). 
277 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 37. 
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proof of fault, one might suggest that tort remedy should not be prohibited when it aims to 
control unlawful behavior that is not deliberately regulated by the CISG or the contract itself.   
There is another significant provision of Article 66278 that implicitly accepts the need for 
domestic tort law in compensating the damages to the goods sold when the buyer cannot rely on 
the damages provided by Article 45(1)(b). As we can see, Article 45(1) makes the CISG’s 
remedial rules applicable only if the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the 
contract and the CISG. Because the buyer is unable to claim damages based on lack of 
conformity, which exists after the risk has passed to him despite the fact that the seller failed to 
deliver conforming goods as required by the contract or Article 35,279 a recourse to tort remedy is 
thus required. Correspondingly, it was noted that under Article 66, the buyer would have the 
right to deduct the loss of goods caused by a tortious act or omission of the seller as they would 
be calculated and claimed under the applicable tort law.280 So, as it can be inferred from Article 
66, if the tribunals applied the CISG to the exclusion of tort remedy in all cases, this would be 
inconsistent with the extent of protection which the CISG’s remedial systems intend to provide.   
All in all, it seems generally convincing to argue that the remedial systems under the 
CISG are sufficiently fair for parties to rely on, when they decide to conclude their international 
sale contract and maintain an enforceable contract. The main reason is that the Convention 
provides a wide range of remedies in case of a breach of contract, particularly the right to 
 
278 Article 66 states, “Loss of or damage to the goods after the risk has passed to the buyer does not 
discharge him from his obligation to pay the price, unless the loss or damage is due to an act or omission 
of the seller.” CISG, supra note 91, art. 66. 
279 Article 36(1) states, “(1) The seller is liable in accordance with the contract and this Convention for 
any lack of conformity which exists at the time when the risk passes to the buyer, even though the lack of 
conformity becomes apparent only after that time.” Id. art. 36(1). 
280 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 63–64.  
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damages, which is always accompanied by other remedies. Therefore, it is safe to say that it 
would cause unfairness to the merchants and generate uncertainty if tribunals allowed alternative 
remedies under domestic tort laws, as they entirely overlap with recoverable remedies under the 
CISG. However, tort remedies remain available when necessary to compensate for particular 
kinds of breaches. As we can see, putative tortious actions typically asserted include promissory 
estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement, 
negligence in performing obligations imposed by contract, negligent liability for defective 
products, tortious interference with contract or business relations, conversion, and tortious breach 
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In some circumstances, as illustrated in 
Chapter One, the alleged claims in some types of international sales relations281 are considered 
independent torts, and thus should be better protected by tort laws. 
E. The Approach of the CISG to Party Autonomy and Its Preemptive Power 
By depositing the instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval, and accession, it 
could be assumed that the Contracting States have found the provisions adopted in the 
Convention to serve as proper rules for the requirements of international trade. However, 
establishing a fair balance between the rights and duties of the parties within the CISG finally 
operates in coordination with the doctrine of party autonomy explicitly recognized in Article 6. 
The doctrine of party autonomy is uniformly recognized as a fundamental principle of 
contract law, and Article 6 also embodies a vigorous recognition of this principle.282 It is thus 
unquestionable that the principle of party autonomy is extremely respected in the area of sale 
 
281 Those types of international sales relations are discussed in the Introduction. 
282 Bell, supra note 228, at 254; see also Francis A. Gabor, Emerging Unification of Conflict of Laws 
Rules Applicable to the International Sale of Goods: UNCITRAL and the New Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 696, 697 (1986). 
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contracts among other international trade transactions. Article 6 recognizes parties’ right to 
contract and freely determine their rights and obligations, as well as the respective remedies. It is 
thus clear that tribunals are bound to honor parties’ intent regarding their rights, obligations, and 
remedies, and to prioritize the agreed terms over the CISG’s respective rules and principles. 
Where the issue of concurrent tort remedy is concerned, the question becomes what the Article 6 
doctrine of party autonomy suggests about the interaction between the CISG and tort laws. In 
answering such an inquiry, it is worth exploring the recognition of party autonomy in the realm 
of international sales contracts, and also considering to what extent a party’s freedom to contract 
controls parties’ relationship in international sales.  
 Article 6 allows parties to freely exclude the CISG, in whole or in part, even where all the 
applicability requirements are fulfilled. Notably, the prevailing views of US courts hold that an 
express exclusion is necessary.283 Moreover, an implicit exclusion of the Convention, in the case 
where the parties agree to resort to the law of a single Contracting State, is discouraged and 
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Automation Sys. v. Thyssenkrupp Fabco, Corp., No. 06-14553, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72461 (E.D. 
Mich. Sep. 28, 2007); Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
51802 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2007); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Tech. Fabrics Can., 
Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (D. Minn. 2007); Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros Int’l., Inc., Civil Action No. 
03- 4821 (JAG), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79734 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2008); Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. 
Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110716 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2011); It’s Intoxicating, 
Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149 (M.D. Pa. July 
31, 2013). Please note that there exist other views supporting the possibility of the implicit exclusion of 
the CISG. See generally FRANCO FERRARI, CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: 
APPLICABILITY AND APPLICATIONS OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS SALES CONVENTION 159–70 (2012) 
(ebook). See also Thyssenkrupp Metallurgical Prods. GmbH v. Energy Coal, S.p.A., No. 653938/14, Slip 
Op. 31922(U) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 14, 2015). 
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would not be recognized.284 Given that an awareness of the CISG among both sellers and buyers 
has increased in recent years, parties’ agreement on the choice of law does not always 
undoubtedly indicate the parties’ true intent to exclude the CISG and its provisions.   
It is even more paramount to explore the doctrine of party autonomy with regards to the 
derogation of the CISG’s provisions. The CISG’s text states that “[t]he parties may . . . derogate 
from or vary the effect of any of its provisions,” clarifying that the parties may agree to other 
rules or results which supplant, modify, or supplement those rules of the CISG.285 It is also 
evident through other provisions, in particular Articles 30, 35(1), and 53 with their phrasing of, 
for example, “required by the contract,” that the CISG is essentially based on the general 
principle of freedom of contract. Accordingly, it could be deemed that all the rights and 
obligations agreed by contract are an integral part of the CISG, which may either take priority 
over,286 or supplement, some of the CISG’s default provisions. In respect to the dispositive 
nature of the CISG’s provisions,287 one should keep in mind that the CISG’s dispositive rules 
yield only to the parties’ intent to agree otherwise. Nevertheless, it does not appear from the 
CISG’s text or historical account that the drafters allowed competing domestic laws to 
undermine the uniform rules, even if those uniform rules embrace the dispositive nature. Insofar 
as the CISG has a preemptive effect on tort remedy, it therefore comes as no surprise that the 
 
284 Michael Joachim Bonell, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions Chapter I Sphere of 
Application Article 6: Parties’ Autonomy, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 
1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION, supra note 206, at 51, 56. 
285 Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions Chapter 
I Sphere of Application Article 6, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 9, at 101, 102. 
286 Ajax Tool Works, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1306. 
287 FERRARI, supra note 283, at 154.  
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agreed terms hold preemptive power over tort claims, at least, to the same degree as the 
preemptive force of the CISG’s default provisions on tort remedy. 
Most likely, the parties exercise their autonomy by incorporating an exculpatory clause 
into their contract. According to Article 6, it is clear that the parties’ will to exclude or limit 
contractual liability is respected. In exercising such autonomy, the parties, for instance, agree 
that the goods are sold “as seen,” or the seller’s liability to pay compensation is exempted, and 
this liability is limited to only repairing or exchanging defective goods.288 Nevertheless, Article 6 
does not say anything about (1) the validity of the contractual clauses purporting to exclude or 
limit a party’s liability in contract, (2) the right to sign a waiver of tort remedies or the effect of 
such a waiver, (3) the validity of the contractual clauses purporting to exclude or limit a party’s 
liability in tort, and (4) the effect of the contractual clauses legally purporting to exclude or limit 
a party’s liability in contract on tort action. Thus, Article 6 only guarantees the right to derogate 
from, or vary the effect of, the CISG’s provisions. However, the exercise of freedom remains 
restricted and limited to some extent.289 As we can see, the control of unfair terms poses a 
problem for the validity of exculpatory clauses. Thus, the validity of clauses purporting to 
exclude or limit a party’s liability falls within the realm of domestic law, according to Article 
4(a). It follows that the agreement resulting in either the exclusion or limitation of liability in 
contract, or in varying the effects of the CISG’s provisions, is controlled by the national law 
applicable to the contract.290 If the parties agree to relinquish the right to tort remedy, it is thus 
likely that applicable domestic law governs and determines whether such a clause is valid, and 
 
288 HENSCHEL, supra note 109, at 140.  
289 Bonell, supra note 284, at 60. 
290 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 285, at 104; see MSS, Inc. v. Maser Corp., No. 3:09-cv-00601, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79261 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2011). 
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thus precludes tort remedy. For instance, if US law was identified as the applicable law, the issue 
of the validity of certain contractual terms would be subject to, for example, rules on 
unconscionability or UCC Article 2 §§ 302, 719. Regardless, the following chapters will 
ascertain whether the enforcement of exculpatory clauses that exclude or limit a party’s liability 
has a legal effect on the right to pursue tort claims under domestic law. 
F. Preliminary Conclusion 
It is further challenging to define the borders of the CISG and its interaction with tort 
laws. This is because the CISG’s text, together with other features, such as the history of its 
evolution, its purposes and functions, and the approaches to remedies and party autonomy, 
suggest various implications. The CISG provides limited guidance in dealing with its scope, to 
the extent that its substantive scope preempts relevant domestic tort laws. Finally, the features of 
the CISG do not provide a definitive statement about its preemption. As a consequence, many 
different approaches to this preemption issue have emerged over time. As we will see in the 
following chapter, each solution attempts to make an analysis based on the doctrines and policies 
underlying several areas of laws, including uniform law, contract law, tort law, and private 
international law. We thus need to consider which approach can bring about the legal outcomes 
that, on the one hand, prevent one uniform norm from overly encroaching on another area of law, 
and, on the other hand, grant international merchants sufficient, fair, and balanced protection of 
their interests. Importantly, the rules and principles of the CISG itself should be appreciated in 
determining the relationship between the Convention and national tort laws. Also, all relevant 
factors of the CISG delineated in this chapter must be placed in perspective when dealing with 
the issue of preemption and concurrence, because the CISG is specially formulated to bring the 
contractual balance of rights and obligations of the parties to transnational sales, and to remove 
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obstacles to international trade, such as the existence of different national sales laws across the 

















III. AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ACADEMIC AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE ISSUE OF 
CISG’S PREEMPTION OF TORT REMEDIES 
Given that the drafters of the CISG did not provide an explicit rule to cope with the issue 
of the CISG’s preemption, and based on the implications explained in Chapter Two, this chapter 
aims to delineate the existing approaches put forth by both jurists and court decisions in 
determining whether and to what extent the CISG has its preemptive effect on domestic tort 
claims, or whether there is a concurrence of domestic tort claim based on domestic law and a 
contractual claim based on the CISG. At the same time, any arguments for or against the 
emerging approaches will be discussed, to examine and assess how such solutions work. Also, 
this chapter will explain domestic rules and approaches adopted by US jurisdictions when 
deciding whether the contracting party’s right to a concurrent tort claim is recognized. The 
following part will show that domestic rules and approaches that deal with concurrence issues 
influence existing solutions which were suggested to solve the issue of the CISG’s preemption of 
a tort claim. Finally, it will be pointed out which solution is the most compelling from the 
viewpoint of this thesis. 
A. Background: The US Courts’ Decisions regarding the Right to Concurrent Claims 
between Contract and Tort in Disputes outside the CISG’s Sphere  
This part of the thesis aims to delineate the rules and approaches applied to domestic 
disputes, interstate cases, and international disputes within US jurisdictions, examining how US 
courts deal with questions of concurrence between contract and tort arising from contracts 
outside the CISG’s sphere.   
It is worth noting that the US laws of contract and tort applicable to disputes falling 
outside the CISG’s scope are typically matters of state law, rather than federal law. Also, a 
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conflict-of-law issue in cross-border disputes is a question of state law. Accordingly, US 
tribunals consider the question of concurrent claims arising from contracts not governed by the 
CISG as a question of state law, and apply various applicable state laws to solve such issues. 
Hence, a party’s right to assert parallel contractual and tort claims is subject to the rules and 
approaches deriving from state laws of contract and tort, as adopted within each state of the 
United States. 
Under US laws and practices, it is generally accepted that concurrent claims are permitted 
as long as the conditions for concurrent remedies are met.291 However, a plaintiff is not allowed 
to have double recovery in both contract and tort.292 Mostly, a plaintiff can exercise their 
freedom of election to assert a cause of action between a contract and tort claim,293 which seems 
to be the most advantageous. In addition to the election, US courts often determine the “gist” or 
“gravamen” of the allegation, to decide whether the alleged claim is founded on contract or 
tort.294 Generally speaking, on the one hand, US courts have moved towards recognizing 
concurrent tortious liability either by the party’s election, or by considering the nature of claim. 
On the other hand, courts also impose certain restrictions on the right to allege tort claims 
 
291 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 93, at 121; see Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 
2d 654, 663 (1958); Celanese Corp. of Am. v. Wilmington, 78 A.2d 249 (Del. Super. Ct. 1950); Rich v. 
N.Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382 (1882); Vandeventer v. Vandeventer, 726 N.E.2d 534 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1999). 
292 Please consider an analysis of the duplicative relief issue in Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, 
B189213, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5276, at *64, *68 (June 27, 2007). See also Bertero v. Nat’l 
Gen. Corp., 13 Cal. 3d 43 (1974); Ghk Assocs. v. Mayer Grp., 224 Cal. App. 3d 856 (1990). 
293 Comunale, 50 Cal. 2d at 663; Rich, 87 N.Y. at 390, 400. 
294 TONY WEIR, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: VOLUME XI: TORTS: CHAPTER 
12: COMPLEX LIABILITIES ¶ 70 (André Tunc ed., 1976) cited in MM Loubser, Concurrence of Contract 
and Delict, 8 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 113, 148 (1997); see N.Y. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edelstein, 637 F. 
App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Mid–South Milling Co. v. Loret Farms, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 
1975) (considering the issue of venue and holding that the gravamen of the alleged cause of action is a 
negligent breach of warranty of sale under the Uniform Commercial Code, rather than a tortious one). 
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primarily when a plaintiff seeks recovery for economic loss.295 It could, therefore, come to a 
premise of economic loss theory, holding that tort claims, for recovering losses not resultant 
from physical harm or damage to property, may be refused296 or permitted under limited 
circumstances.297 Subject to the economic loss theory, in granting tort remedies despite the 
existence of a contract, judgments typically consider the existence of a special relationship,298 the 
emergence of alleged independent obligations299 including but not limited to proof of breach of 
 
295 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 93, at 1164; see Kohn, Savett, Klein & Graf, P.C. v. Cohen, 
Civil Action No. 89-2173, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4150 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1990); Neibarger v. Universal 
Coops., 439 Mich. 512 (1992); EBWS, LLC v. Britly Corp., 928 A.2d 497, 507–08 (Vt. 2007); Eastwood 
v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 Wash. 2d 380 (2010). 
296 E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986); Rotorex Co., Inc. v. Kingsbury 
Corp., 42 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md. 1999); Trinity Indus. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2001); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1 (Utah 2003); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Kinder 
Morgan Operating Ltd. P’ship, 192 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App. 2006). 
297 McStowe v. Bornstein, 388 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1979); Pancake House, Inc. v. Redmond, 716 P.2d 575 
(Kan. 1986); Kohn, Savett, Klein & Graf, P.C., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4150; Collins v. Reynard, 607 
N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1992); EBWS, LLC, 928 A.2d at 507–08. 
298 Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank, 515 A.2d 756 (Md. 1986); EBWS, LLC, 928 A.2d at 507–08; see also 100 
Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 430 Md. 197 (2013) (discussing the requirement of 
intimate nexus to justify the imposition of a tort duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the 
party’s obligation). But see Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.p.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB-08-65, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82217, at *23–25 (D. Md. July 27, 2011) (attempting to restrict remedies to 
contract law where plaintiff asks for pure economic loss, and all parties are businessmen who engaged in 
arms-length commercial bargaining in allocating their risks and limiting their remedies through contract 
negotiation, although the court held that the intimate nexus can be satisfied by a business relationship). 
299 Some courts recognized tortious duties arising independently of contracts. See Colton v. Foulkes, 47 
N.W.2d 901 (Wis. 1951) (recognizing the duty to exercise due care in a contract for repair work); Sain v. 
ARA Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (imposing the duty to exercise due care in 
repairing an air conditioner, which was installed in the vehicle purchased); Formosa Plastics Corp. United 
States v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, 960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998) (finding a separate legal duty not to 
fraudulently procure a contract); Orthotec v. Eurosurgical, Nos. B179387, B189213, 2007 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 5276 (June 27, 2007) (holding that an alleged wrongful breach of contract by the 
interferer was only part of a comprehensive plan designed to disrupt the injured party’s prospective 
economic relationship with the third person, which exists independently from the contractual relationship 
with the interferer. Thus, other conduct accomplished under such a plan were found as independent 
unlawful conduct). Cf. Landwehr v. Citizens Tr. Co., 329 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1983) (holding that no duty 
arises independently out of performance of the contract); cf. Ho Myung Moolsan Co. v. Manitou Mineral 
Water, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127869 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2010) (finding that plaintiff’s claim for 
fraudulent inducement was a breach of contract claim in disguise). 
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an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing300 or proof of additional losses,301 the nature of the 
injury asserted,302 as well as any public policy concerns.303 It is worth further emphasizing that 
some US courts tend to follow the independent duty doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts find the 
alleged tort claim to be independent of the contractual claim if such a claim were not premised 
on any duties explicitly or impliedly required by the contract. An example is the case where a 
tort claim is predicated on a separate legal duty, or in which the tort claim alleged conduct that is 
extraneous or collateral to the terms of the contract.304  
Given that US case law rules which regulate the party’s right to parallel claims are 
diverse, it is beneficial to explore the Restatement of the Laws governing such issues. This is 
because both the Contracts and Torts Restatements are intended to reflect the “consensus view” 
 
300 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654 (1958); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 
566 (1973); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 63 Ohio St. 3d 690 (1992); Bullet Trucking, Inc. v. Glen 
Falls Ins. Co., 84 Ohio App. 3d 327 (1992). 
301 Orthotec, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5276, at *64. 
302 Webber v. Herkimer & M. S. R. Co., 16 N.E. 358 (N. Y. 1888); Colton v. Foulkes, 47 N.W.2d 901 
(Wis. 1951); Kohn, Savett, Klein & Graf, P.C., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4150, at *11–12. 
303 The policy requiring a fair and reasonable construction of the contract to impose a duty of care on the 
party was invoked in Lord Elec. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 123 N.E. 756 (N.Y. 1919). The policy 
protecting a third-party beneficiary whose rights and interests are certain and foreseeable was raised in 
Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958), Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), and Heyer v. 
Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969). The public policy favoring investigation and prosecution of criminal 
offenses was referred to in Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ill. 1981). The policy 
underlying the statute of limitations was considered in Loehr v. E. Side Omnibus Corp., 18 N.Y.S.2d 529 
(App. Div. 1940). Cf. 21st Century Props. Co. v. Carpenter Insulation & Coatings Co., 694 F. Supp. 148 
(D. Md. 1988) (providing the additional reason for denying plaintiffs’ negligence claim that there was no 
existence of any consideration of public safety in finding the allegation as a tort).  
304 Bridgestone/Firestone v. Recovery Credit Servs., 98 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1996); Atla-Medine v. Crompton 
Corp., 00 Civ. 5901 (HB), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5427 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2001); Robinson Helicopter 
Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004); Hall Family Props., Ltd. v. Gosnell Dev. Corp. (In re 
Gosnell Dev. Corp.), 331 F. App’x 440 (9th Cir. 2009); Eastwood v. Horse Harbor Found., Inc., 170 
Wash. 2d 380 (2010); N.Y. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Edelstein, 637 F. App’x 70 (3d Cir. 2016). See cases 
cited supra note 299. 
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across all states on matters of common law.305 This approach is therefore easier than attempting 
to discuss fifty different legal systems, in order to figure out how common law rules regulate the 
right to concurrent claims. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, there is no black-letter 
rule regarding the contracting party’s right to assert a concurrent tort claim. However, the 
Introductory Note of Topic One of Chapter Seven306 notes that apart from the common effect of 
making a resulting contract voidable, a misrepresentation may concurrently be asserted as an 
affirmative tort claim which seeks recovery for damages due to misrepresentation.307 This 
introductory note conforms to the rules stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts regarding a 
distinctive tortious liability for pecuniary loss resulting from misrepresentation308 or 
nondisclosure.309 Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 196310 states a rule 
controlling a contractual term that precludes a party from asserting any claims for 
misrepresentation given as alternative remedies by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Also, 
certain rules regarding negligence, including strict liability stated in the Restatement (Second) of 
 
305 This thesis finds that the US rules on the right to concurrent tort claims are, in essence, integrated into 
the US law of torts, which restates independent tort causes of action. Thus, most common law rules 
described in this part are similar and identical to those investigated in Part I.B., which gives the contour of 
the putative claims under US law of torts possibly alleged by the parties.        
306 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts: Chapter Seven, provides rules on misrepresentation, duress, 
and undue influence. Particularly, Topic One states rules on misrepresentation. 
307 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch.7, topic 1, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
308 Please consider the black-letter rules on liability for fraudulent misrepresentation. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 531, 549 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Please consider the black-letter rules on 
negligent misrepresentation. See id. §§ 552, 552A, 552B. Please consider the black-letter rule on innocent 
misrepresentation in sale, rental, or exchange transaction. See id. § 552C. 
309 See id. §§ 550–551. 
310 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that “A term 
unreasonably exempting a party from the legal consequences of a misrepresentation is unenforceable on 
grounds of public policy”). 
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Torts, affirmatively grant a contracting party the right to alternative grounds of claims for 
liability for supplying chattels for the use of others when such conduct causes physical harm.311 
In terms of an attempt to restate clear rules regarding tort liability for unintentional 
infliction of economic loss arising from contract, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for 
Economic Harm §§ 1-8 (2020) further provides rules and conditions concerning a party’s right to 
a concurrent tort claim for economic loss.312 This Restatement (Third) of Torts § 3 (2020) 
generally states that tortious liability for economic loss, alleging a negligent performance or 
negotiation of a contract between the parties, is precluded313 so that the plaintiff can only seek 
relief in a contract action. This is because the contract regulates negligent conduct causing 
pecuniary damages and such a contract has been readily used to allocate the risk of economic 
loss. However, a party can enjoy exceptions to such pure economic loss rule in certain 
circumstances, such as malpractice claims to recover loss resulting from professional 
negligence,314 or claims for economic loss resulting from a plaintiff’s reliance on a defendant’s 
statements315 or services.316 As we can see, these Restatement rules giving clear formulations of 
common law adopted by the national courts mostly appear to be along the lines of case law rules 
 
311 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388–408 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
312 Economic loss in this Restatement purportedly refers to pure economic loss not arising from injury to 
the plaintiff’s person or out of physical harm to the plaintiff’s property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2020). 
313 See id. § 3.  
314 See id. § 4. Notably, some courts give the underlying reason, for permitting concurrent tort claims of 
professional negligence, that there exists an independent duty that a professional has to exercise care for 
the benefit of his client. 
315 See id. § 5.   
316 See id. § 6.   
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explained above, which restrict a party’s right to allege tort claims to seek recovery for economic 
loss.   
At this point, it can be said that where a particular regional or international instrument 
does not get involved in a cross-border contract, the questions of right regarding concurrent 
claims are left to all relevant domestic laws of states/countries involved. However, when the 
issue of concurrency arises from a cross-border transaction, it remains controversial, in the 
conflict-of-law regime, as to which domestic law determines the hierarchy or concurrency of the 
two actions between contract and tort. In other words, a preliminary question is asked: “should 
an applicable law to such issue be the lex loci contractus, the lex loci delicti, or the lex fori?” 
Regardless of the answer to such an issue, this thesis primarily focuses on the situation where US 
law is identified as the applicable law governing the issue of concurrent claims. The 
investigation of US laws in this part is thus essential for the following discussions. The focal 
issue of discussion is questioning to what extent domestic rules and approaches adopted in US 
states have, in juridical practice, played their roles in the dispute concerning the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrency of tort claims. 
B. The Issue of the CISG’s Preemption of Domestic Tort Claims as Addressed by Scholars 
and Decided by Courts  
The CISG’s preemption of domestic tort claims is most likely seen as the primary dispute 
between parties to international sale contracts. Once the Convention entered into force, it was 
suggested that a new boundary be formed between national law and international uniform law, 
relating to the borderline between contract and tort.317 Since no provision of the CISG expressly 
 
317 Peter Schlechtriem, The Borderland of Tort and Contract–Opening a New Frontier?, 21 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 467, 467 (1988). 
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addresses the right to tort claims for property damage or economic loss arising in the context of 
international sales of goods, the issue of a conflict between domestic tort and uniform remedies 
is thus left open. Provided two requirements are met, jurisdictions would not experience 
difficulty in applying the CISG in a way that it entirely preempts national remedies in all cases 
governed by the CISG. The two prongs are, (1) if the structures and basic legal notions of the 
CISG and national laws be identical, and (2) if both instruments provided similar remedies. 
Given that a uniform law is primarily formulated to comprise the diverse national laws of each 
legal system, it is unlikely that both the requirements mentioned above are met. Therefore, it 
cannot be denied that the tribunals are still confronted with the controversial issue of the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrency, which needs to be resolved in the same manner. As we will see, the 
opinions are divided in terms of the question of whether and to what extent the Convention 
should be interpreted and applied in a way that it replaces domestic sale and contract laws, but 
that it also tends to affect tort claims. Therefore, this part will present and criticize the legal 
solutions that have been proposed by academic and law-applying mediums. In doing so, this part 
of the thesis considers the relevant legal literature and judicial decisions which touch upon the 
issue of preemption/concurrence. In terms of judicial perspectives, this part attempts to provide 
decisions that are relevant to this thesis and are believed to be of importance to represent the 
approaches to the CISG’s preemption issue. This part will begin with an explanation and analysis 
of three competing lines of thoughts, which directly deal with the issue of the CISG’s preemption 
of tort claims. All three approaches include (1) an idea that supports a complete preemption of 
tort claims; (2) a view that essentially suggests competing tort claims with no preemptive effect; 
and (3) an idea suggesting a moderate level of preemption that provides an argument against 
severe encroachment of the CISG’s scope and goals. These lines of thoughts will be presented in 
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turn. The last section will then include an alternate solution, which shifts the analysis from the 
question of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims, to the secondary matter of the characterization 
of such claims.   
1. The CISG Applies to the Exclusion of Tort Claims by Exclusively Acknowledging 
the Main Purpose of Uniformity by the CISG  
1.1 An Overview of Academic Perspectives 
John O. Honnold is the dominant scholar who takes a restrictive approach and supports 
the exclusive preemptive effect of the CISG on tort claims.318 A strong reason raised for this 
perspective is that allowing concurrent claims under domestic law will extinguish the uniform 
remedial solution created for disputes arising from international trade.319 According to Honnold, 
domestic tort law cannot be applied as an alternative to the governing provisions of the CISG, 
where the same operative facts trigger both domestic law and the CISG.320 The restrictive 
exception to the CISG’s preemption is, however, allowed in the case where a domestic claim in 
tort depends on the factual situations that differ, in terms of the facts proved to trigger the 
contractual claim under the CISG.321 One example of this exception is the remedy for fraud,322 
which explains that the CISG does not address or settle factual situations involving fraud, as this 
 
318 HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 72–76. Honnold takes a product liability claim as an illustration of 
applying the same-facts approach. 
319 See id.; see also CISG, supra note 91, pmbl; SONJA KRUISINGA, (NON-)CONFORMITY IN THE 1980 UN 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A UNIFORM CONCEPT? 221–22 
(2004); Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001).  
320 See HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 73–74; see also Ingborg Schwenzer, The CISG—Successes and 
Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 471 (2009); Ingeborg Schwenzer, Divergent Interpretations: Reasons 
and Solutions, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE, supra note 167, at 102, 112–13. 
321 HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 75.  
322 Id. at 73–74. 
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imposes a duty to act in an honest manner. Honnold further takes the view that proof of the 
seller’s breach of a duty of care does not alter the essential character of a contractual claim under 
the Convention.323 According to Honnold, the buyer cannot argue that his tort claim, which also 
requires proof of breach of duty of care, would not be based on the same facts as a claim for non-
conformity under the Convention. Honnold further argues that permitting access to tort claims 
based on such proof of lack of due care would possibly circumvent the uniform international 
rules of the Convention.324 Following this view, one may become skeptical of whether the 
ignorance of the element of tort claim regarding breach of duty of care is, in essence, in line with 
the same-facts solution that needs identical operative facts invoking both claims under the CISG 
and tort law. However, proponents argue that the identical operative facts occur where they are 
needed under the CISG and tort law on negligence. For instance, “(A) failure of the goods to 
conform to the contract (Art. 35) and (B) damage resulting from this defect (Art. 74)”325 overlap 
with the same facts proved for tort claims, although tort law requires a third element of lack of 
due care. It seems that this approach defines the extent of having the same operative facts in the 
broadest manner, primarily supposing the occurrence of the same operative facts and strongly 
supporting a recourse to remedies under domestic tort law or the CISG as mutually exclusive, 
rather than concurrent. Moreover, by adhering to the interest of uniformity in international sales 
contracts, this view purports to believe that product liability claims seeking compensation for 
losses suffered from non-conforming goods are limited to CISG provisions pertaining to quality 
and the rights of the buyer. It is stressed that product liability claims under tort doctrine be 
 
323 Id. at 74. 
324 Id.   
325 Id.  
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excluded altogether.326 Under this opinion, there will only be one exception in case of a product 
liability claim for personal injury or death, which is governed by domestic tort law as explicitly 
stated in Article 5.327 
Based upon the underlying idea of unifying the law, Enderlein and Maskow also suggest 
a functional interpretation of the Convention in order to identify the substantive scope of the 
Convention.328 Enderlein and Maskow indicate that Honnold takes a similar view to theirs, of 
functional interpretation in order to decide the scope of the CISG’s application, but Honnold puts 
forward relatively more extensive criterion for considering the preemption, as explained 
above.329 Enderlein and Maskow also support the notion that the same facts entail legal outcomes 
both under the CISG and tort, and can relate product liability cases and others. In either case, 
they hold that the rules of the Convention should preempt domestic laws.330 It is noteworthy that 
this view depends on the question of whether the Convention is invoked; if yes, then the 
Convention is exclusively applied. In other words, the complete exclusion of claims under 
domestic tort laws exists insomuch as the Convention is invoked so it is applicable as it is and 
excludes claims under tort laws.331 Enderlein and Maskow also affirm that the CISG supplants 
existing rights through certain other rights.332   
 
326 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 160, at 47; see HONNOLD, id. at 73–74. 
327 Ndulo, supra note 170, at 5. 
328 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 160, at 41.  
329 Id.  
330 Id. at 42. 
331 Id.  
332 Id.   
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In conclusion, whenever the Convention applies to the matter in question, it leads to a 
replacement of domestic tort laws, even if those laws govern the same matter and confer rights to 
the injured party. According to this approach, the exception for the non-breaching party to resort 
to the concurrent application of tort law is extremely restricted to the situation where the party 
proves the existence of another separate set of facts that only invoke domestic law.   
1.2 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against a Complete 
Exclusion of Tort Remedies   
From a theoretical point of view, a person who claims the protection of tort law should 
not be denied receiving such parallel civil protection just because he is in the domain of 
international sales, if tort law grants them the right to remedies. In this regard, the standpoint of 
the same-fact approach, which states that the availability of national tort remedies is generally 
barred due to the comparable invocation of the contractual claim under the CISG, is 
unacceptable insofar as it does not appear that rights and obligations established by tort law and 
the Convention really are the same. Considering an extreme encroachment of tort remedies, a 
scholar who formerly preferred the approach of excluding tort remedies altogether has been 
doubtful as to whether the risk of circumventing the policy considerations underlying the CISG 
is severe enough to justify the application of the Convention to the exclusion of tort remedies.333 
Another argument is that the State’s ratification of the Convention on sales contracts could not 
implicitly show the intention to merge contract with tort,334 or to replace tort law with the 
 
333 PETER HUBER & ALASTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND 
PRACTITIONERS 27–28 (2007). 
334 Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some Thoughts about Opt-Outs, Computer Programs 




Convention.335 This approach is supported by a view stating that the drafters did not intend to 
take away rights that the parties would otherwise have under the applicable domestic law.336 This 
argument is supported by the reason given in UNCITRAL’s deliberations and decisions,337 
whereby the Committee decided not to retain the proposal on exclusivity provision, which is 
similar to the ULIS Article 34.338 It is also argued that the exclusivity clause of Article 34 of the 
ULIS was, nevertheless, intended to preclude the parallel domestic remedies that are allegedly 
based on contract law, rather than to intervene with extra-contractual remedies based on areas of 
laws, such as tort law, falling outside the scope of the Convention.339 Moreover, a uniform law 
naturally cannot reach a consensus regarding all aspects, so it is inevitable to have gaps that must 
be filled with other areas of laws, especially laws that are developed to govern extra-contractual 
matters. All the arguments suggest a shortcoming in the drafters’ intention to preclude tort 
remedies. Lack of such a clear intention to prohibit tort claim weighs against recourse to CISG 
remedies as mutually exclusive and against a replacement of the whole system of tort liability.   
Pragmatically, Honnold’s proposition of the same-facts rule may be considered 
problematic and difficult to employ. This is because tribunals still need precise criteria to 
determine whether the operative facts triggering the elements of both claims are principally 
 
335 Joseph Lookofsky, Not Running Wild with the CISG, 29 J.L. & COM. 141, 150 (2011). 
336 Khoo, supra note 226, at 47. Contra ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 160, at 42. 
337 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Tenth 
Session, supra note 194, at 42 (pointing out that it may be inadvisable to protect the seller from tortious 
liability where defective products caused damage to the buyer). 
338 Article 34 of the ULIS states that “In the cases to which Article 33 relates, the rights conferred on the 
buyer by the present Law exclude all other remedies based on lack of conformity of the goods.” See 
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July, 1964, supra 
note 178. The proposal on exclusivity provisions is also relevant to the exclusion of the right to other 
remedies based on a lack of conformity of the goods. 
339 Israel 17 March 2009 Supreme Court (Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd), paras. 63–64 
(Aug. 12, 2020, 6:09 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html.   
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identical. The contractual claim under the CISG always requires proof of the existence of a valid 
contractual relationship as one of crucial elements to show a breach of contractual duty, but facts 
proving an enforceable contract are not generally needed to invoke tort claims. Rather, tort 
claims generally require proof of facts involving a breach of tortious duty which is mostly, by 
nature, independent from the contractual one.340 Accordingly, it would be unlikely to say that 
both contractual and tort claims supposedly require proof of the same set of operative facts in 
most cases insofar as the CISG requires proof of the principal element of a contractual 
relationship, but tort law does not. The schematic argument of supposing the same sets of facts 
needed under both the CISG and tort law, in supporting the analysis made by Honnold,341 is thus 
unpersuasive and doubtful.   
In practice, the US court in Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd.342 
delineated this approach of the completely preemptive effect of the CISG on tort remedies, 
together with another competing approach, in its discussion of the CISG’s preemption. 
Nevertheless, the court turned to a new question of characterization, and saw that this does not 
require a determination concerning the CISG’s preemption of tort remedies.343 The Israeli 
 
340 JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG: A COMPACT GUIDE TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 81–82 (5th ed. 2017). 
341 Honnold addresses the schematic form and poses the issue as follows:  
Domestic law states that facts A, B, and C lead to legal result X, and gives this rule a 
label such as “tort” or “products liability.” Under the Convention, facts A, B and C lead 
to legal results Y. Does the label that domestic law gives to its rule determine whether 
that rule is displaced by the Convention?  
See HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 72. 
342 Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120183 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009). 
343 Id. at 13–16. 
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Supreme Court also considered this approach; however, this court did not follow such a solution. 
The Israeli Supreme Court considered the view of complete preemption as a narrow approach 
that should not be adopted when there appears to be complex situations, which cannot easily be 
fitted into a pre-defined framework.344 Instead, the Israeli Supreme Court adopted an approach 
that is more tolerant, i.e. to accept concurrent tort claims when reaching its final decision on the 
preemption issue.345 Importantly, it should be noted here that tribunals scarcely support this 
overly broad reading of preemptive power of the CISG, even though this far-reaching approach 
was mentioned in the court discussion to present the various commentaries on the issue of the 
CISG’s preemption of tort remedies.   
2. The CISG Applies to Contractual Claims while Domestic Law Concurrently 
Applies to Tort Claims: Permitting Competing Tort Remedies and Confining the Scope of 
the CISG to the Matters Expressly Stated in the Wording of Article 4  
2.1 An Overview of Academic Perspectives 
There also exists a second approach which permits concurrent claims arising by virtue of 
applicable domestic tort law.346 In considering Article 4 of the CISG, Lookofsky submits that the 
Convention applies only to “the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising from the 
contract,” and that the CISG does not govern the rights and obligations arising out of domestic 
tort laws, which he considers to be a separate rule set.347 He further explains that the law of torts 
 
344 Israel 17 March 2009 Supreme Court (Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd), paras. 54–55, 73 
(Aug. 12, 2020, 6:09 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html.   
345 Id. paras. 56–57. 
346 Joseph Lookofsky, Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales: Problems in the Harmonization of 
Private Law Rules, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 407 (1991); see Lookofsky, supra note 334, at 287–88. 
347 Joseph Lookofsky, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CONTRACTS 1, 44 (J. Herbots & R. Blanpain eds., 
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and international sales contracts are distinct, since the sale transaction is made by and for the 
parties in privity, whereas extra-contractual obligations and tort laws are contrary to such 
character of sale contracts governed by international sale laws.348 Lookofsky further reasons that 
domestic tort laws designed to provide remedies for unfair or culpable conduct should be 
permitted to even compete with the CISG regime, similar to tort laws that are applicable 
alongside domestic contract laws.349 It might be said that Lookofsky, on the one hand, supports 
the availability of a competing tort remedy by reason of considering tort action as a claim not 
arising from the contract, and is completely different from a contractual claim under the CISG.350 
On the other hand, he further strengthens his view by comparing and taking into consideration an 
approach permitting concurring tort law to compete with contract law in a domestic system.351 
This thesis is thus inclined to conclude that Lookofsky’s argument for permitting competitive 
tort law, in essence, is based on the approaches adopted within the domestic system dealing with 
the interaction between general contract and tort laws.352 One legitimate reason raised in arguing 
for competitive rules between the CISG and tort law is that a Contracting State’s ratification to 
the CISG does not oblige the State, whose domestic sales law and tort law are simultaneously 
 
2000) (Reproduced by Pace Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Commercial Law with permission of the publisher, 
Kluwer Law International). 
348 Lookofsky, supra note 346, at 405. 
349 Lookofsky, supra note 334, at 285–86; see also Lookofsky, supra note 347, at 44. 
350 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 340, at 81.  
351 Lookofsky, supra note 346, at 414–15; see also Lookofsky, supra note 334, at 285–86; Lookofsky, 
supra note 335, at 147–49; Howard Marine & Dredging Co. Ltd. v. A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd. 
[1978] QB 574 (CA) (appeal taken from Eng.). Lookofsky also cited Howard Marine & Dredging Co. 
Ltd. v. A. Ogden & Sons (Excavations) Ltd. as an example of permitting concurrent tort in the domestic 
system of England.  
352 Lookofsky admits that his argument is influenced by the national doctrine of American and 
Scandinavian law. See Lookofsky, supra note 335, at 148–49, 169.  
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applied to disputes, to merge the CISG with domestic tort law.353 Instead, it only requires a 
substitution of domestic sales law with the CISG. Nevertheless, Lookofsky accepts, by referring 
to the domestic system, that it is difficult to find a distinction and draw a clear line between 
contract and tort.354 He further signifies that locating national law applicable to the action 
brought may be further complicated by the issue of whether to classify the matter in question as 
one of contract or tort.355 According to his statement on classification, it is also doubtful whether 
he agrees with applying the method of characterization to deal with the interaction between the 
CISG and domestic law. It might be presumed here that any matter which is characterized as tort, 
according to him, is outside the CISG’s scope. Such an assumption is, in essence, based on 
Lookofsky’s view that emphasizes a high likelihood of national tort law on product liability 
coexisting and competing with the Convention, when product liability action has traditionally 
been based on tort rules within domestic system.356   
As such, through relying on the plain text of Article 4 and the other reasons mentioned 
above, Lookofsky allows domestic remedies available under tort laws including product liability, 
the rule of misrepresentation, and principles of liability for negligence to be brought alongside 
contractual claims under the CISG.357 As opposed to the first approach, Lookofsky further argues 
 
353 See generally Joseph Lookofsky, CISG Case Commentary on Preëmption in Geneva Pharmaceuticals 
and Stawski, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(CISG) 2003-2004 115, 115–22 (Pace Int’l Law Review ed., 2005), 
https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky8.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2020). 
354 Lookofsky, supra note 346, at 407.  
355 Id. at 409 n.51. Lookofsky cited Howard Marine & Dredging Co. Ltd. v. A. Ogden & Sons 
(Excavations) Ltd. to indicate that the process of characterization is involved. See id. at 407–10. 
356 Id. at 414–15. 
357 See Lookofsky, supra note 347, at 44, 88–89; see also Lookofsky, supra note 334, at 285–86 (stating 
an additional reason that contractual claim and tort remedies have coexisted in many jurisdictions). 
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that there would be competing rules on product liability in some situations because he did not 
believe that the Convention covers all possible product liability rules and principles necessary so 
as to absorb tort claims.358 He also exemplifies the situation of bad-faith termination of 
contractual negotiations (culpa in contrahendo) in supporting the notion that where a sales 
contract could not be made, a recourse to domestic law is thus necessary.359   
Significantly, Lookofsky has recently adopted a method of distinguishing between 
contractual interests created by the international sales contract, and extra-contractual interests or 
general interests intentionally protected by tort law, in supporting competition between the CISG 
and tort law.360 He suggests that it is a required prudent approach which accounts for the nature 
of the possibly contradicting tort rules in the jurisdiction concerned when making the difficult 
choice between preemption of and competition with domestic laws.361   
Apart from Lookofsky, the same position of granting a concurrent tort remedy is also 
emphasized by Michael Bridge. Bridge takes the view that without an explicit provision stating 
so, the CISG does not intend to deprive the buyer of freedom to sue in tort, especially if domestic 
law allows freedom of election between causes of action in contract and tort.362 In other words, 
the CISG cannot limit the application of tort rules of a Contracting State or dispose of the 
domestic problem of overlapping between contract and tort, so the buyer who is capable of 
 
358 Flechtner, supra note 166, at 231 (transcribing Lookofsky’s opinion on the question of product 
liability). 
359 Lookofsky, supra note 347, at 44. 
360 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 340, at 81 (citing the opinion provided in the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision 
of Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd); see Lookofsky, supra note 335, at 150–56. 
361 LOOKOFSKY, supra note 340, at 83. 
362 Michael Bridge, A commentary on Articles 1–13 and 78, in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST AND 
BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 235, 246 
(Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand eds., 2004). 
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choosing to sue in tort ought to be able to do so in the domain of international sales.363 He further 
argues that there is no concept of tort within the Convention because uniformity of the 
Convention is partial, and does not run through the entirety of private law.364 Finally, he suggests 
that the legally distinct nature of tort action must be respected, although the alleged tort claim 
arises out of the contractual relationship between the parties.365  
Other scholars also give an example of the tort claim that creates the room for choice-of-
law rules and the application of some national tort rules, arguing a simple reason which could be 
subsumed by those raised by Lookofsky. This common reason is that non-contractual claims of 
negligence or strict liability in tort do not arise from the contract, so it is thus excluded from the 
scope of CISG according to Article 4.366 As a result, domestic tort laws and the provisions of the 
CISG apply concurrently to such claims of negligence or strict liability, unless national laws 
provide otherwise.367 Another argument for allowing tort remedies is that parties to international 
sales transactions should not be placed in a worse situation than any third person who suffers 
from the defective goods.368  
 
363 FAWCETT, HARRIS & BRIDGE, supra note 242, ¶ 16.78, at 950–51. 
364 Id. ¶ 16.81, at 952. 
365 Id. ¶ 17.183, at 1062. 
366 Henry Mather, Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not Resolved by the CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 
155, 159, 161 (2001). 
367 Tamo Zwinge, The United Nations Sale Convention: Delimitation, Influences, and Concurrent 
Application of Domestic Law, 10 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 227, 252 (2011). 
368 H. H. EBERSTEIN ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT, DAS ÜBEREINKOMMEN 
DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN ÜBER VERTRÄGE ÜBER DEN INTERNATIONALEN WARENKAUF, CISG 
KOMMENTAR c. 45, ¶ 89 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Munich: C.H. Beck 1990) cited in Diana Sewerin, 
International Product Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law 59–60 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished LL.M. 
thesis, Institute of Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with McGill University Library). 
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2.2 An Overview of Judicial Perspectives 
Apart from the academic perspectives, this approach is supported and followed by the 
majority of US court decisions. One US court decision directly cites the opinion of Lookofsky in 
its analysis. In Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH,369 the 
defendant argued that (1) the CISG preempts any common law claims under state law; and (2) 
the plaintiff cannot plead tort claims for negligent misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement 
because its rights to tort claims are prohibited by the pure economic loss doctrine.370 The court 
started by considering the CISG’s preemption issue, and held in favor of the plaintiff’s 
argument.371 Relying on Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc.,372 and Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. 
Greeni Oy,373 the plaintiff contended that the CISG only preempts state contract law claims, and 
only to the extent that such claims fall within the scope of the Treaty.374 The court referred to the 
opinion of the learned jurist – Joseph Lookofsky – as expressed in his article,375 and held that the 
 
369 Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 76748 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2006). 
370 Id. at *8–9.  
371 In support of his argument, the plaintiff cited Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 
1151–52 (N.D. Cal. 2001) and Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 480 
(D.N.J. 2005). 
372 Asante Techs., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52. Please note that when the court in Asante Techs. 
considered the preemptive effect of the CISG and determined the question of the federal court’s judicial 
power over the contractual dispute, the court focused only on the preemptive effect of the CISG over the 
state contract claim, but did not consider the effect on the concurrent tort claim. 
373 Valero Mktg. & Supply Co., 373 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (citing Asante Techs. and ruled that although the 
CISG is limited in its scope of application, it can and does preempt state contract law to the extent that 
alleged causes of action fall within the scope of the CISG). 
374 Miami Valley Paper, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76748, at *9.   
375 Id. (citing Lookofsky’s opinion, which states that “‘Indeed, the CISG drafters made no attempt . . . to 
prescribe the legal effect of . . . a seller’s negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation’”); see also 
Lookofsky, supra note 334, at 280. 
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CISG does not preempt the plaintiff’s claims for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent 
inducement under state law.376 Notably, after determining the preemption issue, the court then 
moved on to the second issue of the economic loss doctrine. It is worthy to point out that this 
court subsequently considered and applied domestic tort law to further determine whether the 
plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement claims are precluded by the 
economic loss doctrine and are thus not actionable. According to Ohio law, the court held that 
the economic loss doctrine does not prevent the plaintiff from pleading negligent 
misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement claims in connection with goods that did not 
conform to the desired model and specifications.377 
There are other US court decisions378 that did not conduct an analysis on the CISG’s 
preemption issue in detail and discuss whether the alleged tort claims fall within the scope of the 
Convention and are thus preempted. Some decisions merely concluded that the CISG does not 
apply to a tort claim, while others assumed a right to concurrent tort claims and then performed 
an analysis on the actionability of alleged tort claims. As long as courts found the alleged tort 
claim available under tort law, the plaintiff would then be given the right to the concurring tort 
claim irrespective of further consideration of whether such available tort remedy overlaps with 
the CISG’s rules. In TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, plaintiffs asserted a 
 
376 Miami Valley Paper, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76748, at *9–10.  
377 Id. at *10–12. 
378 See Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-6384, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12347, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000) (ruling that the CISG does not govern tort claims, and held 
that it does not apply to the alleged claim of tortious interference with business relations. However, the 
court in Viva Vino Imp. Corp. finally held that the CISG is not the applicable law for contractual 
disputes); TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
22, 2006); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC, No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21121 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008); Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, No. 
10-80851-CV, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim 
Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013). 
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contractual claim and tort claims seeking recovery for damages suffered from a Biobox-
production system that was delivered and appeared to malfunction frequently and severely.379 
The court in TeeVee Toons, Inc. took a liberal approach by impliedly assuming the availability of 
plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and then deciding the actionability of such tort claim under 
applicable domestic tort law.380 As for another common law fraud claim, the court applied New 
York law on fraudulent misrepresentation.381 The court then decided the issue of duplicative 
relief concerning a fraud claim, and held that a fraud claim is not duplicative of the contract 
claim and thus does not, as a threshold matter, bar the action.382 Additionally, the court reasoned 
that a fraud claim is not duplicative since plaintiff-TVT based his claim on the misrepresentation 
of a fact, which induced it to enter into the Quotation contract at issue, rather than alleging the 
conduct during the course of performance.383 However, the fraud claim was dismissed because it 
did not meet the element of justifiable reliance under New York law.384  
A similar position of assuming the availability of concurrent allegation of a tort action 
can be shown in Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC.385 After 
 
379 TeeVee Toons, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455, at *2–3. 
380 Id. at *55–57 (applying the economic loss doctrine under New York law adopted by Niagara Mohawk 
Power Corp. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 725 F. Supp. 656, 660 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); Cty. of Suffolk v. 
Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52, 62 (2d Cir. 1984); Consol. Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 567 F. Supp. 358, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Finally, based on the economic loss doctrine under New 
York law and the required element of an independent duty, the court in TeeVee Toons, Inc. denied the 
negligence claim and reasoned that “[b]ecause ‘New York law does not recognize a negligence cause of 
action when economics loss alone is involved,’ and transmogrification of a contract action into one 
sounding in tort is ‘generally prohibited by the courts of New York’”). 
381 Id. at *48.  
382 Id.  
383 Id. at *48–49. 
384 Id. at *49–50. 
385 Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, No. 10-80851-CV, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 128723 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011). 
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upholding the plaintiff, Al Hewar’s, contractual claim under the CISG, the court then turned to 
consider the plaintiff’s right to the claim of fraudulent inducement. Finally, without 
consideration of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims in detail, the court applied Florida tort 
law, finding the fraudulent inducement claim as a tort cause of action arising independently from 
breach of contract.386   
In Sky Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC,387 the court concluded that “negligent 
misrepresentation is a tort claim completely different from a claim for breach of contract”388 and 
thus is not governed by the CISG. In considering the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
on a negligent misrepresentation claim, the court based its decision on the facts that the plaintiff, 
Sky Cast, provided the defendant, Global, with false information regarding the delivery of the 
light poles, and applied Kentucky law to those facts.389 As is stated in its analysis, the court 
relied only on Kentucky case law,390 which had adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 
when deciding whether the alleged negligent misrepresentation is valid.391 This thesis observes 
that this court permitted the defendant’s negligent misrepresentation counterclaim in tort without 
considering whether such a claim may overlap with the contractual claim and thus fall under the 
CISG’s scope.  
 
386 Id. at *6–7 (citing Htp, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996)). 
387 Sky Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC, No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21121 (E.D. 
Ky. Mar. 18, 2008). 
388 Id. at *20.   
389 Id.  
390 This court cited Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2004), 
which adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 as Kentucky law. 
391 Sky Cast, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21121, at *18–20. 
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Apart from the decisions concerning the seller’s tortious liability in regard to his 
obligations to deliver conforming goods and deliver goods as obliged, there is also a US court 
decision under It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH,392 emphasizing the 
seller’s right to commence a concurrent tort claim against the buyer who has a duty to make a 
payment. In It’s Intoxicating, Inc., the US seller-plaintiff simultaneously asserted a fraud claim 
against the German buyers-defendants.393 Similar to TeeVee Toons, Inc., in deciding the validity 
of a fraud claim, the court assumed the availability of the plaintiff’s alleged tort claim, and then 
applied the elements of fraud action and statute of limitation under applicable law to decide the 
merits of the case.394 Clearly stated, the court did not consider whether the alleged fraud claim 
falls under the CISG at the same time, and is thus prevented by the Convention. Similarly, by 
assuming a right to assert a concurrent conversion, the court did not consider the CISG’s 
preemption of the tort of conversion, and then the court referred to the Erie Doctrine to apply 
Pennsylvania law on conversion to determine whether the claim is actionable.395   
The line of reasoning for granting concurring claims adopted in these US cases is 
supported by decisions in other countries as well. To begin with, a foreign court decision under 
Canadian jurisdiction396 permitted the buyer to make a claim in tort for negligent design and 
 
392 It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
107149 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013). 
393 Id. at *40. The complaint alleged that “defendants ‘conspired to fraudulently induce the contract and 
obtain the goods from Plaintiff, without intention to pay full price, and with subsequent effort to avoid 
payment through deceit.’” 
394 Id. at *40–46. 
395 Id. at *61–62 (considering the merits of the case, which were contended by the defendants, that 
conversion is barred by the statute of limitations and the gist of action doctrine). 




manufacturing of goods sold. The court did not prudently consider whether such an alleged tort 
claim will contradict and thus destroy the uniform application of the CISG.397 Also, the Canadian 
court did not thoroughly analyze whether there exists an extra-contractual interest protected by 
applicable tort law, or whether the party’s negligent conduct violates an extra-contractual duty 
imposed by tort law, which would not be trumped by the CISG. Another foreign decision 
rendered by the Supreme Court of Western Australia also held that not only was the seller bound 
by an express term of the contract to supply goods that would be manufactured according to the 
requirements of the Australian Therapeutics Goods Administration and that such goods would be 
sterile, but also that the seller owed the buyer a duty of care to provide goods manufactured in 
accordance with the requirements of the TGA and were sterile.398 Similarly, the Australian 
Supreme Court did not discuss in detail whether the alleged tortious duty of care owed is 
separate from, or identical to, the obligation imposed by the express contractual terms which 
appeared to be governed by the CISG. The last example of the German court decision was 
revealed in a scholarly writing.399 It is said that the German court applied the rule governing the 
issue of rights to concurrent tort claims (the principle of cumul) derived from the domestic 
 
397 The reason may be because the main claim, in this case, is that the goods (tractors) were negligently 
manufactured or designed, and the parties disputed the jurisdiction. So, the court at bar must decide 
whether plaintiffs could make their claim for damages based on negligent manufacturing and design of 
the tractors in Ontario, which is the place where the plaintiffs suffered damages from such negligent 
conduct. See id. paras. 1–2, 24, 27–29.  
398 Australia 17 January 2003 Supreme Court of Western Australia (Ginza Pte Ltd v. Vista Corporation 
Pty Ltd), paras. 204–06 (Aug. 14, 2020, 4:50 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030117a2.html; see 
also Lisa Spagnolo, The Last Outpost: Automatic CISG Outs, Misapplications and the Costs of Ignoring 
the Vienna Sales Convention for Australian Lawyers, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 141, 184–89 (2009) 
(criticizing Ginza Pte Ltd as a disappointing Australian decision, since the court did not utilize the CISG 
resources. Instead, the court reverted to domestic influences. It was also suggested that the CISG’s 
preemption of tort claim should be considered as a preliminary question). 
399 Oberlandesgericht München, 9 August 1995, IPRax 1997, 38, No. 7 U 7143/92 cited in Diana 
Sewerin, International Product Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law 52–53 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished 
LL.M. thesis, Institute of Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with McGill University Library). 
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system to disputes involving international sales contracts.400 The court, in this case, was bound to 
apply the ULIS, pursuant to Article 100 of the CISG. Despite the existence of Article 34 of the 
ULIS, and the fact that the buyer failed to give notification of non-conformity, the court found 
that the question of tortious liability falls outside the scope of the CISG, and allowed the buyer to 
rely on tort remedies pursuant to applicable Italian law regarding the right to concurrent tort 
claims. As we can see, the German court followed the applicable foreign law to determine the 
issue of concurrence involving the relationship in the international sales contract governed by the 
International Convention.401   
From the line of cases demonstrated in this section, most court decisions principally 
adhered to the narrowest scope of the CISG, and applied the applicable tort law located by 
private international law to uphold the availability of the alleged tort claim and to consider its 
actionability or its validity. Clearly stated, not only did these decisions402 adopt a liberal 
approach, but they also applied rules and approaches based on the right to concurrent claims 
between contract and tort deriving from a single domestic system so as to uphold the availability 
as well as consider the validity of a tort claim.   
 
400 Diana Sewerin, International Product Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law 52–56 (Mar. 2000) 
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Institute of Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with McGill 
University Library). 
401 Id. at 53–55. 
402 See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59455 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
22, 2006); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Glob. Direct Distribution, LLC, No. 07-161-JBT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21121 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008) (relying on the Erie doctrine to apply substantive state law, i.e. Kentucky 
law, to the tort claim); Al Hewar Envtl. & Pub. Health Establishment v. Se. Ranch, LLC, No. 10-80851-
CV, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128723 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim 
Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107149 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013) 
(referring to the Erie doctrine to apply substantive state law, i.e. Pennsylvania law, to tort claims); Shane 
v. JCB Belgium N.V., [2003] O.J. No. 4497, [2003] O.T.C. 1006, 126 A.C.W.S. (3d) 781 (Can.); 
Australia 17 January 2003 Supreme Court of Western Australia (Ginza Pte Ltd v. Vista Corporation Pty 
Ltd) (Aug. 14, 2020, 4:50 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030117a2.html; Oberlandesgericht 
München, 9 August 1995, IPRax 1997, 38, No. 7 U 7143/92. 
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2.3 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against Extensive 
Permission of Competing Tort Remedies   
The first angle of the criticism takes into consideration the existing provisions of the 
Convention and the underlying reason for enacting Article 5 to argue against the most lenient 
approach. It is reasoned that no other provisions of the CISG regarding the competence for tort 
claims can be considered sufficient to justify the application of domestic law in regard to the 
right to tort claims.403 Instead, this thesis argues that if the buyer were generally allowed not only 
to assert certain claims according to the CISG, but also to resort to a wide range of other 
concurrent claims under domestic laws, it would be unnecessary to include Article 5 for two 
primary purposes. The first is to prevent conflict between the Convention and domestic product 
liability law governing claims for personal injury and death. The second is to avoid infringing on 
domestic laws that protect such extra-contractual interests. Insofar as Article 5 is necessary to 
prevent applying the CISG to claims for personal injury and death, and thus avoid its preemptive 
effect, this leads to the implicit inference that the CISG is possibly applied in a way to exclude 
other tort remedies not covered by Article 5.   
The other standpoint of the critique accords with the CISG’s objectives and functions 
discussed in Chapter Two and criticizes more along the lines of the method of interpretation 
navigated by the CISG. This trenchant criticism starts with the interpretive dimension of Article 
4. This is because the expansive approach primarily adheres to the plain text and confines the 
CISG’s scope to matters expressly stated under Article 4 when suggesting the permissibility of 
concurring claims. Considering the phrase that “[t]his Convention governs only . . . the rights 
and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract,” one argues that the 
 
403 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 160, at 42. 
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terms of the first sentence of Article 4 describing the scope of the Convention are general, vague, 
open to and in need of interpretation.404 When there is a conflict, it is submitted that the problem 
of the CISG’s scope should be solved in favor of the Convention and its application.405 One 
reason for the pro-CISG approach is that the Convention is widely accepted as a suitable 
international doctrine, formulated specifically for relationships formed under the international 
sales transactions. Thus, the CISG should apply whenever a sufficient basis for the application of 
its uniform rules exists, provided that its language does not preclude such application.406 Another 
reason is that a narrow reading of Article 4 is not consistent with the entire system of the CISG, 
and such a limited interpretation should not be adopted.407 Given the main goals indicated in the 
CISG’s preamble, an application of domestic law bringing about an alternative to fundamental 
rules and principles of the CISG would be deemed unacceptable as it disrupts the consensus of 
international communities to remove legal barriers in international trade. It is solemnly insisted 
that a fair balance between plaintiffs and defendants intentionally equipped by the Convention 
should not be subverted by way of giving plaintiffs the right to choose more favorable domestic 
law.408 Additionally, permitting competing tort remedy without restriction can be detrimental to 
the breaching party when he engages in business with the other party. As a result, this can bring 
 
404 Ulrich G. Schroeter, The Validity of International Sales Contracts – Irrelevance of the ‘Validity 
Exception’ in Article 4 Vienna Sales Convention and a Novel Approach to Determining the Convention’s 
Scope, in BOUNDARIES AND INTERSECTIONS: 5TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CISG CONFERENCE 95, 
99 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2015).   
405 C. WITZ, LES PREMIÈRES APPLICATIONS JURISPRUDENTIELLES DU DROIT UNIFORME DE LA VENTE 
INTERNATIONAL (L.G.D.J. Paris 1995) cited in Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some 
Thoughts about Opt-Outs, Computer Programs and Preëmption under the 1980 Vienna Sales 
Convention (CISG), 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 263, 264 (2003). 
406 Id. 
407 Schroeter, supra note 404, at 99. 
408 HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 76. 
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about adverse effects on the economy in terms of international trade. To achieve the goals of the 
Convention, it is then suggested that the general provision of Article 4 should be interpreted and 
applied in conjunction with Article 7(1) and (2) so as to identify the substantive scope of the 
Convention and assess its boundaries with domestic laws.409 
As far as the goal of uniformity is concerned, the critic emphasizes the intention of 
drafting committees to impose a general obligation on the Contracting States to give effect to a 
uniform law. In this regard, the scholarly view which advocates promoting the uniform rules is 
willing to heighten the need to promote uniformity, as is expressly directed by Article 7(1). Also, 
this view argues against the broader approach that careful consideration should be taken when 
granting plaintiffs additional appeals for domestic law as the other exceptions were not 
persuasive to the international legislative body and were not expressly carved out within the 
Convention.410 The reason is that such additional “exceptions to the area of uniformity seem 
inconsistent with the compromises on scope and substance that led to the international 
agreement.”411   
Furthermore, in supporting this liberal approach stating that there is little threat to the 
goal of accomplishing the uniformity in interpretation,412 the argument seems unpersuasive. 
There are two aspects to consider. The first is that the scope of the CISG’s application as is 
interpreted by different jurisdictions will vary depending on differences in the ways of 
characterizing claims relating to sales as regards to whether it is a contract or tort. In explaining, 
 
409 Pedro Martini, Reading Article 4 with Article 7 Glasses: Shaping the CISG’s Material Scope, in 
BOUNDARIES AND INTERSECTIONS: 5TH ANNUAL MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CISG CONFERENCE, supra note 
404, at 21, 22, 31. 
410 HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 75–76. 
411 Id. at 76.   
412 Lookofsky, supra note 334, at 288. 
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tribunals primarily look towards their law when characterizing the alleged claim, to identify the 
availability of a tort claim. If the alleged claim sounded in tort, it would be treated as a matter 
outside the CISG’s scope. As we can see, such a qualification process is closely related to, and 
inevitably affects, the court’s decision regarding the CISG’s preemption and concurrency 
problem. Accordingly, the CISG’s goal of uniformity is put at risk due to the non-uniform results 
of the characterization arising from different jurisdictions. The second point is that even in the 
domestic system, there have been different rules and approaches adopted by domestic courts to 
consider whether the right to concurrent tort claims should be permitted. Accordingly, if 
tribunals followed the solution of permitting tort actions, the risk of having a competing tort 
remedy encroaching upon the rules of the CISG would possibly depend on national laws, which 
are different in various ways, in respect to the right to concurrency. Therefore, it is not 
convincing to defend the risk of non-uniform results as attributable to the distinctions among 
domestic tort rules, which the CISG does not intend to align with each other.413   
2.4 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against the 
Consideration of Domestic Rules and Approaches to the Right to Concurrent Claims 
As we have noticed from domestic approaches which the aforementioned court decisions 
referred to, there is essentially no domestic rule directly formulated to decide the issue of the 
preemptive effect of the International Convention on a domestic claim or its concurrency 
problem, particularly the CISG’s preemption or concurrency of a tort claim. This thesis thus 
agrees with the criticism of the scholarly view arguing that it would be problematic to consider 
the general rules deriving from a single legal system to determine the concurrence of 
 
413 Lookofsky, supra note 335, at 150. 
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international sales law and national tort law, which is inherently dissimilar from national 
concurrence of contract and tort norms.414 The critical difference is that the competing norm of 
the Convention is the unification of the special supranational instrument and that it has an 
international autonomous character. There is also the criticism that it is inappropriate to leave the 
question of concurrence arising out of the international sales of goods to domestic law, which is 
predominantly up to the municipal court.415 More specifically speaking, it would be ill-suited, to 
give a striking example, if the court applied the French principle of non-cumul to prevent a trader 
from asserting his tort claim, especially when such tort claim essentially falls outside the scope 
of the CISG. It is because the non-cumul principle has originally developed due to the 
competition between French national laws of contract and tort. Significantly, the development of 
non-cumul has been stimulated by many structures, notions, and elements of French laws of 
contract and tort. Taking a domestic solution of merging liability of contort put forth in the 
literature of the Death of Contract416 as another example, Peter Schlechtriem points out that, 
following such merging of the liability of contort, part of the CISG’s fundamental regulations 
regarding the parties’ liabilities and right to remedies, e.g. the prerequisites for liabilities, would 
be abandoned.417 More critically, it would negate the very essence of the CISG and its objective 
to create a uniform law, because the contort remedy may be different depending on the varying 
 
414 C. SCHMID, DAS ZUSAMMENSPIEL VON EINHEITLICHEM UN-KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALEM RECHT: 
LÜCKENFÜLLUNG UND NORMENKONKURRENZ 99–100 (1996) cited in Diana Sewerin, International 
Product Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law 54–55 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Institute of 
Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with McGill University Library). 
415 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 470. 
416 GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 98 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 1995). 
417 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 469–70. 
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grounds of domestic tort laws where the dispute of concurrent claims are decided by different 
jurisdictions of Contracting States with their diverse tort law systems.418  
The proponents of the following approach419 would argue that considering the CISG’s 
substantive scope according to the entire system of its rules could produce outcomes of the 
CISG’s preemption problem, which would be more theoretically satisfied than results simply 
concluded by way of shifting the analysis from the preemption issue to the general question of 
concurrence of claims within the domestic system. As we can see, some domestic mechanisms, 
e.g., the principle of cumul or merging liability of contort, bring about a legal consequence that 
inevitably places a risk of non-applicability of the Convention’s uniform rules when in 
interaction with tort law. In this respect, without an express or implied intention of the drafters, 
the tribunals should not bring the problem of the applicability of the CISG into the system of 
national law, and solve such a question through different applicable laws and approaches to the 
right to concurrent claims. For instance, when dealing with the preemption issue, it would be 
inappropriate for the US courts to follow the traditional domestic approach, and then discover 
that the matter sounded in tort action merely because they are motivated by the public policy 
underlying rule of tort, such as a rule on the limitation period.420 Furthermore, when a conflict of 
law in regard to the concurrence of the two actions arises, tribunals would be inevitably 
 
418 Id. at 469. 
419 See discussion infra Section III.B.3. 
420 Please consider court decisions that are motivated by the public policy behind the rule in question at 
bar when determining the boundary between a contractual claim and a tort claim arising from domestic 
disputes. See Lord Elec. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 123 N.E. 756 (N.Y. 1919); Loehr v. E. Side 
Omnibus Corp., 18 N.Y.S.2d 529 (App. Div. 1940); Hutchinson v. Smith, 417 So. 2d 926 (Miss. 1982); 
see also supra note 303. Notably, under the following approach of acknowledging the substantive scope 
and aims of the CISG, the recourse to concurring tort remedy is supported insomuch as the public policy 
underlying tort law reflects a purpose of regulating particular conduct, thereby imposing an extra-
contractual duty or an aim of providing for extra-contractual protection. 
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confronted with a dilemma as to which approaches and what laws should apply between lex loci 
contractus and lex loci delicti.421 Accordingly, the different courts are highly inclined to apply 
different laws in a complex situation as such. Given that there is a spectrum of applicable 
domestic laws and approaches attempting to solve concurrency problems within different 
domestic systems, it is highly concerning that the Convention’s goal of uniformity is again at risk 
of being disrupted whenever a party lodges both a CISG remedy and tort one.  
3. A Tort Claim Is Generally Allowed with Exceptions: By Acknowledging the 
Substantive Scope and Aims of the CISG 
3.1 An Overview of Academic Perspectives 
This part deliberates over an alternate approach which primarily accounts for the 
substantive scope and aims of the CISG so as to suggest a moderate level of preemption. This 
approach may be considered the compromise approach. Importantly, this approach requires 
tribunals to take caution in allowing inconsistent domestic tort claims. It is suggested that courts 
are not free to permit tort claims or grant remedies against torts if doing so would push aside the 
regulations of the CISG, or the prerequisites and restrictions for its remedies.422 To illustrate, it 
would be an infringement of the Convention if the buyer who fails to give timely notice of non-
conformity is able to choose to bring the action in domestic tort so as to ask for damages caused 
by non-conforming goods.423 To avoid severe encroachment of the CISG’s rules and principles, 
 
421 Marcin Czepelak, Concurrent Causes of Action in the Rome I and II Regulations, 7 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 
393, 393–94 (2011). 
422 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 468. 
423 Id. at 469.  
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the analysis requires an exhaustive investigation of both the entire system of the CISG’s rules as 
well as of domestic tort laws that might concur with the CISG424  
Peter Schlechtriem suggests that an incompatible domestic law should not be allowed.425 
According to Schlechtriem, tort law is considered incompatible when it relates to the seller’s 
actual obligations regarding the quality of the goods, or when it performs functions that are 
equivalent to those of the CISG or the contract itself.426 The primary mechanism under this 
approach is to take the scope and aims of the CISG into account,427 when coping with the 
preemption issue. It is submitted that the Convention regulates its relationship with domestic law 
in terms of the permissibility of concurring claims based on the CISG and remedies based on 
domestic law.428 In any case, Schlechtriem suggests that the quality of the Convention as a 
binding treaty, as well as its objective to enhance global uniformity in dealing with sales disputes 
arising out of international sales, must be maintained.429 Domestic tort rules cannot be supported 
if the application of these rules may supersede legal rules especially established by the 
 
424 Id. at 471. 
425 It is said that Schlechtriem previously expressed the view of supporting the availability of concurrent 
tort remedies. See Peter Schlechtriem, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions Chapter I 
Sphere of Application Article 5, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 76, 79–80 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
However, he had later changed his position from such a liberal view to the opinion illustrated in Section 
III.B.3.  
426 See LISA SPAGNOLO, CISG EXCLUSION AND LEGAL EFFICIENCY 246 (2014). 
427 See generally Schlechtriem, supra note 317. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Defining the Borders of Uniform 
International Contract Law: The CISG and Remedies for Innocent, Negligent, or Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation, 58 VILL. L. REV. 553, 586 (2013); see also Israel 17 March 2009 Supreme Court 
(Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd) (Aug. 14, 2020, 6:05 PM), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html.   
428 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 100; see CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.1 
cmt. B. 
429 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 472. 
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Convention, and thereby violate obligations of an international treaty.430 Accordingly, the 
CISG’s rights and remedies are exclusive only in cases where the matter can be protected and 
governed by the Convention. The CISG Advisory Council also reiterates that the basic concerns 
are, on the one hand, to avoid destroying the balancing of interests and uniformity of law 
purported by the CISG, and, on the other hand, to avoid overly broad preemption of domestic 
tort claims by the CISG.431 
If it turned out that the application of the CISG did not prevent recourse to the alleged 
tort claims, another question would be whether those claims are always concurrently allowed, or 
if it would further depend on domestic rules regarding the permissibility of resorting to 
concurrent claims. This approach would answer that in any case, domestic laws and approaches 
to issues regarding the right to concurrent assertion of other remedies must be further 
considered,432 after already having decided that the CISG does not replace domestic claims.433 In 
other words, although the application of the Convention does not suppress the alleged tort claim 
according to the criteria of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG, 
considering domestic law is required for permitting concurrent tort claims. A plaintiff will be 
permitted to assert tort claims alongside contractual claims under the CISG, only if domestic law 
also permits concurrence of the remedy.434 It should be noted that domestic rules on the 
 
430 Id.  
431 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.1 cmt. B. 
432 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 34–35 (1986) (Reproduced by Pace Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Commercial 
Law with permission of the publisher, Manz); see Müller-Chen, supra note 9, at 732–33. 
433 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.1 cmt. B. 
434 See Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 468 (explaining two different domestic systems regarding the 
concurrence of actions between a rule supporting an election of remedies and the rule of “non-cumul”). 
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permissibility of resorting to concurrent claims are irrelevant at the first stage in deciding the 
preemption issue, but it later becomes involved as substantive law applicable to tort claim so that 
the final outcome is beyond the reach of the CISG.435  
In determining whether the CISG governs a matter in question, Schlechtriem provides a 
guideline of what is to be considered: the protected interests, the respective duties, and the 
relationship between interests and obligations.436 Schlechtriem thus differentiates between 
contractual obligations designated to protect economic interests, and extra-contractual duties that 
are imposed independently of contractual obligations to protect other interests, such as life, limb, 
health, and property.437 Accordingly, rules and principles of the CISG exclusively regulate the 
essence of contractual interests and provide protection for international sales, which should not 
be altered by protections for economic interests granted through tort laws.438 Notably, 
Schlechtriem considers property damages that are incurred from defective goods as the interest 
that is protected by domestic tort law. He then concludes that a tort action seeking property 
damages to either the goods themselves or other property, is “outside the principal domain of 
interests created by contracts,”439 even though such damages are recoverable under Article 74 of 
the CISG.440 He reasons that even if the drafters decided not to exclude product liability from the 
 
435 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.1 cmt. B. 
436 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 473. 
437 Id.; see Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions 
Chapter I Sphere of Application Article 4, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 9, at 73, 80.   
438 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 473. 
439 Id.  
440 Id. at 473–74; see Peter Schlechtriem, Part I Sphere of Application and General Provisions Chapter I 
Sphere of Application Article 4, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL 
SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 425, at 63, 75. 
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CISG’s scope altogether, it is difficult to imagine that the Contracting States’ legislators intend 
to reverse the policy underlying tort law by preempting important sectors of this area of tort law, 
and elevating the Convention to a lex specialis status in regards to consequential damages to 
property.441 Therefore, he opines that claims for damages caused by the goods to property could 
be concurrently asserted based on grounds of both contract under the CISG, and tort under 
domestic law.442  
However, there is an opposing view that considers property damages to goods purchased 
as the interest protected by the CISG.443 Additionally, the materials which are typically affected 
by the delivery of non-conforming goods,444 and the properties which are “attached to the goods, 
or with which the goods are combined or commingled, or which are processed by the goods, in 
the normal course of business or in the course of normal use,”445 are considered as contractual 
interests and are thus exclusively protected by the CISG.446 This is because parties usually 
contemplate the well-being of these properties when they engage in the bargain.447 Given such a 
contemplation, it is justified to regard these properties’ well-being as a contractual interest for 
which the uniform protection was intended. Another view advocating for modifications of tort 
laws also suggests that the CISG dominates over the national tort claim in cases where the goods 
 
441 Schlechtriem, supra note 425, at 79–80. 
442 Id. at 78–79. 
443 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 99; see CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.2 
cmt. 3.2.1; Pascal Hachem, Property Damages Under the CISG, in STATE OF PLAY: THE 3RD ANNUAL 
MAA SCHLECHTRIEM CISG CONFERENCE 17, 27 (Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo eds., 2012).  
444 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 437, at 81.  
445 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.2. 
446 Id. r. 3.2 cmts. 3.2.2–.4. 
447 Id. r. 3.2 cmt. 3.2.2. 
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themselves are destroyed.448 Such a view further reasons that an adaptation is required, because 
domestic law granting compensation for damages done to sold goods may lead to an 
inconsistency between the protective regulations of the CISG and domestic tort laws.449 As such, 
to prevent contradicting legal outcomes, a tort remedy for damages to goods must be subject to 
the specific protective regulations of the CISG, such as the notification requirement under Article 
39.   
Regarding compensation for damages to other property, the proponents of the 
compromise approach still agree that domestic claims seeking recovery for such damages are 
seen as a protection of extra-contractual interests and thus not excluded by the application of the 
CISG.450   
In addition to opinions based on the premise of extra-contractual interests, the 
compromise approach will result in the same outcome in cases where an allegation of tort action 
relies on a breach of extra-contractual duties which exist independent of obligations imputed by 
parties’ agreement or the CISG.451 This premise of extra-contractual duty, as well as the non-
contractual respective interests, is supported by the policies of the Convention, through its 
exclusion of personal injury from its scope. Such policies indicate that where a seller violates the 
standards of due care in the marketing of his goods, causing harm to the buyer’s life and limb, 
the buyer can resort to remedies in tort regardless of their contractual obligations.452 The 
remedies available under tort law will not be subject to the standard restrictions applied to 
 
448 Sewerin, supra note 400, at 93–94, 107. 
449 Id. 
450 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.3 cmts. 3.3.1–.2; see Sewerin, id. at 93. 
451 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 474. 
452 Schlechtriem, supra note 272, at 129. 
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remedies under the Convention.453 Under the majority views, which support the idea of extra-
contractual duty, the CISG exclusively governs claims for property damage, i.e. the typical result 
from a breach of contractual obligation, while a concurring claim under domestic tort law is 
permitted when loss to other property results from a breach of the general duty of safety.454 
However, the same result is not true in the case where parties expressly or impliedly incorporate 
clauses imposing an additional duty of care so as to not cause harm to the buyer through the 
contract.455 Such an outcome, which permits a concurring tort claim, is also not reached in 
situations where the parties include interests, in their contract, that are otherwise extra-
contractual.456 By having such agreements, the buyer’s claim for the seller’s breach of due care 
in rendering his performance can be based exclusively on the CISG, even if the buyer makes a 
personal injury claim.457 An example is the case where parties agree to impose a duty of care in 
performing service obligations under the contract of sale, which falls under the CISG’s sphere by 
virtue of Article 3(2) of the CISG.458 Another instance is the case where parties alter the 
substantive duties under the CISG in a way that requires the standard duty of care to be imposed 
upon the seller in his performance of all contractual obligations. 
 
453 Id.; see also CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.1 cmt. D (confirming the policy 
underlying Article 5, which aims to secure the party’s right to claims under domestic laws that provide for 
the protection of extra-contractual matters, which are not created by the contract, and for protection for 
which the parties did not bargain). 
454 See Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 100; Hachem, supra note 443, at 27. 
455 See Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 96–97; see also CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 
238, r. 2.1 cmt. 2.1.10. 
456 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.3 cmt. 3.3.2. 
457 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 97. 
458 Without such agreements, it is submitted that “When a contract entailing labour or other services is a 
contract of sale in accordance with Article 3(2), the CISG does not govern the liability of the seller for 
death or personal injury caused by such services to the buyer or any other person according to Article 5.” 
See CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.2. 
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Considering the interests protected and parties’ respective obligations, Schlechtriem 
suggests adjusting tort law in cases where the alleged tort remedy involves economic interests 
and their respective contractual duties. Schlechtriem opines that if the CISG genuinely protects 
the matter in question, it is sufficient to adjust the concurrent tort liability, which is protected by 
domestic tort rules, to the rules and principles of the CISG.459 He reasoned that this adjustment is 
appropriate due to the need for a uniform application of the CISG, as per Article 7(1).460   
 Other commentators also provide support for the approach of the CISG being exclusively 
superior to tort law, when it appears that tort laws impose duties that are essentially related to 
those owed by the CISG or the sales contract. In adherence with the prevailing view among legal 
scholars, Warren Khoo uses the case of defective machinery to explain the difficult problem of 
the interaction between the CISG and domestic law when a buyer asserts claims for lack of due 
care in providing a recommendation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and non-conformity.461 Khoo 
suggests that in dealing with the problem as to whether the CISG will displace domestic law, 
tribunals should follow the guidance of Article 7 and grant the widest possible scope of 
application to the CISG, due to its aim of unifying legal rules governing international sales 
contracts.462 Another suggestion to prevent excessive liability is highlighted by Rolf Herber, who 
states that tort claims are generally outside the scope of the CISG, and can be asserted 
concurrently with claims under the CISG in accordance with applicable tort law, but such claims 
must be prohibited when the buyer uses them merely to extend the seller’s liability.463 Herber 
 
459 Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 475. 
460 Schlechtriem, supra note 425, at 79–80. 
461 Khoo, supra note 226, at 46–47. 
462 Id. at 48. 
463 Herber, supra note 232, at 47. 
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further affirms that Article 5 cannot be analogically applied to exclude product liability claims 
for property loss from the ambit of the CISG.464 He also advises that the tort of product liability 
for defective goods may not be applied concurrently with the CISG, inasmuch as tort remedies 
relate to either typical or atypical obligations according to the quality of the goods purchased, 
and the delivery of goods that are free from legal defects in title.465   
In connection with the scope of the CISG, a functional equivalence test, advanced by 
Franco Ferrari, should be investigated. To begin with, Ferrari opines that besides Article 4 of the 
CISG, other provisions must also be taken into consideration to determine the scope of the 
CISG’s application, since other provisions also regulate issues not listed in the first sentence of 
Article 4.466 The functional equivalence test is further explained by pointing out the essential 
function of Article 4, providing an exception to the exclusion of both the validity issue and the 
tort issue from the scope of the Convention. The wording of “except as otherwise expressly 
provided in this Convention” clearly indicates that the CISG provides a functional equivalence 
solution to the validity issue.467 In Ferrari’s view, this functional equivalence test does not 
require an express rejection of particular national concepts; rather, it is adequate that the CISG 
contains rules or principles that provide other options to settle the disputed matter.468 As we can 
see, since the matter of tort liability is not expressly listed in Article 4, it is more difficult and 
arguable whether a party’s concurrent tort claim is included in the Convention, or otherwise 
 
464 Id. at 49. 
465 Id. at 47, 50. 
466 Franco Ferrari, The Interaction between the United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods and Domestic Remedies (Rescission for Mistake and Remedies in Tort Law), 
71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 52, 59–60 (2007). 
467 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 160, at 41; see Ferrari, id. at 65–67. 
468 Ferrari, supra note 466, at 65.  
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covered by domestic law. To this question, Ferrari proposes that apart from the apparent solution 
under Article 5, the functional equivalence test is justified to deal with the preemption and 
concurrence dilemma that arises in terms of domestic remedies based on tort laws.469 In light of a 
functionally equivalent solution, he believes that tribunals can apply the exception to an 
inapplicability of the Convention, as stated in the second sentence of Article 4, to the issue of tort 
liability when it appears that the CISG’s rules and principles provide protection of the parties’ 
interests, which is functionally equivalent to the protection provided by tort laws.470 As a result, 
in the case of equivalent overlapping, the Convention applies exclusively to the matter and then 
replaces domestic law.471 Similar to Schlechtriem’s position, in the case where the overlapping 
condition is not met, Ferrari suggests that tort remedy is not replaced, but whether it is allowed to 
be concurrently asserted depends upon the applicable domestic laws and the domestic system’s 
approach to the issue of concurrency.472  
At last, the approach of considering the actual scope of the CISG when deciding the 
question of preemption is further supported by Ulrich G. Schroeter. Schroeter agrees with the 
CISG’s prevalence and its corresponding preemption only in the case where its rules attempt to 
govern the matters in question exclusively, and those matters are not outside the substantive 
 
469 Id. at 74–76. 
470 Id. Please note that Ferrari exemplifies the case where protected interests under both competing norms 
overlap. However, this thesis is inclined to believe that the equivalence situation requires that, besides 
providing for the protection of the same interests, both competing laws of the CISG and tort law impose 
the same duty upon relevant parties. 
471 Id. at 76. Notably, this view is in contrast to Schlechtriem’s opinion, which suggests the possibility of 
modifying tort law to adhere with the rules of the CISG, rather than displacing tort remedy when a full 




scope of its application.473 He strongly denies exclusive reliance on the strict wording of the first 
sentence of Article 4,474 or on the classification of domestic law as “contracts” and “torts,” in 
defining the scope of the CISG.475 He develops a renewed two-step approach due to the 
international character of the CISG’s interpretation and the uniformity of its application.476 He 
claims that this approach can result in a more international uniform and tenable solution to 
defining the border of the CISG. According to the two-step approach, domestic laws will be 
displaced only if (1) the national law and CISG’s rules are simultaneously triggered by the same 
factual situation, and (2) the national law concerns a legal matter and the matter is also regulated 
by the CISG.477 Schroeter takes the view that the factual circumstances should be taken into 
consideration in finding the precise scope of the Convention and its relationship with other 
domestic laws. One reason for this is that focusing on the factual criterion effectively means that 
tribunals look at the substance of concurring laws, rather than their labels.478 Also, it is good for 
merchants, when conducting their business, to anticipate and determine the legal consequences 
that could result from their business behavior under the relevant laws.479 Apart from factual 
specifications, considering the regulatory purpose and focus of concurring laws is an additional 
necessary factor, since different laws have different purposes in regulating the same factual 
 
473 Schroeter, supra note 427, at 555. 
474 Id. at 556–58. 
475 Id. at 560–63. 
476 Id. at 563. 
477 Id.  
478 Id.  
479 Id. at 564. 
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situations.480 If different purposes were shown in the case with the Convention and competing 
domestic law, the CISG would not exclusively govern the disputed issue.481 This could be the 
case where domestic law addresses various types of risk or legal matters which are distinct from 
the risks undertaken and protected by the CISG.482 In following this idea, tribunals must only 
consider the matters or the particular types of risk to the parties’ interests that the Convention 
wants to regulate and allocate between the parties, no matter how the Convention dealt with 
those matters.483 This thesis observes that the legal criterion considers the risks to the parties’ 
interests, whereas the factual criterion, in essence, focuses on the parties’ behaviors which the 
concurring laws regulate or control. This two-step approach thus helps in clarifying the need for 
consideration of the protected interests and respective duties under the compromise solution put 
forward by Schlechtriem, and other proponents who advocate a moderate level of preemption.   
3.2 An Overview of Judicial Perspectives 
A handful of US court decisions have considered the preemption issue, two of which are 
explained here in order to show an implementation of the compromise approach. Though the 
court did not apply Schlechtriem’s suggested approach in its analysis of all the alleged tort 
claims, the court in Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc.484 considered whether 
promissory estoppel overlaps with the CISG and thus subverts the Convention’s goal of 
uniformity in its application to international transactions. In considering the CISG’s preemption 
 
480 Id. at 565–66. 
481 Id. at 566. 
482 Id.  
483 Id. at 567. 
484 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).   
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of promissory estoppel and tort claims, the court first explained the supplementary notion that 
the CISG does not preempt domestic tort claims. Then, the court supported this view by referring 
to the opinion of Peter Schlechtriem, which suggested that the “CISG does not preempt claims 
for ‘misrepresentation, fraud, betrayal and intentional harm to economic interests.’”485 In 
considering the preemption of promissory estoppel, the court then took a close look at Article 
16(2)(b) and its commentary. This is because the court perceived that promissory estoppel is 
treated as another side of the contract claim,486 and noticed that “[t]he fact that Article 16(2)(b) 
appears to employ a modified version of promissory estoppel suggests that if a plaintiff were to 
bring a promissory estoppel claim to avoid the need to prove the existence of a ‘firm offer,’ that 
claim would be preempted by the CISG.”487 Importantly, the court clarified that it would 
contradict the CISG and hinder its goal of uniformity if the court permitted promissory estoppel 
under US law which requires additional elements of either foreseeability or detriment beyond 
those required by Article 16(2)(b).488 Eventually, the court considered a particular promissory 
claim in this case, finding that “Invamed utilizes promissory estoppel to prove that a promise on 
which it relied should be recognized as binding as if it were a contract.”489 The court also 
emphasized that “if the CISG had contemplated a similar ‘reliance’ principle in its determination 
 
485 Id. at 286 (quoting Schlechtriem’s view and cited Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., CIVIL 
ACTION NO. 99-6384, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12347 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000), which held that the 
CISG does not apply to tort claims. Also, the court cited Asante Techs. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 
2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001), which held that state contract causes of action are preempted by the CISG). 
486 Id. However, this thesis observes that a contract-label is not a determinative criterion that the court 
relied upon when deciding the preemption issue. 
487 Id. at 286–87. 
488 Id. at 287. 
489 Id.  
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of whether a contract had formed, this promissory estoppel claim would be preempted.”490 The 
court, however, found that Invamed’s particular promissory estoppel claim was not preempted, 
because the defendants failed to argue that the CISG contemplates a similar ‘reliance’ principle 
(emphasis added).491 It should be noted that while this court considered the actual scope of the 
CISG when determining the permissibility of promissory estoppel, a more liberal approach to 
permitting tort claims was followed when determining the CISG’s preemption of negligence and 
negligent misrepresentation.492    
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel493 is another US court decision which adopted the 
compromise approach when taking the actual scope of the CISG into consideration and deciding 
the preemptive effect of the CISG on a promissory estoppel claim.494 A promissory estoppel 
action was brought against the seller, Usinor, by both an immediate buyer, CMSA, and a 
downstream purchaser, Caterpillar. The court relied on the holding of Geneva Pharm. Tech. 
Corp. and refused to extend the preemptive effect of the CISG to domestic claims for promissory 
estoppel brought by plaintiffs.495 Accordingly, the court applied Illinois law496 to determine the 
 
490 Id.  
491 Id. The court also noted that “[t]his holding is limited to promissory estoppel as claimed by Invamed. 
Other promissory estoppel claims, such as that discussed above, could be preempted.” See id. at 287 n.31. 
492 Id. at 287–88 (primarily turning to consider whether such claims are actionable or barred by the 
economic loss doctrine under New Jersey law without asking whether overlapping situations may exist 
between the CISG and such tort claims). 
493 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
494 Id. at 673–76. 
495 Id. at 675–76. 
496 It should be noted here that the Illinois court characterized the promissory claim as a contract-based 
claim for its choice of law analysis. Then, the court applied its choice of law rule on the contract to locate 
Illinois law as the proper law applicable to plaintiffs’ state law claims. See id. at 669. 
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validity of the state claim for promissory estoppel.497 Finally, the court dismissed CMSA’s 
promissory estoppel claim for failure to state a claim, because the court found that the promise 
made by the defendant-seller is similar to a warranty, and the immediate buyer, CMSA, could 
use such promise to assert a claim for breach of warranty, and that CMSA had alleged precisely 
such a contractual claim under the CISG.498 The court further reasoned that CMSA’s promissory 
estoppel claim, in essence, duplicates its breach of warranty claim under the Convention, and 
thus the court found no reason to allow CMSA to proceed with its domestic claim for promissory 
estoppel.499 In contrast, the court upheld the downstream buyer, Caterpillar’s, state law claim for 
promissory estoppel against a remote seller, Usinor, and reasoned that such a claim is not barred, 
among other things, by the right to assert claims for breach of warranties under the CISG, since 
the downstream buyer, who is not in privity of contract, cannot proceed with such a contractual 
claim against the remote seller, Usinor, under the CISG.500   
Additionally, a foreign decision of the Israeli Supreme Court501 devoted a significant 
amount of attention to the preemption/concurrency problem. The Supreme Court suggested that 
the definition of the substantive scope of the CISG is a question of the Convention’s 
interpretation,502 in which its international aspect is innate. Although this decision was rendered 
 
497 Id. at 676. 
498 Id. at 681. 
499 Id. at 681–82. However, this thesis observes that it would be convincing to provide these reasons in 
determining the CISG’s preemption of this claim, and the holding would be that the CISG preempts this 
particular promissory estoppel action brought by the immediate buyer in this case.  
500 Id. at 674–76, 681. 
501 Israel 17 March 2009 Supreme Court (Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd) (Aug. 14, 2020, 
10:25 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html.   
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under the ULIS503–the predecessor of the CISG– the court intentionally turned to practical and 
academic discussions under the CISG to resolve the issue in this case.504 The main question to be 
decided by the Supreme Court was whether a buyer who failed to give notice of defective goods 
within the two-year period can circumvent the regulatory prescription required under the Sale 
(International Sale of Goods) Law of 1971505 by raising a claim against the seller or 
manufacturer in tort.506 Apparently, after discussing the competing approaches to deal with the 
main question in the appeal,507 the Supreme Court chose to follow the compromise approach, 
which distinguishes between interests and rights established by the contract that are thus 
protected by applicable contract law or the CISG, and general interests which tort law intends to 
protect.508 When defining the CISG’s scope under the circumstances of this case, the court 
ultimately considered the obligations imposed on the seller, who was also the manufacturer.509 
Notably, the court did not mention whether the plaintiff’s losses were to be considered as 
contractual interests to be protected by the CISG.510 Instead, in supporting its holding, the court 
deliberately drew from the general duty of care imposed on the manufacturer by competing tort 
 
503 Id. para. 17. 
504 Id. paras. 53–61. 
505 Id. para. 23. The relevant rules under the applicable Sale (International Sale of Goods) Law of 1971 
were transplanted from Articles 38–40 of the Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the 
International Sale of Goods of 1964. 
506 Id. para. 16 (stating this main question alongside the statement of facts). 
507 Id. paras. 54–69. 
508 Id. paras. 70–71. 
509 Id. paras. 71–72. 
510 It appeared from the facts that a construction company brought a claim against the Israeli importer, the 
buyer, to reimburse the cost of replacement and to pay damages for the reputation. Thus, this thesis 
believes that the Israeli importer, the buyer, suffered pecuniary losses when it sent a third-party notice to 
the seller, alleging negligent conduct in manufacturing goods and claiming the seller was liable for the 
amount paid to the construction company. Id. paras. 2–3. 
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law, which exists independent of the obligation created by the sales contract.511 The Supreme 
Court ultimately upheld the District Court’s judgment, granting the buyer (i.e. importer) the right 
to a concurrent tort claim against the seller and manufacturer for negligent manufacturing goods 
that were sold.512 It should be noted here that the Supreme Court did not suggest the 
circumstances under which the court would believe the requirement of notice under the CISG 
could have an effect on tort remedies.   
3.3 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Doubt regarding the 
Sufficiency of Authoritative Methods of Interpretation 
One must keep in mind that a claim for a breach of any general obligation, that infringes 
on interests that are particularly protected by tort laws, cannot be impeded by the fact that the 
breaching party engages in international trade. Although the compromise approach generally 
grants the parties permission to pursue various claims in tort, the protection under tort law given 
to the parties is still founded upon the regime of the CISG if it is functionally equivalent to the 
relationship under an international sales transaction. However, some scholars feared that the 
methods of interpretation of tort laws, in light of the Convention restricting the application of tort 
laws, would lead to uncertain results in this context,513 especially when lacking specific 
guidelines on how to interpret the two competing norms. Moreover, it still seems to be 
undetermined whether the existing authoritative resources are sufficient for tribunals to rely on 
when ascertaining the methods of interpretation. Skepticism might be raised since only a handful 
 
511 Id. paras. 71–73. 
512 Id. paras. 73, 80. However, the court held that the negligence claim failed because the buyer could not 
prove negligent conduct in manufacturing goods that were sold by the manufacturer. See id. paras. 74–82. 
513 ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 160, at 42. 
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of decisions and few academic writings have recently emerged, exhaustively investigating the 
CISG’s substantive scope and its goals, as well as possible competing tort claims in terms of the 
preemption of tort remedies. This approach thus requires furtherance of the work done by 
scholars and judicial bodies, establishing authoritative guidance about how to interpret the 
CISG’s text together with the contract itself, and then identify the substantive scope of the CISG 
which may overlap with the range of different tort claims.   
4. Deviating from the CISG’s Preemption Problem, and Relying on the Doctrinal 
Characterization of Claims within National Legal Systems 
Apart from the three approaches focusing on the CISG’s preemption and concurrence of 
tort remedies, some US court decisions adopt an entirely different method of analysis. Instead of 
analyzing the extent of the CISG’s preemptive effect on tort claims, the issue of preemption is 
turned into a question of characterization of claims. The courts thus mainly rely on domestic 
rules governing the characterization of claims within national legal systems in making 
determinative decisions.514 Accordingly, the court will hold that the alleged tort claim would be 
displaced by the CISG insofar as the court finds that such a claim is, in essence, a contractual 
claim.515 Notably, one might believe that the rules on doctrinal characterization are somewhat 
similar to the rules and approaches to the right to concurrent claims between torts and contracts 
within national legal systems. As can be seen in the following cases, this is because the court 
 
514 See Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 120183 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009); Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC, No. 13 CV 
4358 (PKC)(LB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2014). 
515 As we will see, there emerge the opinions which deny employing the classification of domestic law as 
“contracts” and “torts” when defining the scope of the CISG. See discussion infra Section III.B.4.2. 
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generally applies the forum law and approach to the right to concurrent claims in order to 
characterize the alleged tort claim.    
4.1 An Overview of Judicial Perspectives 
Two US court decisions exhibit a way in which the courts deviate from the CISG’s 
preemption of tort remedies, and turn to the question of characterization. The first example is 
Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC,516 which primarily relies on the doctrine of 
characterization, which has its source in the domestic legal system to classify the alleged claims, 
and then decisively determine the permissibility of domestic claims. The second case, 
Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd.,517 began with considering and relying on the 
doctrine of characterization, but later returned to counting on the CISG’s scope when handling 
the preemption issue.   
In Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo v. Seneca Hardwoods LLC,518 a United States Magistrate Judge 
provided a Report and Recommendation in the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment regarding 
the permissibility of tort claims alongside a breach of contract claim under the CISG. In 
considering the permissibility of causes of action under tort laws, the Judge denied the negligent 
misrepresentation claim, as well as the claim for negligent interference with the plaintiff’s 
prospective economic advantage. In its analysis, instead of considering whether the alleged tort 
claims fall within the scope of the CISG’s application, the Judge relied on the forum’s law, 
which was New York law in this case. In particular, the court looked at the doctrine of economic 
loss to characterize and determine whether the plaintiff was permitted to assert a concurrent tort 
 
516 Profi-Parkiet Sp. Zoo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71289. 
517Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183. 
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claim.519 Clearly stated by the Judge, the plaintiff’s alleged negligence-based claims sounded in 
contract, rather than tort, and was thus denied.   
In Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd.,520 the defendant, Super Electric, 
raised the preemptive effect of the CISG on domestic tort claims concerning negligence/strict 
liability and tortious interference with business expectancy as one ground for its motion to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s claims.521 The court ruled that under the supremacy clause, the CISG is a 
federal law which preempts any inconsistent provisions of state law where applicable.522 The 
court concluded that the CISG excludes only state law causes of action falling under the scope of 
the CISG, such as state law claims in contract.523 The court held that it is more difficult to 
determine the question of whether the plaintiff’s negligence/strict liability claim, in connection 
with the allegedly defective refrigerator motors, fell within the scope of the Convention and thus 
was preempted.524 Although the court considered and drew from several existing approaches 
dealing with the preemption problem regarding tort claims,525 it emphasized the consensus 
declaring that the CISG preempts concurring state contractual claims.526 Then, the court deviated 
from the consideration of the CISG’s scope, turning to domestic rules527 on the characterization 
of claims, in order to determine whether the alleged negligence/strict liability claim is essentially 
 
519 Id. at *20–21. 
520 Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183. 
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a contract claim in disguise, and is thus preempted under some US court decisions.528 In other 
words, the court turned to the issue of characterization and applied the forum rules on the 
issue,529 rather than applying US case law and approaches which dealt with the CISG’s 
preemption of tort claim over the issue at bar. Notably, all national rules cited by the court in its 
characterization process involve contractual and tort claims, i.e. concurrent claims, under 
domestic laws of contract and tort.530 From what has been explained thus far, with respect to the 
court’s analysis on characterization, this thesis observes that although the court found the alleged 
claim is essentially the contract, it is still necessary for the court to explain the extent to which 
such a claim falls under the CISG’s scope before firmly concluding that the CISG preempted the 
alleged claim. It goes without saying that if the court fails to consider the CISG’s rules, it cannot 
obtain an accurate outcome on the preemptive effect of the CISG, either on a contract claim or 
tort claim.   
The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff, Electrocraft’s, negligence/strict liability 
claim sounded in contract rather than tort, because “Electrocraft ‘concedes that its breach of 
contract and warranty claims are rooted in the CISG’”531 and it further conceded that its 
negligence/strict liability claim was also based on the same set of factual allegations that Super 
Electric had a duty to deliver conforming goods, which it then failed to do, and its negligent 
conduct caused damages to Electrocraft.532 The court further reasoned, 
these are not allegations of wrongdoing that are extra-contractual or otherwise 
amount to a breach of a duty distinct from or in addition to the breach of contract 
 
528 Id. at *16. 
529 Id. at *16–18. 
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claim at issue in this action. Rather, the obligation of the seller to deliver goods 
conforming to the contract and the interests of the buyer to use, consume, or to 
resell the goods purchased, and therefore to receive them conforming to the 
contract, as alleged by Electrocraft, are economic interests that are basically 
contractual and regulated by the CISG and its rules and remedies for international 
sales.533   
 
Although the court, at the beginning of its analysis, referred to domestic laws 
when classifying whether the plaintiff’s claim sounded in contract, the aforementioned 
reasoning, along with the facts in its analysis, show that the court also considered the 
scope of the CISG.534 In doing so, the court considered the protected interest and 
contractual duty imposed by the CISG to reach an outcome for the preemption issue 
regarding the negligence/strict liability claim. Besides, this thesis observes that the court 
took the position of applying the CISG in a way so as to exclude the alleged tort claim535 
that fell under the CISG’s scope, rather than permitting a tort remedy, on the condition 
that it would be subject to the regulatory provisions of the CISG. 
In the same decision, when faced with the preemption of tortious interference, this court, 
however, cited Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l.,536 and concluded that the CISG does 
not preempt the plaintiff’s tortious interference claim alleging intentional harm to economic 
interests, because the Convention is only concerned with sales of goods between merchants in 
 
533 Id. at *18 (citing Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 473). 
534 Cf. Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at 
*42–49 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (performing its analysis, which was made on the CISG’s preemption of 
a counterclaim for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the preemption of a 
claim for fraudulent inducement, in the same way as the analysis made in Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183).  
535 As we can see, the court finally classified the alleged negligence/strict liability claim as a contract 
claim, rather than a tort claim. 
536 Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.r.l., CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-6384, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12347, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000). 
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different countries.537 As we can see, the court in this case believed that the CISG is inapplicable 
to a domestic intentional tort action, irrespective of any other supportive reasons, other than 
adopting the solution proposed by the liberal approach described in Part B-Section 2 of this 
Chapter.538 It should be noticed that the Electrocraft Ark., Inc. case adopted two different 
analyses of the CISG’s preemption of different alleged tort claims. Nevertheless, the 
determinations regarding all alleged tort claims were also influenced by the national rules and 
doctrines within domestic systems dealing with the interaction between contracts and torts. On 
the one hand, the court applied the forum’s law on characterization in classifying the plaintiff’s 
negligence/strict liability claim as a contract. On the other hand, this court, at the first stage, 
qualified tortious interference action as a tort, and thus recognized such a tort claim to be outside 
the scope of the CISG, which would not be preempted by the CISG. 
4.2 Critiques Based on Theoretical and Practical Perspectives: Against a 
Consideration of Domestic Rules on Characterization in Deciding the CISG’s Preemption 
Issue  
The first criticism is that reliance on domestic rules on characterization is arguably 
incompatible with Article 7(1), which requires tribunals to follow the guidance of “an 
‘autonomous’ interpretation of the CISG’s provisions, including those defining the borders of the 
CISG.”539 By recognizing that the CISG does not provide an autonomous definition of a 
“contract” and “tort,” it is further argued that the contents and limits of domestic law regarding 
 
537 Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183, at *24. 
538 This court mainly adopted the expansive approach described in Section III.B.2, even though the court 
also referred to Schlechtriem’s opinion, as stated in his article regarding the question of the CISG’s 
preemption of a tort claim. See also Schlechtriem, supra note 317, at 474.  
539 Schroeter, supra note 427, at 563.  
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the definition of these categories are uncertain and not internationally uniform.540 It is, therefore, 
submitted that domestic characterization must not decisively play a role in, or should not have an 
overwhelming influence on, the interpretation of the CISG’s regulations when attempting to 
identify whether a certain matter falls under the Convention’s scope541 and to assess the relevant 
boundaries of domestic laws. Tribunals must consider the functions of the relevant rules in 
question, rather than characterizing the matters according to the domestic law of the forum. 
Otherwise, applying domestic rules on characterization would encourage plaintiffs to engage in 
forum shopping so as to find the most favorable domestic rules for their case. 
Secondly, since the collision between the CISG and national law is not innately 
considered a complete conflict of laws in the traditional sense,542 it is doubtful that the forum’s 
conflict-of-law rules on characterization are appropriate for solving this kind of interrelation, 
which is not the case in case of a conflict between the same level of national laws.   
Thirdly, following this approach will contradict the notion underlying the express 
provision excluding product liability claims for death or personal injury from the scope of the 
Convention. In explaining, it can be inferred from Article 5 of the CISG that the doctrinal 
characterization should not be relevant in drawing the line between the CISG and domestic law 
on product liability. This general perception should be employed analogically to other causes of 
action under domestic law. Although the discussion by delegates at the Diplomatic Conference 
 
540 Id. at 560. 
541 Martini, supra note 409, at 31. 
542 C. SCHMID, DAS ZUSAMMENSPIEL VON EINHEITLICHEM UN-KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALEM RECHT: 
LÜCKENFÜLLUNG UND NORMENKONKURRENZ 86 (1996) cited in Diana Sewerin, International Product 
Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law 43 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Institute of 
Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with McGill University Library); see ENDERLEIN & 
MASKOW, supra note 160, at 10. 
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supports the joint proposal of Article 5, based on the underlying assumption that whether product 
liability is permitted would depend upon the characterization of “product liability” claims under 
domestic laws,543 it is still claimed that the supposition relying on classification of claims is 
fallacy, since it goes against both the goal of uniformity and the design of the CISG.544 
Moreover, except for the unconvinced presupposition when legislating Article 5,545 it is not so 
evident whether and how the characterization of claims as contract or tort was taken into account 
in the deliberative process of drafting the CISG when enacting the provisions concerning the 
parties’ rights, obligations, and remedies. Essentially, Article 5 is a significant indication that 
exhibits the drafters’ intention to not rely on the different categories of product liability law in 
different systems. To further illustrate, the drafters intended to enact Article 5 to prevent a 
conflict between the CISG’s rules and domestic product liability rules,546 and to preclude 
tribunals from engaging in characterization processes to define the boundaries between the 
Convention and product liability laws. In this regard, it would be consistent with Article 5, that 
in case of doubt, the doctrinal characterization should not be considerably relied on to determine 
whether product liability claims for property damage would be included in the scope of the 
CISG, and would thus be exclusively governed by the Convention.547 Instead, the consideration 
 
543 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 245–46. 
544 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.1 cmt. C. 
545 Some scholars consider this emerging presupposition, as well as the purpose underlying Article 5 of 
preventing conflicts between the CISG’s rules and domestic product liability rules, when addressing the 
CISG’s preemption of product liability. These scholars also opine that the CISG regulates its relationship 
with domestic law irrespective of how domestic laws characterize and deal with product liability. See 
Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 235, at 98, 100. 
546 Id. at 95. 
547 See Herber, supra note 232, at 50 (demonstrating that the characterization of claims is not decisive, 




should focus on the “interests” sought to be protected by the CISG,548 and interests which are 
protected by domestic tort laws. Further, the underlying idea of disregarding the classification of 
claims should be respected when considering the CISG’s preemption of other domestic tort 
claims that seek recovery for property damage or economic loss. 
C. Preliminary Conclusion 
From the series of different approaches presented above, a moderate level of preemption 
seems to be persuasive for this thesis to further optimistically embrace, clarify, and propose a 
renewed legitimate and justified solution to the issue of preemption. For various reasons, this 
thesis argues that the remaining three approaches are somewhat problematic and unconvincing.   
The view of complete preemption should not be adopted because it clearly contradicts the 
drafters’ intention in terms of scope, and it leads to an extreme intrusion of tort as a general law 
that has a broader scope of application than a special law like the CISG. Given that the CISG 
does not acknowledge an explicit preemption, it is likely unacceptable when an implied 
preemption that is normally based on a field preemption549 brings about a complete exclusion of 
all possible domestic law claims. Moreover, the CISG’s main goal of uniformity can be 
accomplished through other solutions, even if the CISG is not applied as a mutually exclusive 
law. Further, it is undeniable that a private law of tort remains necessary for granting civil 
protections in all legal systems, particularly when the factual situations are even more 
complicated than what the drafters perceived when enacting the uniform law. Also, the existence 
of such complicated situations can be proven by other competing views.   
 
548 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 2.1 cmt. 2.1.6. 
549 The situation where national laws attempt to regulate a matter in which the interest of the uniform law 
is so dominant that it impliedly precludes an application of domestic laws to the same subject matter.  
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Although it has been shown that among the four different approaches, the most lenient 
approach of permitting competing tort remedies has been broadly adopted by US court decisions, 
this thesis does not agree with the liberal approach. This is because if tribunals followed this 
view, the outcome would be that any issue which is traditionally classified as a tort or treated as 
an area of tort within the domestic system can be concurrently asserted alongside contractual 
claims under the CISG. Consequently, it is most likely that the CISG’s rules have been put at 
risk of being encroached by the competing tort remedy. This approach thus reflects an ignorance 
of the importance of the CISG’s rules and principles. This thesis also holds that according to the 
liberal approach, domestic rules on the right to concurrent claim appear to be out of place in 
dealing with the question of the CISG’s preemption of tort remedies. As can be seen, this 
solution, in essence, decisively adopts and applies domestic rules governing the interaction 
between the general law of contract and law of tort, which play their functions at the same level, 
to the interrelation between local law and international treaty. Adopting this approach would 
overlook the actual problem of the tension between the supranational uniform law for 
international sales and the general law of tort. 
To prevent the phenomenon of forum shopping and to give regard to the international 
character of the CISG’s rules, this thesis does not support the view that the issue of the CISG’s 
preemption is not difficult to solve, as it is a matter of characterization. Additionally, the 
traditional approach of characterization of claims, developed in the area of conflict-of-law rules, 
is typically adopted to resolve the conflict between the national laws of relevant states/countries. 
Hence, this thesis is inclined to suggest that forum laws on characterization have a dominant role 
only for private international law purposes, in locating the law applicable to all matters, 
 
 158 
including alleged tort claims that are traditionally classified as legal matters outside the CISG’s 
scope. 
For the reasons given above, this thesis takes the view that the judicial bodies of the 
Contracting States should deliberately reconsider the phenomena of the CISG’s preemption 
problems. Also, they should reassess whether a careful analysis is needed, which takes into 
account both the necessity of the CISG’s rules, and the nature of applicable tort rules, 
establishing a proper dividing line between the CISG and tort law.  
From the viewpoint of this thesis, counting on the CISG’s substantive scope and its aims, 
and giving effects to the CISG insofar as the disputed matter falls under its scope, are the 
essential elements for an analysis of the CISG’s preemption. Giving parties the right to 
concurrent tort remedies when a tortious matter falls outside the CISG’s scope is also another 
key element in coping with the CISG’s preemption of a tort claim. The main reason is that we 
avoid a parallel application of competing claims, under unified and non-unified law, to the same 
factual situations, if this will lead to contradictions and the invalidation of the underlying 
purpose of one norm.550 Therefore, the legal solution to the problem of competing norms of the 
CISG and tort law should focus on preventing such contradictions and the unaccepted 
encroachment of both relevant norms.  
As is explained in Part B-Section 3 of this Chapter, there have been attempts by some 
scholars and judicial bodies to suggest a middle ground. This thesis is inclined to support this 
moderate level of preemption, inasmuch as the compromise approach accords with both the 
 
550 See C. SCHMID, DAS ZUSAMMENSPIEL VON EINHEITLICHEM UN-KAUFRECHT UND NATIONALEM 
RECHT: LÜCKENFÜLLUNG UND NORMENKONKURRENZ 84 (1996) cited in Diana Sewerin, International 
Product Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law 50 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Institute of 
Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with McGill University Library). 
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general obligation to give effect to the binding uniform law for international sales, as well as the 
functions of national tort law in regulating extra-contractual conduct and compensating the loss 
for extra-contractual interests. In the following chapter, this thesis will discuss certain essential 
issues which still need to be clarified and analyzed with regard to the approach of acknowledging 
the substantive scope and aims of the CISG. Also, the opinions on those aspects will be 
developed and proposed to make this solution more convincing. That is, an analysis will be 
provided to give sensible answers to the following emerging questions: (1) Can we use the 
mechanisms existing in the CISG to solve the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims?; (2) 
Do we need to identify the inconsistency between competing norms?; (3) What is the criteria for 
considering the establishment of fully overlapping situations in a particular case, which would 
preclude a concurrent remedy under tort law?; (4) To what extent do domestic rules and 
approaches play a role in the disputes concerning the CISG’s preemption of tort claims?; (5) To 
what extent does an exculpatory clause have a legal effect on the alleged tort claim?; and (6) 












IV. OVERALL ANALYSIS AND OPINIONS: ESSENTIAL ASPECTS UNDER THE ADOPTED 
APPROACH OF ACKNOWLEDGING THE CISG’S SUBSTANTIVE SCOPE AND AIMS 
To diminish the risk of undermining the CISG’s fundamental goals, while reducing the 
risk of excessive encroaching on the domain of tort law, this thesis addresses the CISG’s 
preemption of tort remedies especially. Importantly, US tribunals have the power to deal with the 
issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims sua sponte without a request or prior motion from 
either party for consideration of such a preemption issue.551 As is accepted that the objectives 
and functions of both competing norms must be sustained, it is significant to discuss and then 
propose the most appropriate approach to solving the problem of friction between these two 
norms. Otherwise, this thesis is apprehensive that, on the one hand, some jurisdictions tend to 
cope with such a problem based on familiar concepts based in domestic law, particularly the 
extreme idea of permitting the competing tort remedy. On the other hand, some adjudicators 
prefer a radical idea of pro-convention. In addition to the goal of creating an optimal division of 
functions between the uniform sales law and the law of tort, the more important purpose is to 
identify and establish legitimate justifications for applying both norms to the disputes without the 
fear of severely encroaching upon either. 
Based on the analysis made through the preceding chapters, this thesis adopts the 
approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG. According to this 
chosen approach, the substantive scope and aims of the CISG determine the extent to which the 
CISG preempts domestic tort claims. In other words, tribunals must consider the scope of the 
CISG and its purposes to see whether the alleged tort claim, in essence, falls under its scope. If it 
 
551 See Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at 
*40 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014). 
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does, the CISG has a preemptive effect on such a matter. Further, this thesis offers opinions552 on 
the essential aspects under this approach of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope and 
aims to make the renewed approach more convincing. Rules and opinions given by this thesis are 
primarily offered to assist tribunals with the uniform application of the proposed solution when 
dealing with the CISG’s preemption and concurrency issues. Those opinions relate to several 
aspects that need to be further clarified, namely: 
(1) the use of mechanisms existing in the CISG to solve the issue of its preemption of tort 
claims;  
(2) the indication of an inconsistency between competing norms;  
(3) the criteria for considering the establishment of fully overlapping situations;  
(4) the secondary roles of domestic rules and approaches in the disputes concerning the 
CISG’s preemption of tort claims;  
(5) the legal effect of an exculpatory clause on the alleged tort claim; and 
(6) the policy of modifying ancillary tort rules when a concurrent tort claim is permitted. 
Finally, this chapter provides a hypothetical case to demonstrate and solve the disputed 
issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort claims by applying the proposed approach and following 
the opinions put forth by this thesis.  
 
552 This thesis would suggest that, apart from the CISG Advisory Council Opinions, tribunals can follow 
the opinions given in Parts A. to F. when addressing cases under the CISG and the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrency issue is presented. Please note that the CISG Advisory Council Opinions are 
available at http://www.cisgac.com/opinions/. 
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A. The Use of Mechanisms Existing in the CISG for Solving the Issue of Its Preemption of 
Tort Claims 
 The following opinions are provided to answer the question of whether we can use the 
mechanisms existing in the CISG to solve the issue of its preemption of tort claims.  
The principle of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope, together with the policy of 
attaining its aims, are the primary notions underlying the preemptive effect of the CISG on tort 
remedy. In terms of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope, this thesis would say that, 
from a doctrinal perspective, the CISG’s preemption issue is essentially the problem of its scope 
of application, which could be dealt with through the mechanisms provided by the CISG. 
One important mechanism is the methods of interpretation of its provisions under the 
CISG. René Franz Henschel, taking the interpretation of Article 35 as an example,553 signifies 
that the juridical methods of dynamic doctrine and restrictive doctrine can be applied to 
determine the scope of Article 35554 and its relation to domestic tort law. 
For the sake of the constant development of international trade and the achievement of 
the CISG’s aim to promote such advancement, the proposed approach adopts the effective 
dynamic interpretation of the CISG as a predominant method of interpretation to solve the 
 
553 HENSCHEL, supra note 109, at 33–38, 42–48. 
554 René Franz Henschel concludes that the dynamic method of interpretation is more likely in line with 
international law practices and doctrines. This methodological approach is also most likely followed in 
applying Article 35, leading to autonomous interpretation and giving a broad scope of application of 
Article 35. Under this method, ULIS’s historical account and the principles developed by other foreign 
decisions were practically referred to when interpreting and applying Article 35. See id. at 303–04. 
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preemption issue,555 rather than following the idea of restrictive interpretation.556 Adhering to 
dynamic interpretation is justified by the extent of the Convention’s wording and the spirit of its 
rules. Considering the CISG’s wording, it is submitted that the wording of the Convention should 
be interpreted according to the ordinary, logical international meaning and context.557 In terms of 
the spirit of the rules, it is said that, analogous to Article 7, the Convention encourages an 
extensive interpretation of some of its provisions.558 Accordingly, tribunals are permitted to have 
regard for the legislative history of the Convention in order to understand the purpose of the 
CISG’s rules. Moreover, the good faith principle can serve as an important principle that 
supports the flexible interpretation of the provisions in practice.559 It is believed that the principle 
of good faith not only prevents the tribunals from applying the CISG to cases that the drafters did 
not intend for it to cover, but also reminds them to exercise caution before resorting to domestic 
law.560 Further, the dynamic method of interpretation is also supported by the interpretive rules 
under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties of 1969.561 Therefore, 
 
555 It could be said that this thesis also adopts the approach of the functionally adequate solution, as 
suggested by Franco Ferrari. See Ferrari, supra note 466. 
556 The proponent of restrictive doctrine is concerned about giving up national sovereignty and thus 
prefers applying national laws and principles alongside the CISG. See HENSCHEL, supra note 109, at 34, 
36–37, 75. 
557 Id. at 42. 
558 Id. at 42–44. 
559 Ndulo, supra note 170, at 9. 
560 Id. 
561 Article 31 (General rule of interpretation) states that,  
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
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when interpreting the CISG to deal with its preemption issue, tribunals could consult all the 
CISG’s features, including its text, history of evolution, purposes, functions, and approaches to 
remedies and party autonomy as explained in Chapter Two. In this event, this thesis believes that 
the analogical methodology is allowed, to the extent that it does not violate the drafting 
committee’s intention or the Convention’s purposes. 
Together with the method of dynamic interpretation, tribunals can use the main devices 
under Articles 4, 5, and 7 to draw the CISG’s scope and give preemptive power to its rules and 
principles. Article 4 is the main provision to be taken into account in determining the matters 
 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one 
or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other 
parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
Article 32 (Supplementary means of interpretation) states that, 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]; see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 306 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 2018). Please note that Articles 31 and 32 are now generally accepted by the United States as 




falling under the actual scope of the CISG. However, the extent of the CISG’s scope cannot be 
completely resolved by considering and interpreting only Article 4. This thesis particularly 
considers the wording “except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention,” stated in the 
second sentence of Article 4, as the gap-filling device given within the uniform law itself, which 
the interpreter can rely on to form the basis for applying the CISG.562 On the one hand, this 
clause provides an exception for the CISG to govern certain validity matters and property issues. 
On the other hand, it provides the basis for the CISG to govern matters that are not already 
explicitly mentioned in Article 4. More importantly, this concept of an equivalent solution, 
recognized in the wording of Article 4’s second sentence, requires tribunals to observe and 
interpret Article 4 in connection with other relevant provisions. Those relevant rules include, but 
are not limited to, provisions relating guidance on the interpretation of laws and the construction 
of a contract, and, more importantly, provisions concerning other substantive matters of 
obligations and rights to remedies, such as Article 35 and Article 16.563 Secondly, Article 5 is 
another provision that expressly makes the CISG irrelevant when a contracting party claims for 
death or personal injury to any person caused by the goods. Consequently, it assures the parties 
that the CISG will not have any preemptive power over tort rules on claims for those types of 
loss, unless the parties voluntarily bring those claims into the scope of the CISG through 
contractual terms. Thirdly, Article 7(1) embraces the underlying concepts of giving primary 
effect to the uniform rules of the CISG. Undeniably, the Contracting States are bound to apply 
the uniform rules if the CISG is applicable. Also, tribunals are required to promote uniformity in 
 
562 See also supra note 555 and accompanying text. 
563 Chapter One sketches out Article 35’s scope of regulations and protections regarding a claim for 
delivery of non-conforming goods, and describes Article 16’s protection of the offeree’s reliance on the 
offer, as mainly discussed by the scholars. See supra Part I.D (discussing the CISG’s contractual claims in 
terms of the scope of regulations and protections). 
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the application of this particular treaty, which was especially unified. Lastly, given that a fully 
overlapping situation is where both the CISG and tort law get involved, and each has its own 
interest in governing and settling the same alleged matter as described in Part C of this Chapter, 
Article 7(2) is thus key to the problem of preemption. Article 7(2) reaffirms the underlying 
requirement for uniform law being applicable as the first recourse, and then treating domestic 
law as a last resort in filling the internal gap of the CISG’s rules and principles. Such an internal 
gap is explained when the CISG governs the alleged issue, but such an issue is not expressly 
settled therein. Thus, it follows a fortiori from the hierarchy of norms in solving the internal gap 
that CISG’s rules should be given priority in application over the applicable tort law where a 
fully overlapping situation occurs. Moreover, such a rule on the hierarchy of norms reflects the 
accepted juristic method in all legal systems, providing that the special law has priority in its 
application to the same matter over the general law (lex specialis derogat legi generali). This 
thesis also believes that Article 7(2), in essence, prevents tribunals from applying both the CISG 
and domestic law to an alleged matter when such a matter falls under the CISG’s scope. 
B. The Preliminary Stage of Indicating an Inconsistency between Competing Laws  
 The opinions outlined in this part answer the question of whether we first need to identify 
the inconsistency between competing norms. 
This thesis aims to find an inconsistency between the Convention and tort law because 
the CISG and the applicable law of tort appear not to protect some types of interests sought by 
the injured party. Article 5 reflects the situation where there is only one law that has an interest 
in compensating losses to the specific kinds of interests incurred by the aggrieved party. Since 
Article 5 excludes liability from the CISG’s scope, for death or personal injury caused by the 
goods to any person, this means the CISG does not protect such kinds of interests, for which the 
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injured party asks. Therefore, the alleged tort liability for death or personal injury is exclusively 
governed by the applicable tort law.564 In the case of liability for death and personal injuries, the 
CISG is not hindered by permitting tort remedy, because the CISG does not intend to govern the 
alleged matters. As a consequence, tort remedy for personal losses suffered from such alleged 
liability should not be restricted by the protective rules of the CISG at all. Thus, this thesis 
argues that there is no inconsistency between competing laws in the situation where the CISG 
rejects protecting particular kinds of interests, and only the law of tort has an interest to 
compensate losses with these kinds of interests. 
 Turning to the ambit of tort law, it appears that there exists a situation where the 
applicable tort law does not have an interest to compensate damages in specific types of interests. 
In other words, tort law does not protect certain kinds of interests suffering from improper 
conduct. As we considered the tortious actions that are typically brought against parties to the 
sale contract in Chapter One, we found that US tort laws, in some circumstances, do not intend to 
protect pure economic loss sought by parties to the contract for sale. We can see such a refusal to 
protect pure economic loss in tort rules on claims alleging (1) product liability for damage to the 
goods itself;565 (2) liability for negligent breach of duty under the sales contract; and (3) liability 
 
564 Schlechtriem, supra note 272, at 129. 
565 The EC Member State’s product liability law transplanting the EC product liability directive is a good 
example of another legal system’s product liability law, which does not protect damage to the defective 
product itself.  
Article 9 of the Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 states that  
For the purpose of Article 1, ‘damage’ means:  
(a) damage caused by death or by personal injuries;  
(b) damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective 
product itself, with a lower threshold of 500 ECU, provided that the item of property: 
      (i) is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, and  
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based on negligent misrepresentation. Likewise, US tort law tends not to recognize (1) liability 
based on negligent interference with contract or business relations; (2) liability for conversion 
against the buyer’s act of withholding his payment; and (3) liability for tortious breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
By the same reasoning, when applicable tort law does not have an interest in its content 
to compensate economic loss or to grant the injured party the protection in other cases 
exemplified above, we do not find an inconsistency between the CISG and applicable tort law. It 
is thus not necessary to take a further step to consider the existence of fully overlapping 
situations to apply the CISG in a way so as to exclude such tort remedies. Accordingly, the 
alleged matter must be exclusively governed by the realm of contract law for international sales, 
particularly the CISG. In other words, tribunals must then consider whether a fully overlapping 
situation is established, and the CISG thus subsumes tort claims only in the case where tort law 
grants the injured party the protection of interest for which he asks, or protection against the 
alleged tortious conduct. These protected interests could be damages to other property, or the 
economic loss recognized under limited circumstances or permitted in particular causes of 
action. 
 
     (ii) was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or 
consumption.  
This Article shall be without prejudice to national provisions relating to non-
material damage. 
Cf. Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of 
the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (85/374/EEC), 25 July, 1985 (1985), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985L0374&from=EN (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2020). 
However, in practice, there may be a limited range of cases where the realm of the EC product liability 
directive interacts with the CISG, because most claims relating to consumer contracts available under the 




It is important to clarify that this thesis does not propose this analysis to perform the 
function of an “interest analysis” under choice of law rules—that is, to locate which of the 
various domestic laws apply. As noted in Chapter Three, the interrelation between the CISG and 
national law of tort does not present a conflict of laws in the traditional sense. The analysis made 
to indicate the inconsistency between the Convention and tort law is not the same kind of 
“interest analysis” dealing with cases of conflict between the same level of national laws to find 
whose law applies between the forum law or the law of the foreign country. According to the 
analysis outlined above, after locating the relevant tort law that applies to the alleged tort 
claim,566 tribunals should first consider the scope of tort law to see whether such an alleged 
matter of tort is available or recognized within the scope of the applicable tort law. Since the first 
step, in indicating the inconsistency between competing laws, is to ascertain whether the factual 
situation essentially presents an interest that the applicable tort law wants to protect, this analysis 
is somewhat comparable to the conflict-of-law approach of an “interest analysis.”567 However, 
this thesis interprets this concept of interest in the narrow sense, which is restricted to the 
consideration of the content of the laws or the substantive scope of two laws competing for 
application. Also, this proposed analysis of indicating the inconsistency is based on a unilateral 
interpretation of the scope of competing laws. It is premised on seeking a personal or territorial 
reach of the uniform law and the applicable law of tort, in order to ascertain whether both norms 
are promulgated to govern the alleged matter or not. 
 
566 The law which is indicated as an applicable law governing the issue in dispute depends on the conflict-
of-law approach adopted within the forum’s private international law.    
567 See Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 284–86 (1996). 
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C. The Criteria for Considering the Establishment of Fully Overlapping Situations 
This part provides opinions on what the criteria is for considering the establishment of 
fully overlapping situations in a particular case, which would preclude a concurrent remedy 
under tort law.  
As we saw in Chapter Three, some proponents who support the idea of a moderate level 
of preemption still take the position of allowing for the right to concurring tort claims even in a 
fully overlapping situation. Instead of replacing the alleged tort claim in a case presenting such 
an overlapping situation, such views suggest an alternative way to prevent an inadvertent 
circumvention on the CISG’s rules and objectives. To this end, they submit a partial preemption 
of tort remedy, permitting the right to a concurring tort claim in the case of a fully overlapping 
situation, coupled with the method of modifying ancillary rules in tort to the protective rules of 
the CISG as a matter of policy.  
By considering a policy of attaining the CISG’s aims, coupled with the doctrinal 
perspective discussed in Part A, this thesis adopts a different position regarding the degree of 
preemptive force in case of a fully overlapping situation. Inasmuch as the Contracting States 
place great value on the objectives of the CISG’s fundamental rules and are willing to reach such 
a goal of establishing a fair balance between the conflicting interests of both parties and 
achieving the development of international trade when ratifying or acceding to the Convention, 
this thesis suggests that the alleged tort claim should be subsumed under the CISG when a fully 
overlapping situation is established.568 Accordingly, the party is barred from relying on tort 
 
568 Nevertheless, this thesis submits that if tribunals do not adopt this view of replacing tort claims, they 
should at least give the effect of the CISG’s protective regulations by modifying tort rules to adhere with 




remedy. If reverting to tort remedy under the domestic law of torts is permitted in a fully 
overlapping situation, the uniform law’s purpose of creating a fair balance between the rights and 
duties of the business seller and those of the commercial buyer will be completely impaired. It is 
undeniable that the drafters did not intend such impairment because it destroys all attempts that 
had occurred throughout a half-century. Another rationale for supporting such an effect on the 
alleged tort claim is that both parties to the international sales contract should have no concern 
about an impediment to trade and commerce due to the imposition of an unduly heavy and 
uncertain burden of tortious liability. Thus, giving the CISG a full preemption of tort remedy in a 
fully overlapping situation helps to achieve its goal to facilitate the development of trade. It 
encourages a bargained-for exchange and prevents the business parties from liability beyond 
their expectations that they intentionally dealt with through the arrangement of the contractual 
relationship with equal bargaining power. At this point, it is to be critically noted that a full 
preemption of tort remedy in a fully overlapping situation does not mean that when the CISG 
applies, there can be no tort remedy at all in cases brought under the CISG. This thesis defines 
and interprets a fully overlapping situation in a narrow sense, that such situations must be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, as proposed in this part. Clearly stated, this thesis proposes to 
interpret a fully overlapping situation in accordance with the principle of acknowledging the 
CISG’s substantive scope, reflecting that both competing norms applicable to the dispute in a 
single case entirely overlap, and the alleged matter of tort falls under the CISG scope. 
Before analyzing the establishment of a fully overlapping situation, this part begins with 
emphasizing party autonomy and placing high value on the contractual terms as an integral part 
of the CISG. 
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As a starting point, this thesis proposes that the international sales contract has a 
considerable influence on the establishment of a fully overlapping situation. Although the CISG 
is a special law promulgated to govern international sales, it still adopts the theory of party 
autonomy. It respects the parties’ intention to determine their legal relationship insofar as this 
exercise of freedom, especially between two sophisticated commercial parties, does not violate 
mandatory rules or public policy of the relevant countries. This thesis thus suggests that the 
contract should be treated as part of the CISG and has the preemptive force over tort remedy to 
the same degree as those that the CISG’s default rules enjoy. Treating the contractual terms as 
part of the CISG is consistent with the principle of observing good faith in international trade 
when interpreting the CISG’s default rules. Thus, tribunals must consider both the CISG and the 
contract itself to identify the contractual duties regulated and the protection of contractual 
interests granted by international sales instruments. As a consequence, any duties generally 
imposed by other laws, particularly the law of torts, will be considered as a contractual duty 
arising out of an international sales contract when the CISG’s rules or the contractual terms also 
embrace that duty into the realm of the parties’ contemplation. Let us consider the example of a 
case where the parties contractually agree to impose the general duty not to act in the way that 
the parties’ behavior falls below the standard of care and to bring such a duty to the parties’ 
contemplation when entering into the contract. In this event, the parties can incorporate clauses 
into the contract, explicitly imposing on the parties the duty to observe a standard of care in 
performing contractual obligations in order to prevent unpleasant conduct. On the one hand, the 
parties may intentionally impose such liability based on fault alongside other strict liability 
clauses under the CISG. Alternatively, the parties can agree to enforce liability only for breach of 
a contractual duty with fault. To this effect, we could argue that the CISG and sale contract have 
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already embraced liability for negligent conduct, so that such a matter of negligent breach falls 
under the CISG’s scope. 
In sum, given that contractual term is an integral part of the CISG, this thesis thus 
submits that regard must be had to the international sales contract itself when considering 
whether there exists a fully overlapping situation. In other words, tribunals must consider 
whether parties voluntarily address in their contract what kind of conduct is to be regulated and 
in what way to regulate such conduct, or to assume/allocate risks which one party incurs due to 
the other party’s failure to perform the alleged obligation. It is then to be determined whether 
such an agreed remedial solution is adequately equivalent to, or entirely overlaps with, the 
solution provided by the law of torts. 
Then this thesis proposes that a fully overlapping is established in two situations, which 
are as follows: 
First, a fully overlapping is established where the allegation of concurring tort claim 
makes it clear that such a claim is entirely and solely rooted in the CISG and sale contract. Stated 
another way, the allegation of tort claim is duplicative of the alleged breach of contract claim. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6),569 on pleading, also supports the finding of 
this fully overlapping claim. Rule 12(b)(6) grants the party the right to assert the defense by a 
motion to dismiss, for failure to state a cognizable claim upon which relief can be granted. That 
is to say, despite rights to plead alternative statements of a claim and state separate claims under 
FRCP 8(d)(2)(3),570 a failure to satisfy the federal pleading requirement on the alleged tort claim 
is presumed to establish the first situation of full overlap. The reason for such criterion in order 
 
569 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
570 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2)(3). 
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to find this fully overlapping situation is that it is unacceptable to permit parties to re-
characterize the same set of facts alleged in a contractual claim as a non-contractual matter of 
tort liability, which is, in general, not covered by the Convention. Besides, given that the factual 
situations alleged in supporting tort claims are wholly predicated upon the same conduct 
regulated or duty imposed by the CISG or contract itself, it is irrational to apply tort law with the 
presumption against the CISG’s preemption of tort remedy. Still, this thesis emphasizes that the 
CISG’s substantive scope must be principally taken into consideration when considering whether 
the allegation of tort claim is rooted in the CISG, thereby holding that the CISG preempts such 
an alleged claim due to the existence of this fully overlapping situation. Stated clearly, the mere 
classification of a claim as a contract according to the forum’s law on characterization is not a 
decisive criterion to establish this fully overlapping situation. From the viewpoint of this thesis, 
the decisions of Caterpillar, Inc.571 and Electrocraft Ark., Inc.572 on the CISG’s preemption of 
the immediate buyer’s promissory estoppel action and the CISG’s preemptive effect on the 
alleged negligence/strict liability claim, respectively, could be seen as illustrative examples of 
the existence of this fully overlapping situation, as suggested above. 
Second, another fully overlapping situation is presented where the alleged tortious 
obligation and respective interest protected under tort law are the same as the duty imposed and 
 
571 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 681–82 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see supra Section 
III.B.3.2. 
572 Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09cv00318 SWW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
120183, at *17–18 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009). Cf. Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 
Apparel, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53688, at *42–49 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (performing its 
analysis, which was made on the CISG’s preemption of a counterclaim for breach of an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and the preemption of a claim for fraudulent inducement, in the same way 
as the analysis made in Electrocraft Ark., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120183). See supra Section 




the object of legal protection granted by the CISG and the sale contract in dispute. This second 
situation of full overlap is presumably established even if the allegation of tort claim is not solely 
rooted in the CISG and sale contract, or if it is not duplicative of the allegation of the contractual 
claim. Instead, it centers on the elements of the tort claim under the applicable tort law, and does 
not fail to identify sufficient facts to state the claim to relief that is plausible on its face. In other 
words, the separate alleged factual situations supporting tort claims appear to be primarily rooted 
in the regulations and the respective protections under the applicable tort law. Nevertheless, as 
long as the alleged tort claim could also be settled by the CISG, which regulates similar conduct 
and protects the same interest, a fully overlapping situation is presented. It could be said that the 
criteria for considering the establishment of this second situation of a full overlap are (1) the 
existence of the same duty imposed by competing norms–the regulation goal; and (2) the 
presence of the same object of legal protection under competing norms–the protection goal. 
Insofar as these two goals can be reached by applying the CISG’s rules to the alleged matter of 
tort, such a matter essentially falls under the CISG’s scope, and there is no need to apply the 
domestic law of tort to such alleged matters in this fully overlapping situation.  
In finding whether the second situation of fully overlapping is established, tribunals are 
then faced with the essential task of considering whether the duty imposed, and type of interest 
for which the injured party asks for protection under tort law, are the same as the duty 
established and interest protected within the realm of the CISG. As noted earlier, whether a full 
overlap is established must be considered on a case-by-case basis, since tribunals inevitably need 
to consider factual situations concerned in a single case.573 This thesis comes up with some basic 
 
573 For instance, factual situations are especially critical for indicating incidents of a fully overlapping 
situation related to promissory estoppel, as demonstrated in Chapter One. See supra Sections I.B.2, I.D.2. 
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ideas about when both norms are deemed to share the protection of the same interest and to 
impose an identical duty.  
As for the object of legal protection, this thesis submits that the CISG and the sales 
contract are typically designed to protect economic loss. Thus, it is most likely that the interest of 
pure economic loss limitedly protected by tort law can no longer be deemed as an extra-
contractual interest that is distinct from the similar interest protected under the CISG. On the 
contrary, tort law typically protects the interest of safety in life, limb, and property other than the 
contracted goods themselves. Thus, these types of interests are generally considered as extra-
contractual interests, irrespective of whether the party has a contractual relationship or not. 
Nonetheless, there is an exception that the types of interests protected by tort law may no longer 
be deemed as extra-contractual interests that are distinct from the same kind of interest protected 
by the CISG. Such an exception could only be made when it is proved that the parties, at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract, foresee or ought to have foreseen the possibility of suffering 
losses to those kinds of interests, such as losses to other property that is separate from harm to 
the contracted goods themselves. Thus, the parties are deemed to have the CISG’s rules and 
contract, rather than tort law, protect such interests, particularly property interests. Taking the 
cases suggested in the CISG-AC Opinion No. 12 as an example, where the parties foresee or 
ought to have foreseen the possibility of suffering damages to property which is “attached to the 
goods, or with which the goods are combined or commingled, or which are processed by the 
goods, in the normal course of business or in the course of normal use.”574 Thus, the protection 
of damages to such property is no longer considered as one of the extra-contractual interests. 
 
574 CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, supra note 238, r. 3.2.   
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Let us now turn to consider the existence of the identical duty imposed under the CISG. 
This thesis then takes the duty to inform with accurate information as a demonstration of the case 
where both the CISG and tort regulate the same duty. If the injured party alleged a claim of 
breach of tortious duty to inform true information, namely a claim for innocent 
misrepresentation, this thesis would submit that such a duty, which is imposed without the 
element of fault under tort law, is the same as the duty imposed by the CISG on the seller as long 
as the misrepresentation relates to, but is not limited to (1) the nature and quality of the goods; 
(2) the suitability for use or the functions of products for a particular purpose; and (3) the skill 
and ability of the seller. However, the element of negligent conduct or fraud required by tort law 
generally makes particular tortious duty distinct from the duty owed under the CISG, unless the 
CISG’s rules or the binding contract are interpreted to impose upon the breaching party a duty to 
not commit negligent conduct or act in a dishonest manner. 
All in all, the allegation of a claim brought by one party seeking the protection of 
contractual interest against the other party’s breach of contractual duty falls under the scope of 
the CISG. When it is so obvious that the allegation of tort claim is duplicative of the allegation of 
a claim for breach of a contractual duty, the fully overlapping is presented. Similarly, if the CISG 
provides the remedial solution that is adequately equivalent to or entirely overlaps with the 
solution which is provided for the alleged claim under tort law, another fully overlapping 
situation arises and thus leads to the CISG’s preemption of a tort claim. 
D. The Secondary Roles of Domestic Rules and Approaches in the Disputes concerning the 
CISG’s Preemption of Tort Claims 
This part considers the role of domestic rules and approaches in disputes concerning the 
CISG’s preemption of tort claims. 
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This thesis argues that the problem of the CISG’s preemption or the interaction between 
the CISG and domestic tort law is not the same as concurrent claims in contract and tort arising 
from a purely domestic dispute. Such a preemption problem coming out of the transnational sales 
governed by the CISG must be considered as distinct from the problem of concurrency arising 
out of claims within a single domestic legal system. When the CISG gets involved, the answer to 
the question of its preemption of tort remedy should not be provided differently, depending on 
the legal tradition dealing with the issue of concurrent claims followed within the realm of 
national law. It would be ill-suited and out of place if tribunals directly apply different domestic 
laws and approaches in dealing with the problem of concurrent claims to issues of interaction 
between the Convention and tort law. As suggested above, the CISG’s rules, the autonomous and 
dynamic method of interpretation, and the notion of granting the CISG preemptive force in a 
fully overlapping situation, are the key to dealing with the question of whether the CISG 
preempts domestic tort claims. Theoretically, it is nevertheless suggested that domestic laws and 
approaches of either contract or tort perform their subordinate roles in several aspects. From the 
viewpoint of this thesis, allowing those rules to serve secondary functions for only specific 
purposes would comply with the drafters’ intention to leave some matters indirectly related to 
transnational sales in the area of domestic laws. Also, applying domestic laws and bringing those 
laws into play, in a limited way for which they advocate, would not negate the CISG’s objectives 
and functions altogether. Under the proposed approach of acknowledging the substantive scope 
and aims of the CISG, domestic rules and approaches are optimally applied as a supplement for 
four different but related purposes, as discussed subsequently. 
Firstly, the forum rules and doctrines on characterization could be applied, for the 
purpose of private international law, when tribunals engage in the preliminary stage of 
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characterization, and thereby locate the applicable domestic law for the alleged claim. However, 
when the alleged claim is classified as a tort, this does not mean the tort claim is always 
considered to be outside the CISG’s scope and is thus governed by applicable tort law. That is to 
say, the domestic qualification of a claim under private international laws is not determinative in 
deciding whether the CISG displaces such alleged claims under domestic law. Applying the 
forum’s law through the characterization process to decide the question of the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrency may lead to a distortion of either the CISG as the applicable law to the 
contractual claim, or the foreign law applicable to the alleged tort claim.575 Thus, tribunals must 
additionally follow the opinions suggested under the proposed approach and apply the 
mechanisms stated in Parts A, B, and C when considering the issue of the CISG’s 
preemption/concurrency. 
Secondly, domestic tort laws are applicable in considering whether an inconsistency 
emerges between the CISG and tort law. That is, domestic tort law helps with determining 
whether there is inconsistency between two competing norms. In doing so, tribunals must take 
into account the elements of tort claim as required by the applicable tort law to see whether the 
applicable tort law protects a particular kind of interest which the plaintiff seeks, such as 
economic loss. To this end, the economic loss rules adopted within a particular jurisdiction, like 
the US, would be relevant to determine whether the applicable domestic tort law restricts the 
scope of interest to be protected under tort law. 
Thirdly, tribunals apply domestic laws to determine the existence of a fully overlapping 
situation. As suggested above, one fully overlapping situation is where the allegation of tort 
 
575 This view is supported by the discussions and opinions regarding the possible approaches to parallel 
claims arising outside the realm of the CISG. Cf. FAWCETT, HARRIS & BRIDGE, supra note 242, ¶¶ 20.28–
.52, at 1203–13. 
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claim makes it clear that such a claim is duplicative of the breach of contract claim and is, in 
essence, a CISG-based claim falling under the CISG’s scope. Regarding the first fully 
overlapping situation aforementioned, tribunals must first take into account domestic procedural 
rules on pleading together with the supplement of rules on characterization, when determining 
whether the statement of claim duplicates the breach of contract claim and thus falls under the 
CISG’s scope. Another fully overlapping situation, as suggested above, is where the CISG and 
the applicable tort law share an equivalent solution to the alleged matter. Thus, a consideration of 
domestic tort law is required to find what tortious duty and its respective protection of interest 
are, and whether the two aspects are adequately equivalent to the duty imposed and the 
respective protection granted under the CISG. 
Lastly, once it is established that the CISG does not exclude the concurring tort claim, 
tribunals then apply the domestic law of torts to decide the validity or actionability of concurrent 
tort claims and the merits of the case. However, when considering the merits, ancillary rules in 
tort might be modified to the protective rules of the CISG, contingent upon the fulfillment of the 
condition put forward, as stated in the following Part F. 
In sum, tribunals can apply domestic laws and approaches in several aspects, as explained 
above. However, tribunals must keep in mind that under the proposed approach, they are 
principally required to adhere to the CISG’s substantive scope and its aims in making a 




E. The Effect of Exculpatory Clauses on Tort Claims 
 This part turns to the effect of exculpatory clauses on tort claims. 
The issue of the effect of an exculpatory clause576 on tort claims arises only when the 
CISG does not displace the concurring tort action. In a fully overlapping situation where the 
legal consequence leads to the exclusion of tort claim, there is no need to determine the effect of 
the exculpatory clause on the tort claim. 
When parties agree on a disclaimer of contract liability, it is questioned whether such a 
disclaimer clause is permitted and could be raised as a defense to exclude or limit contractual 
liability. Another question is whether such a disclaimer is enforceable. Although Article 6 
explicitly allows parties to vary the effect of the provisions that subject the breaching party to 
contractual liability, it does not state anything about the enforceability or validity of the terms 
purporting to exclude or limit a party’s liability in contract. This thesis agrees with the scholarly 
opinion that the validity of disclaimer clauses excluding or limiting liability in contract is 
excluded from the CISG’s scope by Article 4(a), and is thus left to domestic law, which is 
located by private international law.577 
 
576 Please note that the word ‘exculpatory clause’ referred to in this thesis refers to a contractual clause 
completely excluding the party’s liability, and a term limiting the types or the scope of the remedy. 
577 See also Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., No. C05-5538FDB, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31262, at *3–7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2006) (following this view and applied domestic law 
to decide whether an exculpatory clause is valid); see CISG-AC Opinion No. 17, Limitation and 
Exclusion Clauses in CISG Contracts, Rapporteur: Prof. Lauro Gama Jr., Pontifical Catholic University 
of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Adopted by the CISG-AC following its 21st meeting in Bogotá, Colombia, on 
16 October 2015 r. 4(a) cmts. 4.1–.8, 
http://cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_17.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 
2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 17]. 
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Likewise, when parties agree on the exclusion of a tort remedy, a critical question is 
whether liability in tort may be excluded or restricted by a contractual clause.578 Since neither the 
wording of Article 6, nor the principle underlying the CISG, deals with the parties’ right to sign a 
waiver of tort remedies, the issue of the effect that such a waiver of tort has on tort action is 
outside the CISG’s scope and is subject to domestic law. Similarly, Article 4(a) excludes the 
validity of the contractual clauses purporting to exclude or limit a party’s liability in tort from the 
CISG’s scope. Such a validity issue is thus subject to domestic law. When both issues are left to 
domestic law, it appears to create the conflict-of-law problem that requires application of private 
international law in locating the applicable laws to determine those issues. In that regard, there 
exists one approach that is in the interest of this thesis. Such a view proposes that while the 
applicable contract law governs the validity of the waiver clause, the issue of whether tort claims 
could be excluded or limited is governed by the applicable tort law.579 Accordingly, the laws of 
different countries may govern two such separate but related issues mentioned above, leading to 
dépeçage.580 It may follow that the exculpatory clause purporting to exclude or limit tort liability, 
as a contractual defense, is valid under lex loci contractus; however, it is prohibited by lex loci 
 
578 We can see the example of Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V., which shows that the parties agreed to an 
exculpatory clause explicitly releasing the seller from both contractual liability and liability based on tort 
law. However, the injured party did not allege a tort claim in this case. See Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V., 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31262, at *7–8. 
579 FAWCETT, HARRIS & BRIDGE, supra note 242, ¶¶ 20.53–.58, at 1213–16; see P. M. North, Contract as 
a Tort Defence in the Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 914, 920–21, 931 (1977). 
580 The concept of dépeçage is defined broadly under the conflict-of-law theory to cover situations where 
tribunals apply different laws of different countries to determine different issues in a single case brought 
in a multistate dispute. See Willis L. M. Reese, Dépeçage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 
COLUM. L. REV. 58, 58, 75 (1973). 
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delicti or vice versa.581 To this effect, this thesis argues that tort liability is still maintained in two 
situations. First, the applicable law of contract invalidates the exclusion or limitation of tort 
liability on grounds such as unconscionability582 or violation of public policy.583 Second, even 
though the applicable law of contract (lex loci contractus ) validates the exculpatory clause, tort 
liability is maintained when the applicable tort law (lex loci delicti), on the other hand, denies 
giving the effect of a waiver of tort remedy. This thesis agrees with applying different laws to 
these issues because the admissibility of a waiver as a defense on tort liability is separate from 
the validity of the contractual term. Granting legal effect to a waiver of tort claim would intrude 
into the tort law of a certain country. Therefore, the internal law of tort regarding the 
admissibility of a disclaimer as a defense on tortious action must be considerably respected. That 
is to say, when it appears that the mandatory law of tort prohibits any agreement purporting to 
exclude liability for a particular claim in tort, this vital policy underlying such a mandatory rule 
outweighs the parties’ bargain of interest in the allocation of their risks. 
 
581 The tribunals would not envisage such a conflict of the legal outcomes as mentioned if they adopted 
the different approaches, which prefer applying one law to deal with the effect of exemption clauses on 
tortious liability. See North, supra note 579, at 920–21. 
582 See U.C.C. §§ 2-302, 2-719 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31262, at *4–7. 
583 See 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title Co., 430 Md. 197, 234–37 (2013) (applying 
Maryland law, which generally enforces the exculpatory clause. However, this court also specified three 
exceptions to the general rule permitting exculpatory clauses. Those exceptions are mainly based on 
public policy concerns, which invalidate exculpatory clauses when they are otherwise applicable); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (recognizing public policies 
that underlie exceptions to the general rule permitting term exempting from liability); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (particularly stating a rule controlling a 
contractual term that precludes a party from asserting any claims for misrepresentation given based on 
tort). See generally S. Harrison Williams, Consumers and Remedies: Do Limitation of Liability Clauses 
Do More Harm than Good?, 65 S. C. L. REV. 663 (2014) (proposing a new test comparable to the 
liquidated damages test under the Restatement (second) of Contracts. It is suggested that this new test 
would avoid the burdensome considerations of unconscionability and public policy when determining 
whether a limitation of liability clause is enforceable). 
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The last question regarding the effect of the exculpatory clause is whether the contractual 
clause legally purporting to exclude or limit a party’s liability in contract affects tort action. To 
resolve this question, the method of interpretation of a contract is of significant relevance. The 
CISG recognizes the freedom of contract doctrine. Under such a doctrine, parties are free to 
allocate their particular risks arising from international trade in a particular way. In some 
circumstances, it may be required to prevent the plaintiff from suing in a parallel tort claim to get 
around the exclusion or limitation of liability arising out of the contract. Thus, it could be the 
case that a contractual term purporting to exclude or limit a party’s contractual liability may be 
interpreted to reflect the parties’ actual intent to exclude or limit either contractual liability under 
the CISG or plausible concurrent liability in tort (emphasis added).584 This thesis, however, 
submits that without an express statement or conduct indicating the parties’ true intention, the 
outcome of the interpretation cannot be reached in a way so as to exclude or limit tort liability.585 
Clearly stated, a disclaimer clause purporting to exclude or limit liability in contract is not 
 
584 Compared to domestic laws and approaches to the right to concurrent claims, it is clear that the 
applicable English tort rule denies imposing a tortious duty of care on the defendant if it is inconsistent 
with what has been agreed upon by the parties. See, e.g., Robinson v. PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd., [2011] 
EWCA Civ 9; [2012] QB 44 (CA) 63 (appeal taken from Eng.). However, it is not apparent that US 
courts refuse to impose a tortious duty of care, which is inconsistent with the contractual arrangement.  
585 In light of Articles 8 and 9 stating rules of contract interpretation, and Article 11 recognizing proof of 
the existence of contractual terms by any means, it is submitted that the CISG rejects common law rules 
of the plain meaning, four corners, and parol evidence in contract interpretation. See CISG-AC Opinion 
No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause and the CISG, 23 October 
2004. Rapporteur: Professor Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law School, Camden, NJ, USA. Adopted by the 
CISG-AC on its 7th meeting in Madrid with no dissent r. 1–3, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-
AC-op3.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 3]; see also CISG-AC 
Opinion No. 17, supra note 577, r. 1 cmts. 1.16–.17, 1.20–.21. Thus, this thesis submits that the indication 
of the parties’ true intention covers the statement used in an entire contract and some sort of statement or 
conduct extrinsic to the contract itself. Cf. Clements Auto Co. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 178–
79, 181 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding that a disclaimer of warranty is ineffective to negate reliance on false 
representations made with or without intent to deceive. Besides, this court took the view that Minnesota 
tort law would be distorted if the court held that “under the U.C.C., an action for fraud, based on innocent 
misrepresentation, could not be maintained where the contract validly disclaimed all warranties”). 
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autonomously treated as a means for excluding or limiting tort remedy, unless the parties’ intent 
to that effect is found.586 To this effect, the fundamental rule of contract granting the effect to the 
parties’ mutual consent would be truly sustained. The breaching party cannot argue that party 
autonomy is weakened by creating an ignorance of the exculpatory clause and thereby granting 
the plaintiff the right to remedy under tort law. Further, this thesis suggests that the disclaimer 
clause being interpreted to exclude tort liability must be subject to the domestic law of tort on the 
admissibility/availability of such clause as a defense on tortious action. 
In dealing with the effect of an exculpatory clause, one should bear in mind that the 
applicable law governing the issue of the validity of contractual clause is one of the areas on 
which the law of one country may not be typical of all laws on a global scale. For example, US 
law is extremely committed to the general principle of party autonomy, to the point that the 
parties to the contract, even a contract with a consumer,587 are generally allowed to waive their 
right to all remedies with some limited exceptions.588 Therefore, there is a strong likelihood that 
tribunals will grant legal force to exculpatory clauses under US law. On the contrary, when other 
 
586 See Schlechtriem, supra note 425, at 80. 
587 See Williams, supra note 583 (discussing the decision of Gladden v. Boykin, 402 S.C. 140 (2013), 
which reviewed a limitation of liability clause according to the contentions of unconscionability and 
conflict with public policy). 
588 See Trinity Indus. v. McKinnon Bridge Co., 77 S.W.3d 159 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the 
contractual provision between sophisticated business parties, who possess equal bargaining power when 
providing for a limited repair-and-replace remedy, is enforceable); see also Fifth Third Leasing Co. v. 
Cherokee Pontiac, No. E2001-01628-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 184 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 
2002) (holding that the contractual clause excluding consequential damages in an arms-length contract 
between the parties is enforceable); Barbara Berry, S.A. de C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., No. 
C05-5538FDB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31262 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2006) (primarily treating 
exclusionary clauses incorporated in a commercial transaction as presumably enforceable unless two 
types of unconscionability are established); 100 Inv. Ltd. P’ship, 430 Md. at 232–37 (stating that under 
Maryland law, exculpatory clauses are generally valid insofar as they are consistent with the public policy 
underlying the principle of freedom to contract); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (AM. LAW 




systems adhere less to the principle of party autonomy, in comparison with the US system, the 
disclaimer clause agreed upon might be invalidated by such foreign law applicable to the 
contract. With respect to the issue of the validity of the disclaimer clause, one should also keep 
in mind that such an issue could be solved by the non-binding UNIDROIT Principles,589 if they 
are the applicable law chosen by the parties. One way to reach a uniform outcome to the validity 
issue is to advise parties to agree to the UNIDROIT Principles, which are widely recognized as 
the general principles of international commercial contracts governing the question of validity. 
More importantly, this thesis agrees with the method suggested by the CISG Advisory Council 
Opinion, stating that the validity tests to exculpatory clauses under the otherwise applicable law 
still need to be interpreted and applied in accordance with international standards and principles 
of the CISG.590 Those include not only the distinctive priority of freedom of contract but also the 
standard of fairness in international trade, the autonomous concept of fundamental breach, and 
the principle of reasonableness. Apart from promoting uniformity in the application of the CISG, 
this suggestion maintains the international character of the CISG and supports the observance of 
good faith in international trade. 
 
589 The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016 (PICC) provides some 
substantive rules for validity issues such as fraud, gross disparity, the validity of exemption clauses 
limiting or excluding liability for non-performance, and the validity of liquidated damages for non-
performance. See UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 
https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2016/principles2016-e.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2020) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles 2016]. 
590 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 17, supra note 577, r. 4(b). 
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F. The Possibility of Modifying Ancillary Tort Rules When a Concurrent Tort Claim Is 
Permitted  
When it turns out that the CISG does not displace the competing tort claim, it seems 
justifiable to apply whatever rules in tort appear favorable to the injured party. However, the 
policy concern is raised over whether the right to rely on the parallel claim in tort is a way to get 
around the prerequisites for, or restrictions on, exercising the right to remedies required by the 
CISG. Thus, it seems rationally persuasive to modify some ancillary rules in tort to the CISG’s 
protective regulations, which are aimed at putting a prerequisite for, or restriction on, exercising 
the right to remedies under the CISG. The reason is that those regulatory provisions are 
uniformly formulated to guarantee fairness in the relationship under international trade and 
allocate risks to the parties’ interests in various appropriate ways. Those protective regulations 
include fundamental rules on the (1) requirement of notice, (2) test for the scope of recoverable 
consequential damages, (3) exemptions from liability provided by the CISG, and (4) duty to 
mitigate the loss. Thus, it is worth considering the extent of such fundamental rules, and the core 
concepts underlying these rules.  
1. The Requirement of Notice591 
The notification is considered a crucial concept in protecting the benefits of the trader, 
who needs to know where he stands so he can avoid any possible losses or expenses. Article 39 
imposes a technical duty to give notice, specifying the nature of defect or the non-conformity of 
goods, to the seller. It further provides that the buyer must give notice within a reasonable time 
after he has discovered the lack of conformity or ought to have discovered it. The primary 
 
591 Article 39 of the CISG is arguably one of the most distinctive CISG features. See Schroeter, supra note 
427, at 553.  
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purpose of the notification requirement is to allow the seller to do what he must do in case of 
non-conformity. For instance, the seller would be able to remedy the lack of conformity, conduct 
his own examination of the goods, and gather all evidence required to defend against the buyer’s 
evidence in his allegation of a lack of conformity.592 If the buyer fails to provide the required 
notice, this regulation protects the seller by cutting off the buyer’s right to all remedies provided 
under the CISG.593 Such deprivation of the buyer’s remedies allows the seller to regard the sale 
transaction as the final relationship, thereby relieving the seller from keeping records and 
evidence at hand for a certain period of time, in order to defend himself against potential claims 
from the buyer.594  
It is also important to note that, in any event, the buyer must give notice no later than two 
years from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to the buyer. The two-year 
limitation signifies the drafters’ intent to protect the seller’s rights not only to obtain the timely 
evidence in the dispute, but also to pursue any claim against the person who may be liable to the 
seller for his supplies or manufacturing.595 Given the purposes this notice requirement serves, it 
is a fundamental defense provided under the uniform law, and is thereby typically raised to 
restrict the buyer’s right to remedies in case of liability for delivery of non-conforming goods. 
Thus, we should be particularly aware of its prominence when permitting concurrent tort claims 
that are closely related to a contractual claim for lack of conformity of the goods. One way to 
 
592 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 35. 
593 Id. at 34–35; see FERRARI, supra note 283, at 184. 
594 Schlechtriem, supra note 272, at 131. 
595 United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 11 
April, 1980, supra note 150, at 35. 
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sustain this fundamental regulation is to put this same restriction on the right to such a parallel 
tort remedy. The condition and reasons for an adjustment made to tort rules will be further 
discussed in Section Five. 
2. The Test for the Scope of Recoverable Consequential Damages 
The right to damages provided by the CISG is subject to the test of foreseeability under 
Article 74. This Article defines the scope of recoverable consequential damages available under 
the CISG and sets forth the basic rule for the calculation of damages.596 Article 74 is based on 
the concept of placing the injured party in the same position which he would have been in, had 
the contract been fully performed. Under Article 74, the injured party can recover damages as a 
sum equal to the loss suffered as a consequence of any breach of obligations, including loss of 
profit. Importantly, the parties’ foreseeability at the time when concluding the contract draws the 
extent of damages granted. That is, recoverable damages may not exceed “the loss which the 
party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract, in 
the light of the facts and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible 
consequence of the breach of contract.”597 This suggests that the test of the breaching party’s 
foreseeability under Article 74 primarily intends to allocate risks of loss between the parties to 
the international sales, not a stranger. When both the CISG and the law of tort share the protected 
interest, particularly economic interest, this thesis argues that it makes sense to apply the same 
 
596 Id. at 59; see CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74. Rapporteur: 
Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA. 
Adopted by the CISG-AC at its Spring 2006 meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, 
http://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_6.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 
2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 6].  
597 CISG, supra note 91, art. 74. 
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rule as Article 74 so as to limit the extent of damages for which the injured contracting party 
asks, based on tort remedy. 
3. The Exemptions from Liability Provided by the CISG  
Another protection given for the parties in case of a breach is an exemption from liability. 
This part will address the defense of the exemption from liability based on three main grounds. 
Let us begin with the defense of impediment to performance, which is most frequently raised and 
discussed among scholars. Article 79(1) exempts the breaching party from liability to pay 
damages for failure to perform any of his obligations in the case of impediment (emphasis 
added). However, it does not prevent the other party from exercising his right to other remedies 
he might have, such as the appropriate remedy of the declaration of avoidance. In relying on such 
an exemption, the breaching party must prove that non-performance was due to “an impediment 
beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment 
into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or to have avoided or overcome it, or 
its consequences.”598 As we realized, the underlying premise of liability for lack of conformity 
under Article 35 requires for the seller to be responsible for non-conformity by virtue of 
contractual arrangements, irrespective of his fault in the delivery of defective goods.599 However, 
it is submitted that Article 79 essentially constitutes an exception to the concept of strict liability 
for non-performance of the contractual obligation under the CISG.600 Secondly, Article 80 
 
598 Id. art. 79(1). 
599 HENSCHEL, supra note 109, at 66. 
600 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Part III Sale of Goods Chapter V Provisions Common to the Obligations of the 
Seller and of the Buyer Section IV Exemptions Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 9, at 1128, 1132, 1141; see also CISG-AC 
Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, Rapporteur: Professor 
Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University School of Law, New York, N.Y., USA. Adopted by the CISG-
AC at its 11th meeting in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China, on 12 October 2007 r. 1 cmts. 6–13, 
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exempts one party from responsibility for all kinds of remedies, where the cause of non-
performance is attributable to some extent to the other party. Article 80, based on the principle of 
comparative fault, prevents the injured party from relying on the other party’s breach of duty to 
the extent that the former’s act or omission causes such failure to perform. Thirdly, Article 35(3) 
particularly grants the exemption from liability for breach of implied warranties specified under 
Article 35(2). Such an exclusion of liability is allowed when the buyer knew or could not have 
been unaware of such a lack of conformity at the time of the contract’s conclusion. This same 
basis of exemption applies to the case of a breach due to a third-party right or claim.601 In sum, it 
should be stressed here that the defense of those exemptions from liability is granted based on 
the concept of assigning risks to the party who should bear those risks. Permitting a parallel tort 
claim notwithstanding a successful proof of those exemptions would make this concept of 
assigning risks to the right person meaningless, especially where tort remedy is closely linked to 
the protections under the CISG. 
4. The Duty to Mitigate the Loss  
 It should be noted, too, that besides being granted the defense of exclusions from liability 
for damages or other remedies explained above, the breaching party is provided with the right to 
claim a reduction in the damages claimed, when the aggrieved party fails to mitigate avoidable 
losses. Under Article 77, the aggrieved party must fulfill the duty to undertake possible and 
 
http://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_7.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 
2020) [hereinafter CISG-AC Opinion No. 7] (taking the view that the wording of “a failure to perform 
any of his obligations” is interpreted to include a breach of duty to deliver conforming goods). But see 
HONNOLD, supra note 163, at 477–78 (taking the opposing view that the seller may benefit from the 
defense of impediment where the buyer brings claims against him for failure to perform any of his 
obligations, rather than a claim for delivering defective goods). 
601 Please see the seller’s duty to deliver goods free from a third-party right or claim as imposed under 
Article 42. See CISG, supra note 91, art. 42. 
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reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate loss arising from the breach. The aggrieved party 
must take steps as may be reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate all losses that are not 
limited to loss of profit resulting from the breach. Otherwise, the breaching party can reduce 
damages by the amount in which the loss should have been mitigated. Even if tort law that is 
developed within a single nation has its own rule on mitigation of damages, this thesis argues 
that for the sake of uniformity and certainty of the legal outcome regarding the right to damages, 
modification of tort rule on the obligation to mitigate the loss is still advisable. 
5. The Theoretical and Practical Justifications for Modifying Ancillary Rules in 
Tort to the CISG’s Regulatory Provisions 
All that said, those protective regulations may get involved as the defense to a contractual 
claim under the CISG. Permitting the right to a concurrent tort claim without any restrictions 
would otherwise be seen as a deprivation of the defenses for which the Convention provides, 
resulting in the infringement of fundamentals set by the uniform sales law. Thus, this thesis lays 
a policy foundation for sustaining the objectives of the CISG’s fundamental rules and places 
great value on an equally voluntary bargain of the contract despite recognizing the concurrent 
tort action. This thesis proposes that these fundamental rules should operate as defenses to 
concurrent tort claims as well. In other words, as long as the breaching party in a single case 
could benefit from any CISG defense of those fundamental rules, he should be able to raise the 
same defense to his tortious liability. 
One may argue that tribunals are not legitimately permitted to recognize defenses to tort 
claims that are not included in the relevant common law or statutory tort regime. Nevertheless, 
this thesis asserts that the extension of the CISG’s fundamental rules to the domestic tort remedy 
is possibly permitted, provided such modification is supported by theoretical and practical 
 
 193 
justifications. This thesis holds that modifying tort rules to the CISG’s protective regulations is 
justified and facilitated when the concurrent tort remedy is closely linked to the legal protection 
of interests under the CISG, even if not fully overlapping with the remedial solution given by the 
CISG. Such a close link is found when both the CISG and tort law protect the interest of the 
same kind. As can be seen, such a condition of having the same interest protected is one of two 
pillars required in showing their equivalent solution to the alleged matter – the fully overlapping 
situation. Whenever both the CISG and tort law grant protection to the same kind of interest, it is 
justified to extend the CISG’s regulations to the parallel tort remedy for three main reasons. 
First, proving a close link by showing that both the CISG and tort law protect the same interest is 
sufficient to justify the adjustments to tort rules, because the CISG’s protective regulations are 
most likely to reflect its goals of protecting parties’ interests. Such protective goals include 
allocating risks to the parties’ interests, as well as compensating damages to the party who 
should not bear risks arising out of the international trade. By engaging in the contractual 
relationship, the parties, contrary to the third party’s position, have benefited from sale laws and 
contracts. Thus, it is typical for contracting parties to take any risks arising through their 
contractual relationship, as long as those risks are related to interests in their reasonable 
contemplation. As discussed, this thesis accedes that tort remedy is necessarily permitted when 
tort law still deters and regulates unlawful conduct that is different from the behavior controlled 
by the CISG. However, when tort law protects the same interest as the kind which is protected by 
the CISG, and the party is deemed to contemplate such an interest, the parallel tort claim should 
not be allowed in a way that it is inconsistent with the goals of the CISG’s protective regulations. 
Second, this thesis argues that resorting to the protection of the interest of the same kind given by 
domestic tort law to avoid the restrictions under the CISG violates the duty of good faith. In 
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essence, Article 7 embraces the principle of good faith in international trade. Through the 
method of interpretation, such a principle could be applied to impose on the parties a duty to act 
in good faith, and such a duty is supplementary to other obligations agreed upon by contract or 
imposed by the CISG on the parties.602 Under the CISG, each party is thus bound to not exercise 
their right to the protections coming out of the relationship under international trade in a way that 
is inconsistent with the good faith covenant. Only by means of modifying tort rules to the 
CISG’s protective regulations, in the case where both norms protect similar interests, can we 
discourage an act that is against the duty of good faith. Last but not least, parties are deemed to 
impliedly agree to such modification when both the CISG and the law of tort protect the same 
kind of interest. Typically, the sophisticated business party to the contract is put in a position 
whereby the party can recognize the restrictions on remedies, or the duty to comply with some 
prerequisites for exercising the right to remedies under the regime of uniform sales law when 
entering into an international contract. This thesis argues that the party has contemplated the 
effect that the CISG’s protective regulations may have on the protection of the interest of the 
same kind under tort law when the same party is, at the same time, subject to the other regime of 
tort law. This is to assume that the parties have a consensus on the basis that the party’s right 
relating to the same protected interest will be subject to protective regulations imposed by the 
CISG, irrespective of whether the right to remedy is based on the theory of contract or not. Thus, 
the adjustment made to tort rules could be treated as an implied term of the contract. 
Accordingly, the modification of tort rules, as suggested, does not create an undue intrusion of 
the protection of interest given to the contracting parties beyond their expectations. 
 
602 See YALIM, supra note 109, at 113–21, 194–96. 
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Given all these reasons, it can be said that the parties’ presumed intention to have a tort 
claim conditional upon the reservations and requirements provided under the Convention 
justifies a modification of tort rules. Thus, tribunals are allowed to recognize certain defenses to 
tort claims based on the presumed intention to modify tort rules, although those defenses are not 
provided by tort law itself. However, a higher value of the policy underlying tort law may 
outweigh this policy matter of modifying tort rules. On the one hand, in light of a greater policy 
underlying tort law in deterring outrageously wrongful conduct, this thesis advances an 
exception to such a modification of tort law, as suggested. That is to hold that such modification 
of ancillary rules in tort is prohibited if tort law appears to be principally aimed at deterring a 
particular kind of outrageously wrongful conduct, such as fraud or gross negligence, rather than 
compensating for the loss. Such an exception to the modification of tort laws thus prevents the 
CISG from overly intruding into the mandatory law of tort that purportedly punishes and deters 
extremely unaccepted tortious conduct. On the other hand, this thesis suggests that tribunals must 
take great caution when relying on this notion of the parties’ presumed intention in order to 
modify the relevant rules in tort, thereby giving effect to the CISG’s protective regulations. Such 
a precaution requires having regard for the mandatory character of the applicable tort law. In 
other words, tribunals must consider whether such a relevant tort law system liberally permits 
them to make equitable adjustments to the application of tort law based on certain theoretical and 
practical justifications. 
G. Applying the Proposed Approach to Solve the Issue of the CISG’s Preemption of Tort 
Claims Raised in the Hypothetical Case  
At this point, it is worth considering a hypothetical case of an international sale for rubber 
as an illustration of the issue of the CISG’s preemption of tort remedies. This part demonstrates 
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the legal methods used and the outcomes of solving the preemption issue by employing the 
proposed approach and adopting the opinions put forth by this thesis. 
Hypothetical case: There has been a negotiation between X, a company incorporated in 
Canada, a rubber component supplier, and Y, a company incorporated in the US, a 
manufacturer of end products containing rubber as their main component. During the 
negotiation, Y specified the quality of the rubber components to be purchased. It required the 
rubber to be highly resistant to high heat and chemicals. As for the qualification of heat and 
chemical resistance, X provided the documents confirming that all rubber materials that X 
previously sold to other customers have excellent temperature and chemical resistance. Also, X 
insisted that all rubber components previously sold had never exploded during the production 
process. In fact, X had not been aware that all previous customers did not put the rubber 
purchased into the chemicals with a high temperature. Relying on the statement regarding the 
characteristics required, Y ordered and bought the rubber from X. A sale contract between them 
was drawn and concluded at Y’s place of business in the US. Other than giving an express 
warranty on the quality specified, the parties also agreed in the contract that X has an additional 
duty to perform quality tests of the rubber purchased, in a standard laboratory. Later, it turned 
out that the rubber purchased cannot withstand the heat of the high temperature and the 
chemicals used in production. As a result, the rubber exploded during production. 
The explosion caused damage not only to the rubber itself, but also to other property. 
Moreover, it resulted in pecuniary loss incurred from the lack of end products intended to be 
sold to Y’s customers. Apart from damage to the property, the employees who have worked at the 
factory suffered from personal injuries. Further, Y is responsible for the employees’ injuries as 
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per the employment relationship between Y and its employees. The factory is located at Y’s place 
of business in the US. X has its place of business in Canada. 
Accordingly, Y filed a complaint in the US federal court. 
Y asserted both contractual and tort claims. As for the contractual claim, Y, the plaintiff, 
relied on the CISG and alleged that X, the defendant, is in breach of the express warranty by 
failing to deliver the goods specified under the contract. The plaintiff lodged several other claims 
under American domestic law as follows: (1) claim for damages under promissory estoppel; (2) 
claim for negligent misrepresentation; (3) claim for fraudulent inducement; and (4) claim for 
negligent breach of duty in performing chemical laboratory testing. 
However, the defendant contended that when the CISG governs the international sale 
contract, the plaintiff cannot concurrently assert any claims under domestic laws. The defendant 
argued that the CISG, as the governing international convention, preempts all claims under 
domestic laws. 
According to the hypothetical situation, the CISG governs the international sales between 
Y and X, because both parties have their places of business in different countries, namely the US 
and Canada, which are Contracting States to the CISG.603 Let us, then, suppose that under the 
conflict-of-law rules, the US law of torts is the applicable law to the alleged tort claims. 
 
603 Article 1(1) states that “This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose 
places of business are in different States: 
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or 
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State.” 





According to the facts, the plaintiff-Y asked for various types of losses, including a loss 
to the goods themselves, pecuniary loss of profit, damages to other property, and loss for the sum 
of money paid to its employees who suffered from personal injuries. 
By applying the proposed approach, the court begins with the preliminary stage of 
determining whether there is an inconsistency between the CISG and domestic tort laws. Based 
on the reasons given in Chapter Two-Part B-Section 2.2(2), this thesis agrees with the majority, 
holding that Article 5 excludes a recourse action, regarding personal injury brought by the buyer 
against the seller, from the scope of the Convention. Thus, there is no inconsistency between the 
CISG and the law of torts regarding the alleged tort claims for the sum paid to compensate his 
employees’ personal injuries. Claims for such loss are thus exclusively applied by US law of 
torts. Then, let us turn to consider the right to allege domestic claims for damages to property 
and economic loss. 
(1) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss under promissory estoppel 
Under US law, it is most likely that the economic loss doctrine does not bar a promissory 
estoppel claim. Thus, US law on promissory estoppel has an interest in governing this alleged 
claim. However, the representations constituting the alleged promise regarding qualities of 
goods, at the same time, emerge from or are predicated on warranty of the quality of goods given 
by the binding sale contract. Accordingly, promissory estoppel alleging a committed declaration 
to pay for the consequences of a breach of that promise is duplicative of the allegation of the 
warranty claim recognized by Article 35(1) of the CISG. Thus, a fully overlapping situation is 




(2) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss based on negligent 
misrepresentation  
Let us suppose that the applicable state law of tort has adopted the rule in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).604 Such rule holds a seller, who negligently supplies 
misinformation concerning goods sold, liable for pecuniary loss caused to the purchaser who 
relies upon the misinformation. Also, US law, adopting the rule in Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Prod. Liab. § 9 (1998), holds a commercial product seller liable for harm to property resulting 
from negligent misrepresentation of material fact concerning the goods sold. Since the element 
of negligent conduct required by tort law generally makes the cause of action independent from a 
claim for non-conformity under Article 35, a claim for negligent misrepresentation is not 
preempted by the CISG unless the fully overlapping situation is presented. 
 Neither the CISG’s provisions, nor the contractual terms, impose upon the seller a duty of 
care in communicating information regarding characteristics of the goods. Thus, this thesis holds 
that both the CISG and the tort rule on negligent misrepresentation do not impose the same duty 
on the seller. As a result, the fully overlapping situation is not established, so the alleged claim 
for negligent misrepresentation does not fall under the scope of the CISG. 
In terms of the recovery for damages to other property, the protection of safety of other 
property under tort law is generally seen as an extra-contractual interest. Because no set of facts 
indicates that the parties foresee or ought to have foreseen the possibility of having other 
 
604 Please note that the Restatement (Second) of Torts will be superseded upon completing the ongoing 
Restatement of the Law Third, Torts series, which will have nine components, including the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm. If the applicable state tort law later adopted new rules 
under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 5(5) (2020), there would be no 
inconsistency between the CISG and tort law regarding the alleged tort claim, which seeks economic loss 
based on negligent misrepresentation. This is because the Restatement (Third) of Torts denies recognizing 
liability for economic loss based on a negligent misrepresentation made in the negotiation period. Such a 
claim for negligent misrepresentation is thus exclusively applied by the CISG. 
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property destroyed due to the defective goods at the time of contract, we do not consider this 
kind of interest as an object of legal protection under the CISG. To this effect, the plaintiff is 
allowed to assert a negligent misrepresentation claim seeking recovery for damages to other 
property as a distinct cause of action in tort, alongside a claim for non-conformity.  
As for the recovery of economic loss, namely loss to the goods and loss of profit, it is 
clear that this kind of economic loss purely arises from the alleged negligent conduct in 
providing the statement concerning the quality of goods, which turned out to be defective. 
Accordingly, this thesis would say that the limited protection of pure economic loss given to the 
contracting party by tort law can no longer be deemed as an extra-contractual interest. Thus, the 
negligent misrepresentation claim seeking recovery for pure economic loss is considered as a 
related but separate tort claim under the tort law that protects the same kind of interest, which is 
protected under the CISG. As a result, the governing ancillary tort rules could probably be 
modified to the protective regulations of the CISG if the seller raised the defense to the seller’s 
liability as a merit of the case at bar.  
(3) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss based on a claim for fraudulent 
inducement 
Claims for fraudulent inducement seeking recovery for damages to property and 
economic loss are recognized under the US law of torts. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. 
Liab. § 9 (1998) apparently covers the case of harm to other property in justifiable reliance on 
fraudulent misrepresentation. Under § 9, the defrauded person is permitted to assert a tort action 
of fraudulent misrepresentation against a seller who engages in selling products and makes a 
fraudulent misstatement of material fact concerning the product sold. Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 525 (1977), the seller is subject to tortious liability to the buyer in deceit for 
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pure economic loss caused to him if the seller fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, 
opinion, intention, or law to induce the buyer to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon 
such a statement. Similar to negligent misrepresentation, proof of the particular act of fraud is 
seen as the main element of a tort action of deceit. Thus, it makes this claim independent from a 
claim for non-conformity under Article 35. When the allegations show that the seller’s fraudulent 
misrepresentation was made during the pre-contractual stage and prove that such an act of fraud 
induces the buyer to enter into the contract, these specific allegations make a claim in fraudulent 
inducement arise independently from the breach of contract claim. As we can see, neither the 
CISG’s provisions nor the terms of the contract impose on the seller a contractual duty not to act 
in a dishonest manner when communicating information regarding certain features of the goods. 
Thus, one could not say that both the CISG and tort rule on fraudulent misrepresentation impose 
the same duty on the seller. The fully overlapping situation is thus not established, and this claim 
for fraudulent inducement does not fall under the CISG’s scope. As a result, the CISG does not 
preempt such a claim. Since the recovery for harm to other property is not typically considered 
as the object of legal protection under the CISG, the plaintiff is permitted to concurrently rely on 
the fraudulent inducement claim, seeking recovery for damages to other property as a distinct 
cause of action in tort. 
In terms of the modification of tort rules governing a tort claim of fraudulent inducement 
seeking recovery for pure economic loss, the final result is contrary to the outcome of the claim 
in negligent misrepresentation for pecuniary loss. Although the CISG and the law of tort are 
deemed to protect the same interest of pecuniary loss arising from the alleged fraudulent 
misrepresentation of the quality of goods, the modification of ancillary rules in tort governing 
this related but separate tort claim is prohibited. This is because the US rule on fraudulent 
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misrepresentation mostly aims to deter parties’ outrageous conduct so as not to commit fraud, 
rather than compensating for losses incurred. 
However, it is necessary to evaluate further conditions necessary for liability in 
fraudulent misrepresentation so that the seller’s misrepresentation may be actionable. Those 
conditions include fraudulent character of the misrepresentation, a requirement of intent or an 
expectation of influencing conduct, and the buyer’s justifiable reliance upon the 
misrepresentation.  
(4) Recovery for damages to property and economic loss based on a claim for negligent 
breach of duty in performing chemical laboratory testing. 
According to the facts, the seller is bound by a contract to perform laboratory testing. As 
we can see, the buyer alleged negligent conduct in performing laboratory testing, rather than 
claiming against the seller for loss suffered from the defective goods. Thus, it is likely that US 
tort law imposes a separate duty of care on the seller and recognizes a claim for negligent 
liability for damages to property or even for economic loss.  
As for whether the fully overlapping situation is created, we can see that neither the CISG 
nor the contractual term expressly holds the seller liable for his conduct, which falls below the 
standard of due care when performing the additional duty agreed upon by the contract. Further, it 
is said that the party’s right to damages, resulting from the other party’s breach of contractual 
duty under the CISG, does not require proof of faulty conduct. Consequently, no fully 
overlapping situation is presented, and this claim of negligence does not fall under the CISG’s 
scope. The CISG does not exclude this tort claim in negligence.  
Based on the same reasons provided when deciding claims of negligent 
misrepresentation, the buyer can, on the one hand, concurrently assert tort of negligence, seeking 
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recovery for damages to other property as a distinct cause of action in tort. On the other hand, the 
court could, as a matter of policy, modify the ancillary tort rules that govern this related but 
separate tort claim for negligent liability for pure economic loss. This is because the CISG and 
the law of tort are deemed to protect the same interest of economic loss arising from the alleged 
negligence in actively performing the duty to test the goods. 
H. Preliminary Conclusion 
Among the existing approaches to the issue of CISG’s preemption of a tort remedy, the 
compromise approach of acknowledging the substantive scope and aims of the CISG is the most 
appropriate and convincing one. However, certain essential aspects of such an approach need to 
be further analyzed and developed by this study. This thesis comes up with the proposed 
compromise approach that generally supports the presumption against the CISG’s preemption of 
tort remedy. However, such a presumption can be rebutted in a single case at bar, when the 
alleged matter of tort falls under the scope of the CISG, thereby leading to the CISG’s full 
preemption of tort remedy. Such a position on the CISG’s full preemption taken by this thesis is 
supported by the notions underlying Article 4, 5, and 7 as the leading doctrinal grounds. Further, 
as a policy matter, this thesis suggests the modification of tort rules to the CISG’s protective 
regulations in the case where the alleged tort claim is not replaced, and where the two competing 
norms protect the same interests. 
Under the proposed approach, tribunals play significant roles in interpreting the CISG’s 
rules and finding the CISG’s actual scope, as well as in signifying the scope and functions of 
applicable tort law in each case. This continuing task of interpreting both norms helps to generate 
more resources addressing the CISG’s substantive scope of application and its preemption of tort 
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claims. Thus, it contributes to guidance necessary for the task of resolving the problems of the 





















By considering the CISG’s rules and their underlying principles, particularly Articles 4, 
5, and 7, together with other features of the CISG, including the history, objectives, and 
functions, this thesis develops the approach of acknowledging the CISG’s substantive scope and 
aims as a basis for resolving the issue of the CISG’s preemption of the tort claim. Under the 
proposed approach, the main theoretical viewpoints are that (1) the CISG’s regulations and 
protections, including legal commitments agreed by transnational sales, determine the outermost 
limit of its scope; (2) the CISG is exclusively applied to any matters falling under its substantive 
scope, thereby excluding the equivalent remedial solutions under domestic law; (3) insofar as the 
alleged matter of tort is distinct, or related but separate, from the remedial solutions given under 
the realm of the CISG, the domestic law of tort is simultaneously applied to settle the disputes 
even if a tort claim is connected with the relationship under the international sales contract. The 
study also puts forward a policy perspective about the condition on, and the extent of, modifying 
ancillary rules in tort when the applicable tort law simultaneously governs the alleged claim in 
tort.  
A. Summary 
Under the proposed approach, the rules would be that:  
 an application of the CISG does not preempt the alleged claim in tort that would be 
otherwise available under the domestic tort law of any country. It does not matter whether the 
applicable domestic law classifies the alleged tort claim founded as a contract, a tort, or 
otherwise.   
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 The presumption against the CISG’s preemption of tort remedy is rejected when a fully 
overlapping situation is established. To this effect, the CISG exclusively governs and settles the 
alleged matter, thereby precluding the injured party from relying on remedy under tort law.    
 The fully overlapping situation is established when  
(1) the allegation of concurring tort claim makes it clear that such a claim is completely 
and solely predicated upon the CISG and sale contract. Or 
(2) the CISG and the applicable tort law share an adequately equivalent solution to the 
alleged matter. The equivalent remedial solution can be shown through the presence of two 
pillars as follows: 
(2.1) both the CISG and the law of tort intentionally impose the same duty upon the party 
in regulating same kinds of conducts by the breaching party and 
(2.2) the protection of interest granted to the injured party by tort law is the same as that 
interest of the kind for which the CISG provides. 
By adopting the rule stated above, the CISG is applied in a way so as to exclude a 
concurring tort claim only in the situation of full overlap. Before considering the existence of a 
fully overlapping situation, tribunals should consider whether there is an inconsistency between 
competing norms of the CISG and the law of tort. If only one norm intends to compensate losses 
for particular kinds of interest or to give protection against the alleged wrongful conduct, there 
will be no inconsistency which needs to be solved by taking the additional step of considering 
the fully overlapping situation. Accordingly, only such a pertinent norm, which has an interest in 
its content to compensate losses to such kinds of interest or to protect against the alleged 
conduct, governs the alleged claim exclusively. However, if both the CISG and the law of tort 
intend to protect the party seeking damages for particular kinds of interest against particular 
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wrongful conduct, tribunals are required to consider whether a fully overlapping situation is 
established. 
Two situations of full overlap could be proved according to the rule stated above. In 
indicating the fully overlapping situation, tribunals must interpret the CISG’s rules. At the stage 
of interpretation, tribunals are required to rely on specific guidance for the method of 
autonomous interpretation, and to take into account the contractual terms and all relevant 
provisions possibly related to the alleged claim, so as to uncover the CISG’s substantive scope 
and thus identify the remedial solutions provided under the Convention. Then, tribunals are also 
charged with the essential task of investigating the applicable law of tort to examine the elements 
of action and to specify the scope of regulations and protections given to the alleged tort claim.   
According to the proposed approach, the CISG’s rules and methodology, in particular the 
idea of the hierarchy of rules underlying Article 7(2), decisively deals with the issue of its 
preemption. Neither the rules on doctrinal characterization, nor the domestic rules or principles 
on the right to concurrent claim, have a considerable influence on the decisive determination of 
how the CISG interacts with tort law. Nevertheless, the doctrinal characterization of claims still 
serves its function for the primary process of locating law applicable to the alleged tort claim. 
Likewise, domestic rules or principles on the right to concurrent claim have operated as part of 
tort law in three respects. Firstly, those rules and principles are considered to indicate the 
inconsistency between competing norms, identifying whether the applicable tort law intends to 
protect the particular interest, especially the economic loss suffered from the alleged tortious 
conduct, or whether it recognizes a particular claim in tort. Secondly, domestic tort laws are 
considered in order to find the existence of a fully overlapping situation. Lastly, once it is 
established that the CISG does not preempt the alleged tort claim, the validity of concurrent tort 
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claims, including the merits of the case, would be subject to the law of torts. Given that the 
defense of the exculpatory clause is concerned, the domestic law of contract and the law of tort 
govern the questions of whether the disclaimer is valid and whether it is admissible as a defense 
on tort liability, respectively. However, the method of interpretation of contract under the CISG 
remains applicable when discovering the parties’ intent to exclude or limit their liability, 
particularly tortious liability.605   
Under the proposed approach, it could be said that in the constellation of international 
sales governed by the CISG, the injured party is provided with two types of concurrent tort 
claims. The first one is a distinct cause of action in tort, which is a situation where the concurring 
claim in tort is completely distinct from the contractual claim of the CISG. The second one is a 
related, but separate, tort claim. It is considered related because there exists one of the elements 
required to establish a fully overlapping situation, i.e. either the existence of the same duty 
imposed or the presence of the same protected interest. 
Given that the CISG does not preempt the aforementioned two types of concurrent tort 
claims, this thesis submits that the plaintiff can be granted all the provided remedies under both 
the CISG and the domestic law of tort. However, the plaintiff will not have a double recovery. 
Alternatively, the plaintiff can otherwise exercise a choice, as it sees appropriate. As a matter of 
policy, in maintaining the goal of creating fairness between both parties and achieving the 
development of international trade through the uniform application of its regulatory provisions, 
tribunals are justifiably permitted to modify some auxiliary rules in tort to the CISG’s protective 
rules, provided that both the CISG and tort law protect similar kinds of interests. However, an 
 




exception to such a modification of tort law is advanced when tort law embraces a relatively 
highly valued policy in deterring outrageously wrongful conduct. Additionally, this thesis 
suggests that tribunals must consider whether such a relevant tort law system liberally permits 
them to make equitable adjustments to the application of tort law based on certain justifications, 
e.g., the parties’ presumed intent on modifying rules in tort. 
All in all, this thesis hopes to develop a more appropriate solution to criticism606 
regarding the interaction between the uniform sales law and possibly concurrent domestic law 
remedies, particularly those based on tort laws. This approach accords with both the international 
spirit of the Convention and the essential functions of tort laws. These proposed rules on the 
CISG’s preemption of tort remedy not only promote the uniform application of international 
rules on transnational sales, but also uphold the separate functions of tort laws either in 
regulating improper behavior or in protecting the injured party’s extra-contractual interests. 
Consequently, the traders would mostly have their rights and obligations protected by both the 
uniform sale law and the law of tort. Finally, it comes as no surprise that applying the proposed 
approach to the preemption issue at bar to different cases may produce a different outcome. This 
is because there cannot be a one-size-fits-all answer to the issue of preemption. Following the 
opinions suggested and applying the mechanisms put forth in Chapter Four, a different result 
could emerge either when (1) there is only one pertinent norm of either the CISG or national tort 
law that has an interest in governing the alleged claim; (2) the CISG applies exclusively to the 
alleged matter in dispute and thus excludes domestic claim in tort; or (3) tort law applies to the 
alleged tort claim concurrently with the CISG’s rules governing contractual claim. The 
possibility of diverse outcomes depends on the different circumstances and factual situations 
 
606 See Schwenzer, supra note 320, at 470–71. 
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concerned in a single case, as well as on the range of different tort laws applicable to the alleged 
claim. Given that the US law of torts has been analyzed, as an illustration, it is always advisable 
to adopt those viewpoints, rules, and opinions even though the applicable tort law is that of a 
foreign country, rather than US law. 
B. Avenues for Further Study and Research 
As is arguably suggested by this thesis, contractual terms greatly influence the extent to 
which parties can rely on a concurring tort claim which would otherwise be available under 
domestic tort law. This is not to deny that the proposed approach poses relevant questions on the 
rules and methodology, and to what extent the international sales contract is interpreted. 
Determining the meaning of the contract or the parties’ actual or presumed intent is not simple, 
especially when international sophisticated commercial parties are typically engaged in 
sequences of negotiations, course of dealing, and usages of trade in the international context. 
Also, the different characteristics of the parties, as well as their different backgrounds in 
language, legal, and cultural systems may play a role in determining the meaning of the contract 
so as to apprehend it fully. Thus, it is worthy of exploring and analyzing the rules and methods of 
interpretation of the international commercial contract, particularly of international sales 
contracts. For the sake of the development of rules and methods for interpreting transnational 
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INTERNATIONALEN WARENKAUF, CISG KOMMENTAR (Peter Schlechtriem ed., Munich: 
 
 230 
C.H. Beck 1990) cited in Diana Sewerin, International Product Liability Law and Uniform 
Sales Law (Mar. 2000) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Institute of Comparative Law McGill 
University) (on file with McGill University Library). 
Oberlandesgericht München, 9 August 1995, IPRax 1997, 38, No. 7 U 7143/92 cited in Diana 
Sewerin, International Product Liability Law and Uniform Sales Law (Mar. 2000) 
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Institute of Comparative Law McGill University) (on file with 
McGill University Library). 
 
INTERNET SOURCES 
Australia 17 January 2003 Supreme Court of Western Australia (Ginza Pte Ltd v. Vista 
Corporation Pty Ltd) (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:30 PM), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030117a2.html. 
Austria 13 April 2000 Supreme Court (Machines case) (Aug. 7, 2020, 10:19 PM), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000413a3.html. 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 3, Parol Evidence Rule, Plain Meaning Rule, Contractual Merger Clause 
and the CISG, 23 October 2004. Rapporteur: Professor Richard Hyland, Rutgers Law 
School, Camden, NJ, USA. Adopted by the CISG-AC on its 7th meeting in Madrid with 
no dissent, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op3.html (last visited Aug. 20, 
2020). 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74. Rapporteur: Professor 
John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA. 




visited Aug. 25, 2020). 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG, 
Rapporteur: Professor Alejandro M. Garro, Columbia University School of Law, New 
York, N.Y., USA. Adopted by the CISG-AC at its 11th meeting in Wuhan, People’s 
Republic of China, on 12 October 2007, 
http://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_7.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2020). 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 12, Liability of the Seller for Damages Arising Out of Personal Injuries 
and Property Damage Caused by Goods and Services under the CISG, Rapporteur: 
Professor Hiroo Sono, School of Law, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. Adopted by 
the CISG Advisory Council following its 17th meeting, in Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA, 
on 20 January 2013, 
http://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_12.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 17, Limitation and Exclusion Clauses in CISG Contracts, Rapporteur: 
Prof. Lauro Gama Jr., Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Adopted by 
the CISG-AC following its 21st meeting in Bogotá, Colombia, on 16 October 2015, 
http://cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_17.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
CISG-AC Opinion No. 19, Standards and Conformity of the Goods under Article 35 CISG, 
Rapporteur: Professor Djakhongir Saidov, King’s College London, United Kingdom. 
Adopted by the CISG Advisory Council following its 25th meeting, in Aalborg Denmark, 
 
 232 
on 25 November 2018, 
https://www.cisgac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_19d.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, Montreal, 28 
May, 1999 (1999), 
https://www.iata.org/contentassets/fb1137ff561a4819a2d38f3db7308758/mc99-full-
text.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 
Warsaw, 12 Oct., 1929 (1929), http://library.arcticportal.org/1588/1/Warsaw1929.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, Hague, 1 July, 1964 
(1964), https://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1964ulis/convention-international-
sale-goods1964.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (85/374/EEC), 25 July, 
1985 (1985), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31985L0374&from=EN (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
Israel 17 March 2009 Supreme Court (Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd) (Aug. 7, 
2020, 1:04 PM), http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090317i5.html. 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, 
https://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2016/principles2016-e.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2020). 
 
 233 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Texts and Status: International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) and Related Transactions (Aug. 2, 2020, 9:25 PM), 
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg.   
United Nations Conference on Contracts of the International Sale of Goods, Vienna, 10 March – 
11 April, 1980 (1980), https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19-
ocred-e.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2020). 
 
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 
Comments by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/125 and A/CN.9/125/Add.1 to 3 (1977), 
reprinted in [1977] 8 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. 109, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.    
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Tenth 
Session, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/32/17 (1977), reprinted in 
[1977] 8 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.    
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.  
U.N. Secretary-General, Analysis of Comments by Governments and International Organizations 
on the Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods as Adopted by the Working 
Group on the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/126 (1977), reprinted in 
[1977] 8 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. Y.B. 142, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.    
















Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD), Indiana University Maurer School of Law, United States     September 2020 
• Dissertation Title: “The Preemptive Effect of the CISG on Tort Claims under US Law” 
Master of Laws (LLM Thesis Program), Indiana University Maurer School of Law, United States           2017 
• (summa cum laude) 
• Thesis Title: “The Concurrent Liability in Contract and Tort Under U.S. and English 
Law: To What Extent Plaintiff Is Entitled to Recover for Damages Under Tort Claim?” 
Certificate of completion of the Legal English Course, Intensive English Program, Indiana University      2016 
Master of Laws in Private Law, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand       2011 
• Thesis Title: “Juristic Person’s Liabilities for Representative’s Actions” 
Barrister-at-Law, Institute of Legal Education, Thai Bar Association, Bangkok, Thailand     2007 
Bachelor of Laws, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand         2006 




Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University              2006-2016 
• gave a lecture to groups of undergraduate students.   
• Subjects taught:  
§ Introduction to Law and Legal System. 
§ Juristic Act and Contract. 
§ Specific Contracts. 
§ Judicial System and General Principles of Procedural Law. 
Member, the Committee of Academic Affairs, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University         2010-2016 
• provided academic guidance and course selection assistance to  
undergraduate students.  
Member, the Committee of Student Affairs, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University          2008-2016 
• supervised students regarding extracurricular activities and worked with  
groups of students on academic projects.   
Member, the Committee of National Moot Court Competition organized by Faculty of Law, Thammasat 
University, the Office of the Judiciary of Thailand, the Office of the Attorney General of Thailand and Lawyers 
Council of Thailand                                              2014             
• managed inaugural competition and formulated the simulated cases used for  
oral pleadings in competitions. 
Member, the Committee of the Faculty of Law’s Developing Plan, Thammasat University.      2008-2014 
• created and managed educational developing plan. 
Research Assistant, Thammasat University Research and Consultancy Institute           2010-2014 
 
• researched projects on: 
§ The Resolutions to the Disputes regarding the Rights over Lands in National Forest 
Reserve Areas in Thailand: Case Studies regarding the Overlapping Rights over 
Lands in the National Forest Reserve Areas in Ratchakrut Subdistrict, Mueang 
Ranong District, Ranong Province. 
§ Restorative Justice Process in Court of Justice. 
Secretary, Thammasat University Legal Aid Center, Bangkok, Thailand           2010-2012 





The Outstanding Academic Achievement, Indiana University Maurer School of Law            2016-2017 
Highest Grade in Advanced Legal Research (Spring, 2017), Indiana University Maurer School of Law        2017 
Highest Grade in Employment Law (Spring, 2017), Indiana University Maurer School of Law           2017 
Highest Grade in Introduction to Law (Summer, 2016), Indiana University Maurer School of Law         2016 
Sanya Dharmasakti Prize for Outstanding Students, Sanya Dharmasakti Foundation      2008 
The Certificate of Merit in Recognition of Distinguished Participation in Social Activities, 
Faculty of Law, Thammasat University            2005 
The Certificate for Academic Excellence, Thammasat University           2003-2005 





• “An Interpretation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540: The 
Protection of Communities’ Rights,” Thammasat Rapee Journal, 2007 
Research papers: 
• Kamolvan Chiravisit and Phutchaya Numngern, “Legal Validity and Consequences of 
Declarations of Intention When a Person Who Made the Declaration of Intention Dies, 
Becomes Incompetent or Quasi-incompetent By Courts’ Orders,” (Research Paper, 
Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, 2013)  
• Narong Jaiharn, Phutchaya Numngern, Napat Soraat and Sawatree Suksri, “The 
Development of Law and Regulations to enhance the System of the Protection and 
Assistance for Injured Persons, Alleged Offenders and Defendants in Criminal Cases 
according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 and Universal 
Standards,” (Research Paper, Rights and Liberties Protection Department, Ministry of 
Justice, 2013) 
• Narong Jaiharn, Phutchaya Numngern, Napat Soraat and Sawatree Suksri, “State 
Compensation Schemes for Wrongful Convictions: Judicial remedy to the Wrongfully 
Convicted Defendant,” (Research Paper, Rights and Liberties Protection Department, 
Ministry of Justice, 2012)  
• Matalak Orungrote and Phutchaya Numngern, “Curriculum for Competent official, 
Inquiry official and Mediator according to Domestic Violence Victim Protection Act, B.E. 
2550,” (Research Paper, Department of Women’s Affairs and Family Development, 
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, 2008) 
 
